Temporary injunction modified in high-profile rental housing case

for rentThe  long-running dispute between the City of Dallas and the Topletz family, which owns a number of residential rental properties, reappeared in the case of Topletz v. City of Dallas. The Fifth Court substantially affirmed a temporary injunction in favor of the City and a class of tenants, reversing as to one provision that “prohibits appellants from raising rent, properly initiating eviction proceedings, or evicting . . . without leave of the trial court.” This provision was overly broad because it “enjoins activities the appellants otherwise have a legal right to perform . . . .” No. 05-16-00741-CV (April 6, 2017) (mem. op.) (citing, inter aliaWebb v. Glenbrook Owners Ass’n, Inc., 298 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2009, no pet.)).

Attorneys Immune in Collection Case

immune defense

Echoing a line of cases from the Fifth Circuit about attorney immunity, and applying the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in Cantey Hanger LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015), the Fifth Court affirmed a summary judgment for a law firm involved in a foreclosure, noting: “The evidence shows Mackie Wolf provided appellants with a copy of the original note that appellants executed and all actions taken by Mackie Wolf were made in connection with its representation of its clients, BONY and Ocwen. The actions taken by Mackie Wolf that are the subject of this litigation—obtaining the note and presenting it to appellants—are the kinds of actions that are part of the discharge of an attorney’s duties in representing a party.” Santiago v. Mackie Wolf, No. 05-16-00394-CV (March 10, 2017) (mem. op.)

A good year for scire facias

scire faciasThe writ of “scire facias” made one of its rare appearances in City of Dallas v. Ellis, after ten years passed from rendition of judgment, and the two-year grace period for a writ of scire facias expired as well. Unfortunately for the judgment debtor, under another provision of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code, the grace period does not expire for a judgment held by an incorporated city. The debtor did not persuade the Fifth Court that the city’s case should be viewed as one for subrogation that could potentially avoid that provision. No. 05-16-00348-CV (Feb. 17, 2017) (mem. op.)

FED Refresher

jp logo2Appeals from forcible entry and detainer actions are common and we do not ordinarily report on them, but it has been some time since we last noted a summary of key principles. A good one appears in the recent case of McCall v. Fannie Mae, in which the appellant alleged improprieties about the relevant foreclosure sale. “But,” noted the Fifth Court, “the deed of trust expressly created a landlord and tenant-at-sufferance relationship when the property was sold by foreclosure. This provided an independent basis to determine the issue of immediate possession without resolving the issue of title. As we have explained, any defects in the foreclosure process . . .  may be pursued in a suit for wrongful foreclosure or to set aside the substitute trustee’s deed, but they are not relevant in this forcible detainer action.” No. 05-16-00010-CV (Jan. 20, 2017) (mem. op.)