The National Court Reporters Association recently published a fascinating “white paper” about “ethical and legal issues related to the use of artificial intelligence … and digital audio recording of legal proceedings.” It’s succinct, thoughtful, and raises questions relevant to just about any area of law practice or court administration that’s touched by the influence of generative AI and related technologies.

A deadline issue, based on the interplay of Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 and the TCPA, was resolved against the timeliness of a TCPA motion in In re Petition of Oak Creek Investments:

Rule 202 ensures that the persons to be deposed have at least 15 days’ notice of the hearing, served “in accordance with Rule 21a.” See id. But the rule does not condition effective service on the inclusion of a hearing date in the petition. We conclude that appellants’ TCPA motion, filed more than 60 days after service of appellees’ Rule 202 petition, was untimely.

No. 05-22-00477-CV (Jan. 6, 2013) (mem. op.).

“[A]ppellants assert that the order disposes of all issues based, in part, on language at the end of the order stating that ‘[a]ll other relief not expressly provided for herein is DENIED.’ The Texas Supreme Court, however, has specifically rejected such language as an indicator of an order’s finality, concluding that when, as here, no conventional trial on the merits has occurred, an order is final for purposes of appeal only if it ‘actually disposes of every pending claim and party’ or ‘clearly and unequivocally states’ it finally disposes of all parties and claims. Because the order here leaves the amount of attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs to be determined, it is not final and appealable.” Page v. 3838 Oak Lawn, No. 05-21-00859-CV (Oct. 29, 2021) (mem. op.) (applying Lehman v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001)). My LPHS colleagues Sam Hardy and Dan Polese represented the successful movant in this matter.

The Who memorably asked, “Who Are You?” In that spirit, the case of MBM Family Trust No. 1 v. GE Oil & Gas, LLC examined a claim that a trustee had acted solely in her individual capacity, rather than in her trustee capacity, and was thus not subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas in a judgment-collection lawsuit. Whatever theoretical force this argument may have had, the Fifth Court found that it lacked support in the testimony presented, which did not draw this distinction and which also presented credibility issues that the judge had resolved against the appellant. No. 05-20-01103-CV (Sept. 17, 2021) (mem. op.).

The Texas Supreme Court’s longtime staff attorney for public information, Osler McCarthy, retires on August 31 after many years of dedicated service. I wanted to salute his hard work and share a well-written tribute to him recently prepared by former Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson.

The dispute between Governor Abbott’s GA-38 order, on the one hand, and Judge Tonya Parker’s TRO / County Judge Clay Jenkins’ recent COVID order, on the other, has led to the filing of a mandamus petition in the Fifth Court on the Governor’s behalf. It is accompanied by a request for emergency relief that requests a ruling by Friday afternoon.

If you are an email subscriber to this blog’s new posts, or subscribe to its RSS feed, please know that Google has discontinued its “Feedburner” service, so 600Commerce is converting to a similar (but hopefully much improved) service offered by “Follow.it.” With luck, the transition will be seamless. But if you experience a loss of service – or the opposite problem of multiple deliveries – please notify me at dcoale@lynnllp.com. Many thanks for subscribing

CNN recently reported on a Capitol rioter who was turned in by an unimpressed Bumble match (right). This story illustrates precisely the kind of “red-blue” interaction (admittedly, with less romanticism) that jury service forces when it brings together people of different backgrounds and interactions.  These interactions are increasingly important in our divided times, and have taken on new dimensions after the difficult year of 2020. I discuss this topic (jury selection, not date-getting) with top jury consultant Jason Bloom in the most recent episode of the Coale Mind podcast.

This week on the “Coale Mind” podcast, I had top-flight jury consultant Jason Bloom as a special guest; in the episode we touch on the many pervasive effects that 2020 will have on jurors and jury selection, including:

– A surprising eagerness of people to show up and serve on juries, in part driven by widespread feelings of frustration after months of shutdown;

– Concern about what Jason calls the “massive exercise in confirmation bias” that potential jurors bring to the courthouse with them, depending on how restricted a juror’s information sources may be;

– The once-obscure psychological terms “ultracrepidarian” and “pareidolia” (you have to listen to the podcast to explore those terms’ meaning 🙂;

– Remembering that 2020 changed potential jurors not only because of COVID, but because of Black Lives Matter, the Biden-Trump election and its aftermath, etc.

– And a reminder that jury service—unlike the similar civic-engagement exercise of voting—forces jurors to form a consensus among their different beliefs; and

– Why 1-page written questionnaires for potential jurors may be particularly useful now in light of the above issues.

This is a cross-post from 600Camp, which follows commercial litigation in the Fifth Circuit.

The DC Circuit’s recent style manual amendment that criticized the use of “Garamond” font has drawn national attention. As this matter has now become a pressing issue facing the federal courts, 600Camp weighs in with these thoughts, all of which are written in 14-point size:

Accordingly, if you really like Garamond and are writing a brief with a word limit rather than a page limit, you should consider bumping the size up to 15-point. And of course, in a jurisdiction with page limits rather than word limits, Garamond offers a way to add more substance to your submission–but be careful that this extra substance does not come at the price of less visibility.

A vote is underway – eight new Texas Disciplinary Rules have been proposed, and the supreme court has authorized a State Bar membership vote about them. This page has information about the proposed rules.

Please check out my new podcast, Coale Mind, where once a week I talk about constitutional and other legal issues of the day. This forum lets me get into more detail than other media appearances, while also approaching issue from a less technical perspective than blogging and other professional writing. I hope you enjoy it and choose to subscribe! Available on Spotify, Apple, and other such services.

In this election year, the State Bar’s Judicial Poll has special significance – if you have not voted yet and can’t locate the email from the Bar about it, just click here for your  ballot by February 4.

In an artful scramble to avoid Dyer v Medoc Health Services, 573 S.W.3d 418, 424 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2019, pet. denied), the movant abandoned the argument that the relevant business communications dealt with “a matter of public concern,” and instead focused on whether the communications were in connection with “a good, product, or service in the marketplace” — namely, workplace complaints about the plaintiff. The panel majority was not persuaded, concluding that “[t]he allegations against Damonte clearly are not based on, related to, or in response to conversations Damonte purportedly had with employees about problems they were having with the company,” and that “nothing in Hallmark’s lawsuit suggests are predicated on anything other than Damonte’s alleged involvement in a scheme to misappropriate and use Hallmark’s confidential information.” A concurrence cautioned that “[t]he majority opinion should not be construed to mean the content of the communication at issue must itself be defamatory or actionable” to be actionable. No. 05-18-00874-CV (July 12, 2019) (mem. op.)

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.

The 600Camp blog has a page of my tips about legal writing; several of those tips involve different tests to eliminate unhelpful extra words and passive voice. I recently learned of a new such test called “Anglish” that focuses on the origin of words, and seeks to use only words that entered the language before the Norman Conquest. (An example of the resulting prose, from Wikipedia: “I am of this opinion that our own tung should be written cleane and pure, unmixt and unmangeled with borowing of other tunges; wherein if we take not heed by tiim, ever borowing and never paying, she shall be fain to keep her house as bankrupt.“) I don’t recommend it for legal writing, but it is an interesting exercise that shows the remarkable ability of English to absorb words from other languages.

In 2018, the Texas Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have taken different approaches to an important type of “Casteel” problem, in which a jury question has several legally viable theories, some of which are not supported with adequate evidence.

Federal. After a thorough (and infrequently-seen) summary of how federal law has developed on the “Casteel problem” of commingled liability theories, the Fifth Circuit concluded in Nester v. Textron, Inc., 888 F.3d 151 (5th Cir. 2018): “We will not reverse a verdict simply because the jury might have decided on a ground that was supported by insufficient evidence.” (applying, inter alia, Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991)).

State. In Benge v. Williams, 548 S.W.3d 466 (Tex. 2018), a medical-malpractice case, the Texas Supreme Court observed: “The jury question in the present case, unlike the one in Casteel, did not include multiple theories, some valid and some invalid. It inquired about a single theory: negligence. But we have twice held that when the question allows a finding of liability based on evidence that cannot support recovery, the same presumption-of-harm rule must be applied.”

(Thanks to Mark Trachtenberg for pointing out this comparison at the recent Advanced Civil Appellate Course!)

DRI’s 2018 Appellate Advocacy Seminar will be held at the Planet Hollywood Resort in Las Vegas from March 14-15, 2018.  This year’s seminar will include valuable insights into effective advocacy (including tips from Bryan Garner), and joint sessions with trial court practitioners.  The seminar promises great networking opportunities with judges, appellate practitioners and trial advocates from across the country. This year’s seminar will be held in conjunction with the Trial Tactics Seminar, and anyone attending the appellate seminar can attend the final day of the Trial Tactics Seminar for no cost. The seminar also coincides with the beginning of the NCAA men’s basketball tournament, a great time to enjoy the excitement of Las Vegas. You can register for the Appellate Seminar here.  Save $100 and get the best hotel rates when you register and book by February 13, 2018.

 

 

Five Tips for Hurricane Harvey Litigation (a version of this article is in this week’s Texas Lawbook)

In the course of reviewing the Fifth Circuit’s commercial cases for the 600 Camp blog, I have read many opinons about disputes arising from Hurricane Katrina cases. In light of the havoc recently created by Hurricane Harvey, I wanted to share five observations  to prepare for the litigation that will inevitably result.

  1. Record the facts.

Any lawsuit creates tension between the past and the future. The parties want to move on, and put the expense and stress of litigation behind them. But the legal case forces them to revisit the past.

That tension is particularly acute after a disaster such as Harvey, which forced people and businesses to endure incredible stress, while making them then revisit that trauma to protect their legal rights in court. The – entirely understandable – desire to move on, must be squared with the need to take the time to preserve evidence.

Consider St. Bernard Parish v. Lafarge North America, a case about the destruction of a bridge during Hurricane Katrina. While the parties offered extensive expert testimony about what caused the damage, the summary judgment proceedings turned in no small part on the facts of what happened during the storm, including facts established by photographs.

A party facing litigation should consider – as awkward as it can be while recovering from a life-disrupting event – what facts seem obvious now but may fade from memory as time goes on. To the extent possible, some thought should be given to:

  • maintaining electronic records, even if the hardware appears damaged at first blush;
  • writing down a “log” of relevant conversations and events about important events;
  • storing any relevant physical objects, for potential future analysis by experts; and
  • simply writing down basic information about names, addresses, phone numbers, and the like.

In a case arising from a natural disaster, courts will likely be forgiving as to claims of spoliation. But lost information is lost, and its absence can later effect the resolution of a legal case.

  1. Help the people.

The fact evidence in the Lafarge case also included eyewitness testimony, which proved critical to defeating the defendant’s summary judgment motion. Just as a photograph can deteriorate, a person’s memory can fade. And the likelihood of that occurring can only increase when the person is placed under the severe stress of a natural disaster.

Any “team” confronted with a legal challenge by Harvey ­– a business, a professional organization, or even a family – should be mindful of the psychological effects of that stress, and encourage counseling for depression, substance abuse, and other such problems when their first signs appear. Of course, that is a good practice in any event. But its potential side benefit to a legal case is real and worth remembering.

  1. Remember three definitions.

The factual and legal issues that will ultimately go to trial in cases about Harvey simply cannot be predicted with any specificity. But in the short run, three basic legal concepts are likely to pervade business dealings related to the storm:

  • The Texas pattern jury instruction about “duress” defines it as “the mental, physical, or economic coercion of another, causing that party to act contrary to his free will and interest.”
  • While “force majeure” is ordinarily defined by a specific contract, it generally refers to an “extraordinary event or circumstance beyond the control of the parties,” and often does not excuse a party’s non-performance entirely, but only suspends it for the duration of the event.
  • Impossibility of performance” is defined by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as occurring “[w]here, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.”

Awareness of these concepts can potentially avoid problems down the road, as well as identify topics and issues that require special attention today.

  1. “Two-deep leadership.”

The Boy Scouts of America strictly follows a policy of “two-deep leadership,” under which two adults should be present at all times when interacting with youth. One benefit of that policy is to avoid “he-said, she-said” disputes between two eyewitnesses with no third–party corroboration. In the stress of dealing with the aftermath of Harvey, involving a business colleague or a friend in important discussions may help the future resolution of a legal matter, if a dispute arises about what was said in those discussions.

  1. Crowdsource, wisely.

For good or ill, social media has come a long way since Hurricane Katrina. Used judiciously, it can be a good source of information about late-breaking news or the reputation of a particular business. And it can provide a valuable outlet for self-expression after the trauma of Harvey.

But social media posts can survive much longer than the thoughts that prompted them, and rash comments about people or events can come back to haunt the person who makes an ill-advised post. Social media is a valuable conduit for information, and at the same time, it is a reliable creator and collector of potential evidence.

Conclusion

Faced with the reality of recovery from one of the worst storms in the nation’s history, planning for future litigation may seem to be a distant worry. But the foundation for that litigation is being put in place today, intentionally or unintentionally. These five basic ideas may provide ways to place that foundation in a more orderly manner, resulting in a stronger end product.

I recently participated in a mock reargument of Marbury v. Madison (right), albeit changed from the original to (1) actually have discussion about judicial review (2) actually have participation by my character, Attorney General Levi Lincoln, who in “real life” was ordered to stay silent by a highly irritated President Jefferson. In case you should ever need such a thing, here are my notes about the case against judicial review, which rely heavily upon an outstanding 1969 Duke Law Journal article by Professor William Van Alstyne.

falling treeRepresentatives of the Estate of Samuel Dorfman moved to dismiss tort claims under the Texas anti-SLAPP law, brought by professionals who did work for the Estate and complained that they had been defamed and disparaged in comments about their work. Applying the newly-decided opinion in Hersh v. Tatum , 2017 WL 2839873 (Tex. June 30, 2017), the Fifth Court held that the trial court erred in determining that “the Estate was not entitled under the TCPA to seek dismmissal of appellees’ claims because the Estate denied making the communications that form the bases of those claims,” and remanded for further consideration of the TCPA motion. Dorfman Estate v. Proactive Inventory, No. 05-16-01286-CV (July 11, 2017) (mem. op.)

The Dallas Morning News reports the recent death of former Dallas Court of Appeals Justice David Lewis, who resigned from that Court last year to combat alcoholism and depression. The story sounds a warning note for all in the legal profession about the importance of mental health.

for rentThe  long-running dispute between the City of Dallas and the Topletz family, which owns a number of residential rental properties, reappeared in the case of Topletz v. City of Dallas. The Fifth Court substantially affirmed a temporary injunction in favor of the City and a class of tenants, reversing as to one provision that “prohibits appellants from raising rent, properly initiating eviction proceedings, or evicting . . . without leave of the trial court.” This provision was overly broad because it “enjoins activities the appellants otherwise have a legal right to perform . . . .” No. 05-16-00741-CV (April 6, 2017) (mem. op.) (citing, inter aliaWebb v. Glenbrook Owners Ass’n, Inc., 298 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2009, no pet.)).

immune defense

Echoing a line of cases from the Fifth Circuit about attorney immunity, and applying the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in Cantey Hanger LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015), the Fifth Court affirmed a summary judgment for a law firm involved in a foreclosure, noting: “The evidence shows Mackie Wolf provided appellants with a copy of the original note that appellants executed and all actions taken by Mackie Wolf were made in connection with its representation of its clients, BONY and Ocwen. The actions taken by Mackie Wolf that are the subject of this litigation—obtaining the note and presenting it to appellants—are the kinds of actions that are part of the discharge of an attorney’s duties in representing a party.” Santiago v. Mackie Wolf, No. 05-16-00394-CV (March 10, 2017) (mem. op.)

scire faciasThe writ of “scire facias” made one of its rare appearances in City of Dallas v. Ellis, after ten years passed from rendition of judgment, and the two-year grace period for a writ of scire facias expired as well. Unfortunately for the judgment debtor, under another provision of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code, the grace period does not expire for a judgment held by an incorporated city. The debtor did not persuade the Fifth Court that the city’s case should be viewed as one for subrogation that could potentially avoid that provision. No. 05-16-00348-CV (Feb. 17, 2017) (mem. op.)

jp logo2Appeals from forcible entry and detainer actions are common and we do not ordinarily report on them, but it has been some time since we last noted a summary of key principles. A good one appears in the recent case of McCall v. Fannie Mae, in which the appellant alleged improprieties about the relevant foreclosure sale. “But,” noted the Fifth Court, “the deed of trust expressly created a landlord and tenant-at-sufferance relationship when the property was sold by foreclosure. This provided an independent basis to determine the issue of immediate possession without resolving the issue of title. As we have explained, any defects in the foreclosure process . . .  may be pursued in a suit for wrongful foreclosure or to set aside the substitute trustee’s deed, but they are not relevant in this forcible detainer action.” No. 05-16-00010-CV (Jan. 20, 2017) (mem. op.)

th8Axiomatic, but like many other basic mandamus concepts, worth remembering:

  1. If the trial court does not have jurisdiction to rule on relator’s motion, the motion cannot be categorized as “properly filed” for purposes of a potential writ of mandamus to compel a ruling;
  2. And if the the trial court does not have jurisdiction to rule on the motion, “it logically follows that it does not have a ministerial duty to rule on the motion.”

In re: Guzman, No. 05-16-01109-CV (Sept. 29, 2016) (mem. op.)

liability meme“Legal-malpractice damages are the difference between the result obtained from the client and the result that would have been obtained with competent counsel. Here, the result obtained, foreclosure, was inevitable concerning [Plaintiff’s] failure to pay her mortgage in her past and her refusal to pay in order to bring the loan current. Under these circumstances . . . there is no evidence of damages resulting from any alleged legal malpractice.” Sheetz v. Slaughter, No. 05-14-00982-CV (Aug. 31, 2016) (mem. op.)

nina-pham-1

Most people will know the origin story of this appeal. In 2014, Nina Pham was working at a nurse at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital Dallas, a hospital in the Texas Health Resources (“THR”) hospital system. She was tasked with caring from Thomas Duncan, who was diagnosed with Ebola. Pham cared for Duncan for several days. After treating Duncan, Pham was also diagnosed with Ebola. She and her adorable dog became well known the world over, but Pham claimed that THR was negligent in its policies, allowing her to contract Ebola.

In Texas Health Resources, et al. v. Pham, (August 3, 2016), the Dallas Court of Appeals considered an interlocutory appeal of a temporary injunction prohibiting THR from moving forward in a parallel administrative proceeding in the Texas Department of Insurance to determine if Ms. Pham was an employee of THR for purposes of the workers’ compensation statute. If she was an employee of THR, then workers’ compensation would be her exclusive remedy. The trial court issued a temporary injunction barring THR from proceeding before the Texas Department of Insurance because a decision in favor of THR would deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over Ms. Pham’s claims.

The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the temporary injunction in an opinion that focuses solely on the issue of Ms. Pham’s probable right to recovery. Ms. Pham had argued that expert testimony establishing that she contracted Ebola as a result of THR’s negligence was unnecessary at the temporary injunction stage, pointing to evidence of inadequate training and procedures relating to the treatment of Ebola. She also pointed to statements by an insurance adjuster suggesting that Ms. Pham contracted Ebola due to inadequate policies and procedures. But the Court of Appeals was not persuaded. It noted that evidence of a probable right of recovery must be evidence that “under applicable rules of law, establishes a probable right of recovery.” It held that under the circumstances presented, the “applicable rules of law” would require expert testimony establishing causation, a requirement that was not excused at the temporary injunction stage. Without expert testimony of causation, Ms. Pham could not establish a probable right of recovery necessary to support a temporary injunction, allowing the Court of Appeals to avoid deciding whether a trial court can enjoin a parallel administrative proceeding.

Texas Health Resources, et al. v. Pham, (August 3, 2016)

Second Chance

In Southampton Ltd. v. Four Horseman Auto Group (July 20, 2016), the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether a plaintiff who fails to file an interlocutory appeal of an order granting a special appearance as to some but not all defendants may later appeal the special appearance after a final judgment. It held that interlocutory appeal is permissive and the decision not to pursue an interlocutory appeal does not waive the right to appeal the order after final judgment. There are indeed second chances.

This was an issue of first impression for the Dallas Court of Appeals. A majority of courts had reached a similar conclusion, but at least one court has reached the opposite result.

Addressing the merits, the court also concluded that the special appearances were improperly granted. Each defendant had entered into agreements with a forum selection clause designating Dallas County, Texas as the forum for all disputes. The defendants argued they did not authorize the execution of those agreements, which were signed by a director who owned a 25% interest in each of them, but the bylaws of each entity stated that a single member constituted a quorum of the directors of the companies. Moreover, that single member had effectively conducted all the business of each of the entities without any approvals from any other members. Thus, the court concluded that the executing director had apparent authority to bind the defendants.

Southampton Ltd. v. Four Horseman Auto Group (July 20, 2016)

TexasBarToday_TopTen_Badge_VectorGraphic

Over the weekend, I participated in a DAYL skills seminar, making a mock appellate argument against my friend, the capable Chad Baruch. Judge Martin Hoffman led the seminar, and Justices Molly Francis, Ada Brown, and Bill Whitehill presided over the argument.dayl snapshot 2

Show your work

In Starwood Management, LLC v. Swaim, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant by holding that the plaintiff’s evidence of causation, an opinion from their expert witness, was conclusory and therefore not admissible summary judgment evidence. The opinion is a reminder that expert opinion evidence on summary judgment must be more than mere conclusions.

The facts of the case arose from plaintiff hiring the defendants, an attorney and his law firm, to recover an aircraft that was seized by the DEA for an allegedly illegal registration. The defendants were late in filing a claim with the DEA’s Forfeiture Counsel to recover the aircraft, causing the plaintiff’s federal claim for the aircraft to be dismissed. The affidavit offered by the plaintiff as evidence of causation was that of an attorney who had successfully represented the plaintiff in five previous aircraft seizure cases. His opinion was that if the plaintiff had timely filed its claim with the DEA such that the federal lawsuit would not have been dismissed, the DEA would have returned the aircraft as it had in those prior five case. The district court excluded the opinion and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed because it held the expert’s opinion of causation was conclusory. Inexcusably passing on an opportunity to use one of this blogger’s favorite Latin phrases, ipse dixit, the Dallas Court of Appeals instead described the legal standard in less colorful but ultimately more helpful terms. “To avoid being conclusory, ‘[t]he expert must explain the basis of his statements to link his conclusions to the facts.’ An expert must also ‘[e]xplain how and why the negligence caused the injury.’” Or as I was told in math class, the expert must show his work. This expert failed to do that because, although he had past experience in other aircraft seizure cases in which the outcome was positive, he failed to describe the facts of those cases. As a result, he failed to link those cases to the one at hand, rendering his causation opinion a mere conclusion.

Starwood Management v. Swaim

Edwards Sims paid A-1 $5,000 for an engine he claimed was faulty, and A-1 refused to provide a refund. Sims filed a petition in justice court seeking total damages of about $7000, within the $10,000 jurisdictional limit. After A-1 failed to appear for trial, the justice court entered a judgment for $7155.

A-1 then appealed the judgment to county court. Sims amended his petition to seek additional damages, including rental fees incurred due to the passage of time, and attorney’s fees in county court. After A-1 failed to respond to requests for admission, which were deemed admitted, county court entered a judgment for $35,730, including $21,206 in damages, including additional damages “due to the passage of time,” and $14,384 in attorney’s fees.

On appeal, A-1 claimed that the county court’s judgment exceeded the jurisdiction maximum of $10,000 for small claims cases. The court of appeals recognized that when a case is originally filed in justice court and is appealed to the county court, the county court’s appellate jurisdiction is also restricted to the $10,000 maximum. But the court held that additional damages accrued “due to the passage of time” do not deprive the court of jurisdiction. The damages incurred after the justice court judgment and the attorney’s fees incurred in county court were due to the passage of time. Thus, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a $35,730 judgment on a claim that when filed was subject to a $10,000 jurisdictional maximum.

A-1 Parts Stop, Inc. v Sims