Discovery problems = bond problems

Acra v. Bonaudo illustrates the “falling dominoes” problem that can arise from  discovery issues. Appellants sought to supersede a judgment with relatively small bonds. The district court found problems with their discovery responses, which interfered with their ability to establish a low net worth at the hearing about bond size. The Fifth Court affirmed: “On the record before us, we deny the request to vacate the trial court’s orders. Without evidence of all of Acra’s and Secner HR’s assets and liabilities, the trial court could not determine their individual net worth. And, without a determination of their individual net worth, the amount of bond, set in accordance with civil practice and remedies code section 52.006 and appellate rule 24.2(a)(1), was not an abuse of discretion.”  No. 05-17-00451-CV (Dec. 8, 2017) (mem. op.)

How to use contention interrogatories –

In a rare grant of mandamus relief about written discovery, based on the “heart of a party’s case” concept of irreparable injury, the Fifth Court strongly endorsed the use of “contention” interrogatories and related requests for production. Requests as to which it granted relief included ones seeking:

  • “Specific factual and legal basis for establishing a fiduciary duty owed by Coralli
    to Vola. (Interrogatory No. 17)”;
  • “Documents Vola contends establish, demonstrate, or prove the amount of
    uniforms Sting Soccer committed to purchasing from Vola as alleged in
    paragraph 17 of the first amended petition. (Request No. 27)”; and
  • “Documents Vola contends establish, demonstrate, or prove the amount of damages alleged owed to Vola by Sting Soccer. (Request No. 35).”

The opinion makes other useful statements about appropriate discovery objections and requests for admission. In re Sting Soccer Group, No. 05-17-00317-CV (Nov. 30, 2017) (mem. op.)


Novel question, old writ.

Applying In re: Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. 2008), which held that a Rule 202 pre-suit deposition was inappropriate in a health care case before service of the appropriate expert report, the Fifth Court held in In re Sandate  that third-party discovery was improper for similar reasons, and granted a mandamus petitition to quash it. No. 05-17-00871-CV (Oct. 19, 2017).

While Sandate does not directly address the requirement of a lack of adequate remedy by direct appeal, Jorden makes clear that this line of authority is not intended as a general invitation to seek mandamus relief about discovery matters:

Correcting whichever view is wrong after final judgment seems very unlikely, as it is hard to imagine how allowing discovery a little too early could ever be harmful error — either by causing rendition of an improper judgment or preventing the presentation of an appeal. If (as relators claim) Texas law prohibits presuit depositions until an expert report is served, those depositions cannot be “untaken” and thus an appellate court will not be able to cure the error and enforce the statutory scheme after trial. As a result, relators unquestionably may lose substantive and procedural rights if review is postponed, rights the Legislature believed (as discussed below) are critical to ensuring access to affordable medical care in the state.

Sandate does, however, contain a muscular summary of when mandamus relief may issue to address a trial court’s legal error:

In civil cases, “[a] trial or appellate court has no discretion in determining what the law is or inapplying the law to the facts, even if the law is somewhat unsettled.” [Jorden, 249 S.W.3d] at 424 (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (case of first impression regarding enforceability of contractual jury waiver); see also Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding) (changing 100 years of case law and granting mandamus for abuse of discretion when trial judge followed then-existing law), disapproved on other grounds by Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).

Mandamus Week continues . . .

The Discovery Channel may have has Shark Week, but the Fifth Court is having Mandamus Week. The most recent installment is In re: Commercial Metals, which involved a challenge to a protective order about a business’s trade secrets. The Court began by reminding, as to the basic requriements for a writ of mandamus, that “[a] trial court abuses its discretion if it orders discovery exceeding the scope permitted by the rules,” and that “[n]o adequate appellate remedy exists when the trial court compels production beyond the permissible bounds of discovery.” That said, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the particularized procedures used to limit use of the information by plaintiff’s “de facto in house counsel,” and denied the petition. The opinion provides useful guidance on a very practical and recurring issue in business disputes about the use of confidential information. No. 05-16-01214-CV (Aug. 29, 2017) (mem. op.)

Yes, you may have more than 30 minutes for those depositions.

Six tenants intervened in a code enforcement action, seeking to pursue class claims against the property owners. Defendants sought to take their depositions about issues regarding certification, the intervenors moved to quash, and the trial judge allowed the depositions to proceed, but for no more than thirty minutes each. The Fifth Court granted mandamus, finding that “the record includes no evidence or even argument regarding how a deposition of any length wqould cause intervenors to suffer harm or subject them to undue burden,” and also that the intervenors “lack an adequate remedy by appeal because the order severely compromises relators’ ability to present its case on the issue of class certification.” In re: Topletz, No. 05-17-00315-CV (Aug. 24, 2017).

No, you may not have merits discovery yet.

In a forceful statement against merits discovery before the resolution of a special appearance, the Fifth Court granted a writ of mandamus to require that “relator’s deposition be limited to matters directly relevant to the issue of jurisdiction if the deposition is taken before the trial court rules on relator’s special appearance,” because “Rule 120a requires discovery be limited to matters relevant to jurisdiciton prior to a ruling on a special appearance.” In re: Stanton, No. 05-17-00834-CV (Aug. 24, 2017) (mem. op.) (citing, inter aliaIn re: Doe, 444 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Tex. 2014)).

Proportionality, proportionality, proportionality.

250px-Fibonacci_spiral_34.svgLast Friday, the Texas Supreme Court denied mandamus relief in a high-profile dispute about the proper format in which to produce electronic records, but provided extensive guidance about the framework and factors that should decide such disputes, and remanded for reconsideration in light of that guidance. In a nutshell: “Under our discovery rules, neither party may dictate the form of electronic discovery. The requesting party must specify the desired form of production, but all discovery is subject to the proportionality overlay embedded in our discovery rules and inherent in the reasonableness standard to which our electronic-discovery rule is tethered. The taproot of this discovery dispute is whether production in native format is reasonable given the circumstances of this case. Reasonableness and its bedfellow, proportionality, require a case-by-case balancing of jurisprudential considerations,which is informed by factors the discovery rules identify as limiting the scope of discovery and geared toward the ultimate objective of “obtain[ing] a just,fair, equitable and impartial adjudication” for the litigants “with as great expedition and dispatch at the least expense . . . as may be practicable.” In re State Farm Lloyds, No. 15-903 (Tex. May 26, 2017).

Rule 202, anonymous Internet postings, and anti-SLAPP

firstamendment_0 (1)In Glassdoor Inc. v. Andra Group LP, the Fifth Court affirmed an order granting a Rule 202 petition about online reviews of a business as an employer, offering several pointers for the handling of such petitions:

  • The trial judge limited the scope of the examination to two posts, and specific items within them;
  • The movant established its potential business disparagement damages with three affidavits about the effect of the posts on its recruiting;
  • The statements at issue went beyond “hyperbole or mere personal opinion” to make specific “accusations of illegal conduct that are capable of being proved true or false”; and
  • The First Amendment rights of the anonymous reviewers to speak anonymously “must be balanced against the right of others to hold accountable those who engage in speech not protected by the First Amendment.”

A “mirror image” anti-SLAPP motion was properly rejected for the same reasons that the Rule 202 petition was granted. No. 05-16-00189-CV (March 24, 2017) (mem. op.)