This is a cross-post from 600Hemphill, which follows commercial litigation in the Texas Supreme Court:

“[W]e adopt the following two-step inquiry for determining when requests for findings and conclusions that are not required by the rules will trigger the extended ninety-day filing deadline. First, was the non-jury proceeding a type in which the trial court could consider evidence? Second, if so, was there evidence before the court? When the answer to both questions is yes and a party requests findings and conclusions, all parties benefit from the extended appellate timetable.

The first question is categorical, not case-specific. For example, it will be answered yes for a judgment following a bench trial, a default judgment on a claim for unliquidated damages, a judgment rendered as sanctions, and any other judgment that could be based in any part on an evidentiary hearing.

The second question is case-specific and focuses on whether evidence was presented to the trial court, not whether that evidence proved to be necessary in hindsight. In answering this question, it is not relevant whether the evidence presented was disputed, or jurisdictional, or material to an issue later raised on appeal.” Phillips v. McNeill, No. 19-0831 (Dec. 3, 2021) (citations omitted, emphasis added) (applying IKB Inus. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1997) and Gene Duke Builders, Inc. v. Abilene Housing Auth., 138 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)).

Adding to the Fifth Court’s thorough discussion of exactly what constitutes a “finding of fact” in In re AEJ, the Court recently reminded: “Though the parties’ appellate arguments describe oral ‘findings’ recited by the trial court, a trial
court’s oral statements from the bench do not generally constitute findings of fact. ‘Statements made by a trial court outside of properly filed written
findings and conclusions do not limit an appellate court’s review.’WorldVentures Marketing v. Travel to Freedom, No. 05-20-00169-CV (Sept. 23, 2020) (mem. op.) (citations omitted).

The paternal-rights case of In re AEJ fully reviewed the somewhat-untidy law about Tex. R. Civ. P. 299 and its consequences, and made these observations and conclusions. As to the requirements of the rule:

  • Tex. R. Civ. P. 299 says: “Findings of fact shall not be recited in a judgment. If there is a conflict between findings of fact recited in a judgment in violation of this rule and findings of fact made pursuant to Rules 297 and 298, the latter findings will control for appellate purposes. Findings of fact shall be filed with the clerk of the court as a document or documents separate and apart from the judgment.” (emphasis added);
  • One line of Fifth Court cases holds “that findings in the body of a judgment ‘are inappropriate and may not be considered on appeal’.”;
  • However, another line of Fifth Court cases says that “[b]ecause the record does not contain any additional findings of fact or conclusions of law, the findings in the
    judgment have probative value and will be treated as valid findings.”

The Court found that on this record, the trial court made adequate findings in a  memorandum ruling (observing, in a footnote, that the Court was not bound by the lable placed on findings by the trial court). The Court also found no harm from any lack of findings, noting that the record and issues were well-defined and straightforward. It concluded with a practical observation: “And finally, in this case the remedy for a failure to make findings would be to abate the appeal and direct the trial judge to file findings on endangerment and best interest—presumably the very findings she has already made twice.” No. 05-20-00340-CV (Aug. 31, 2020).

The Fifth Court’s recent opinion in Guillory v. Dietrich addressed the appropriate subjects for findings of fact. The Court continued discussion of that subject in King Aerospace, Inc. v. King Aviation Dallas, a rare state-court trademark-infringement case. (The substantive holdings of King will be discussed in later posts.) The  Court rejected the appellants’ arguments that these additional findings of fact should have been made:

  • A finding about the “tacking” doctrine about a trademark’s use, when that doctrine was not necessary to support the trial court’s judgment, as well as a similar unnecessary finding about the effect of the Appellee’s bankruptcy;
  • “Although the trial court made no specific finding regarding the date [Appellee] began using the . . . mark, it concluded Appellee had prior common law rights in that mark” (emphasis added);
  • Appellant objected that the findings “fail to specify how [Appellee] used the marks in commerce and the effect of [his] inability to work after his accident,” as to which the Court found: “The trial court found that [Appellee] continuously used the . . . marks and neither abandoned them nor intended to abandon them. These findings sufficiently address the controlling issues and are all that is required.”

No. 05-19-00245-CV (April 30, 2020) (mem. op.).

Like Wile E. Coyote struggling to find Road Runner, attorneys and judges often wonder what level of detail is needed for findings of fact. The Fifth Court provided strongly-worded guidance in Guillory v. Dietrich:”Many fact findings in this case have no obvious relevance to any ultimate issue, such as finding 30 (“[Dietrich] was employed by Procter & Gamble for over 40 years.”). These additional findings concern evidentiary matters instead of controlling issues. As such they are unnecessary. . . . We disregard such findings in this opinion. Moreover, the unnecessary findings made our task in resolving this appeal, and presumably appellants’ task in briefing it, more difficult. A trial court should make findings as to only disputed facts significant to the case’s ultimate issues. Findings that a jury would be asked to make in a case may be an appropriate guide. Although we impose no consequences for the excessive findings in this case, excessive findings that obscure rather than clarify the judgment’s basis may lead to consequences such as remand for proper findings or sanctions.”   No. 05-18-00504-CV (Jan. 6, 2020) (citation omitted).

Tex. R. Civ. P. 263 allows a trial on stipulated facts. “Parties may submit matters in controversy to the court upon an agreed statement of facts filed with the clerk, upon which judgment shall be rendered as in other cases; and such agreed statement signed and certified by the court to be correct and the judgment rendered thereon shall constitute the record of the cause.” Lavizadeh v. Moghadam reminds that “[i]n reviewing a judgment entered pursuant to stipulated facts, we disregard the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law . . . we consider we consider only whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the agreed facts, utilizing a de novo review.” No. 05-18-00955-CV (Dec. 13, 2019) (mem. op.)

Richardson Business Center proved an easement by estoppel, and appealed the trial court’s decision to not award attorneys’ fees for its successful declaratory-judgment action. However: “The trial court did not file findings of fact or conclusions of law. Without findings of fact establishing the basis for the trial court’s exercise of discretion, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to award attorney’s fees.” Hazzani v. Richardson Business Center, No. 05-18-00346-CV (July 21, 2019) (mem. op.)

At trial, the judge “stated the parties did not have a contract and it was taking the quantum meruit claim under advisement ‘to make a determination as to damages.'” But the judgment awarded damages for breach of contract, and the judge then entered findings of fact and conclusions of law that “the parties operated under an express contract.” Problem? No: “[W]ritten orders or judgments control over conflicting oral pronounements. . . . [T]he trial court’s written findings supersede any oral statements.” Kaur-Gardner v. Keane Landscaping, No. 05-17-00230-CV (May 14, 2018) (mem. op.)

D&D

In Baxter & Associates, LLC v. D&D Elevators, Inc., No. 05-16-003300-CV (Feb. 15, 2017), the plaintiff appealed from the denial of a temporary injunction against former employees and the company they formed. The plaintiff alleged that the former employees took trade secrets, namely a list of builders with projects potentially including elevators, in violation of their fiduciary duties and the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“TUTSA”).

After a two-day hearing, the parties received a signed order denying the request for temporary injunction, which was attached to an email from the court administrator stating, “The Court makes the following rulings: … I do find that trade secret as to existing jobs or bids was obtained… [but] there is an adequate remedy at law….” The plaintiff requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, and filed a motion for reconsideration based on its argument that it did not need to show no adequate remedy at law under TUTSA to obtain injunctive relief. The trial court did not sign any findings of fact or conclusions of law, and the plaintiff appealed without filing a notice of past due findings and conclusions of law.

The first issue addressed by the court was procedural—whether the statement contained in the court administrator’s email stating the existence of trade secrets was a finding of fact. The Court of Appeals held it was not, in part because at a subsequent hearing the trial court stated that it had not made such a finding. Although the plaintiff formally requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, it failed to file a notice of past due findings and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 297. Thus, the Court of Appeals held there were no findings of fact or conclusions of law, that any error for the failure to make such findings was not preserved, and implied a finding that the plaintiff had not shown the existence of a trade secret.

The Court went on to hold that there was evidence that would have allowed the trial court to conclude that the list of projects was not a trade secret because the information could be publicly identified, and therefore would not “derive[] independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known….”

Baxter & Associates, LLC v. D&D Elevators, Inc., No. 05-16-003300-CV (Feb. 15, 2017)

alpha omegaAlpha Omega alleged that a law firm breached its responsibilities as an escrow agent. In ts findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court said: “11. Alpha Omega, Inc. did not prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that a fiduciary relationship existed between it and the Defendants.” The Fifth Court disagreed, and then found harm because the trial court “did not evaluate the remaining elements of fiduciary breach under the proper legal standards” and “there was some evidence of the remaining elements of fiduciary breach, such that the trial court could have reached the opposite result had it not erred in finding 11.” Accordingly, it reversed and remanded. Alpha Omega CHL, Inc. v. Min, No. 05-15-00124-CV (June 16, 2016) (mem. op.)

findAppellees sued Pak for breach of contract and won a judgment in their favor after a bench trial.  Pak requested findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Then, in a series of unfortunate events: the trial judge did not enter findings or conclusions; Pak filed a notice of past due findings and conclusions on December 31 — the judge’s last day in office — and the successor judge did not enter findings until January 12, after the period specified by the Rules.  The panel majority reasoned that the successor judge (who did not participate in the trial) had no authority to make findings and conclusions, and that Pak did not have to object at the time to preserve his appellate complaint about them. It then found harm, reversed the judgment against Pak, and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.  A detailed dissent would have found a waiver on the specific facts and circumstances of the case, noting the original judge’s continued availability.  Pak v. Ad Villarai, LLC, No. 05-14-01312-CV (Feb. 16, 2016) (mem. op.)