Continuing the shower of spring en banc opinions from the Fifth Court, an eight-justice majority concluded that any “substantive nexus” between the relevant safety standards and health care was too attenuated to implicate the Texas Medical Liability Act on the following facts: “On May 25, 2014, Faber went to pick her mother up at Dayspring [Assisted Living Community] to take her to a hair styling appointment. Faber parked in Dayspring’s parking lot and asked a Dayspring employee to help Millie to the car. Millie, who had become a Dayspring resident only a week earlier, used a rolling walker and sat on it facing backwards as the Dayspring employee pushed her along the public sidewalk outside Dayspring’s entrance. Millie’s walker got caught in a large crack in the sidewalk, causing her to fall and hit her head on the concrete.” 

A 5-justice dissent saw otherwise: “The facts that form the basis of Faber’s suit show that Smith did not simply trip over a crack in the sidewalk. Instead, she fell because a staff member of the health care institution in which she resided pushed her over a crack in the sidewalk while she was seated in a wheeled walker causing her to fall. Because of this, Faber’s claim is inextricably intertwined with the conduct of, and duties owed by, Collin Creek as a health care provider.”  Faber v. Collin Creek Assisted Living Center, No. 05-18-00827-CV (May 3, 2021).

Applying In re: Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. 2008), which held that a Rule 202 pre-suit deposition was inappropriate in a health care case before service of the appropriate expert report, the Fifth Court held in In re Sandate  that third-party discovery was improper for similar reasons, and granted a mandamus petitition to quash it. No. 05-17-00871-CV (Oct. 19, 2017).

While Sandate does not directly address the requirement of a lack of adequate remedy by direct appeal, Jorden makes clear that this line of authority is not intended as a general invitation to seek mandamus relief about discovery matters:

Correcting whichever view is wrong after final judgment seems very unlikely, as it is hard to imagine how allowing discovery a little too early could ever be harmful error — either by causing rendition of an improper judgment or preventing the presentation of an appeal. If (as relators claim) Texas law prohibits presuit depositions until an expert report is served, those depositions cannot be “untaken” and thus an appellate court will not be able to cure the error and enforce the statutory scheme after trial. As a result, relators unquestionably may lose substantive and procedural rights if review is postponed, rights the Legislature believed (as discussed below) are critical to ensuring access to affordable medical care in the state.

Sandate does, however, contain a muscular summary of when mandamus relief may issue to address a trial court’s legal error:

In civil cases, “[a] trial or appellate court has no discretion in determining what the law is or inapplying the law to the facts, even if the law is somewhat unsettled.” [Jorden, 249 S.W.3d] at 424 (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (case of first impression regarding enforceability of contractual jury waiver); see also Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding) (changing 100 years of case law and granting mandamus for abuse of discretion when trial judge followed then-existing law), disapproved on other grounds by Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).

Locked Doors

In Durham v. Children’s Medical Center of Dallas, the Dallas Court of Appeals decided an issue of first impression: If a 12-year-old receives medical treatment and dies more than two years after that treatment because of the negligence of the health care providers, does the Texas Constitution’s Open Courts Clause prevent the running of limitations for survival and wrongful death claims? The Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that the answer is no because the Open Courts Clause does not apply to statutorily created claims.

The facts are plainly tragic. A 12-year-old girl was injured in a car accident in Hawaii. During treatment, the doctors also diagnosed a dilation of the ascending aorta, which apparently was not related to the accident itself. The doctors recommended a follow-up with a cardiologist. The girl was transferred to Children’s Medical Center of Dallas for a short time before then being transferred to Scottish Rite, where she was treated for her injuries resulting from the accident. Unfortunately, there was not a follow-up on the information about her enlarged aorta. A little more than two years later, the girl died because her aorta ruptured. She was only 15 years old. The girl’s mother and the administrator of her estate brought wrongful death and survival claims. Summary judgment was granted based on the 2-year statute of limitations.

The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 74.251 applied, which requires claims to be filed within 2 years of the treatment that is the subject of the claim unless the child is younger than 12. Because the girl was 12 at the time of treatment, the exception did not apply and limitations began to run on the date of treatment for statutory causes of action, including wrongful death and survival claims. The Court then distinguished the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Weiner v. Wasson, which held that limitations are unconstitutional as applied to minors under the Open Courts Clause of the Texas Constitution because they would cut off the minor’s cause of action before he reaches majority. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the Open Courts Clause and Weiner v. Wasson could not save the survival and wrongful death claims because the Open Courts Clause does not apply to statutory claims, which include survival and wrongful death claims. As a result, the survival and wrongful death claims arising from the girl’s death were already barred by limitations months before her death.

Durham v. Children’s Medical Center of Dallas