Connie Sigel used a website to book an apartment in Paris (the one in France) for a seven-night vacation. During that stay, an intruder with keys to both the apartment and its safe stole most of Sigel’s possessions. Sigel sued the booking agency on multiple contract and tort claims. The trial court denied My Vacation Europe’s special appearance, but the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed and rendered. The Court held that Sigel’s act of accessing MVE’s website and renting an apartment while she was located in Dallas did not constitute a purposeful availment of Texas by MVE, and there was no evidence that MVE specifically targeted Texas residents for its services. The Court of Appeals also held that there could be no specific jurisdiction in Texas because the claims all arose from a burglary that occurred in France, meaning that the relationship between Texas and the operative facts of the litigation was too tenuous to support jurisdiction.
My Vacation Europe, Inc. v. Sigel, No. 05-14-00435-CV
Update: Threepeat. The dream is alive.
Although medical malpractice usually isn’t this blog’s cup of tea, it is sometimes interesting to see just how broadly the courts will apply the expert report requirement for health care liability claims contained in Chapter 74 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code. In this case, we learn that a case against a hospital will not be dismissed for failure to file an expert report when the claim is for a slip-and-fall injury. The Court of Appeals distinguished between claims that have an indirect relationship with health care (which require an expert report) and those that are “completely untethered” from health care. Slipping and falling on a wet floor in a hallway, the Court holds, has nothing to do with health care, and so the trial court correctly denied the hospital’s motion to dismiss.
Methodist Hosps. of Dallas v. Searcy, No. 05-14-00375-CV
A special appearance in a probate case has led to the exceedingly rare grant of a motion for sanctions for the filing of a frivolous appeal. In this instance, the appellant managed to make a general appearance in the case before filing the special appearance — a fact that the appellant had failed to even address in response to the appellee’s briefing in the probate court. On top of that, the appellant had failed to preserve his argument on appeal that the special appearance was somehow severable from the motion to show cause in which he entered his general appearance, nor had the appellant objected (and thereby preserved error) when the probate judge overruled the special appearance without holding a separate hearing on it. Although the appellee had not submitted any evidence of her damages to support the award of sanctions, the Court of Appeals granted her leave to file such evidence within ten days of the opinion.
Estate of Ardyce Deuel-Nash, Deceased, No. 05-14-00128-CV
In what appears to be only the third opinion in the state reviewing a motion to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, the Dallas Court of Appeals has affirmed a trial court’s order that granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss on the pleadings. Similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Rule 91a allows a party to move to dismiss a cause of action “on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact,” based solely on the claimant’s pleadings. In this case, the plaintiffs sued the City of Dallas after emergency services failed to respond to a 911 call reporting their son’s drug overdose. The plaintiffs attempted to plead their way around governmental immunity by claiming the City had negligently used or misused the 911 system’s telephone and computer systems. The Court affirmed dismissal of negligence claims that the City had failed to properly respond to the 911 call, but also affirmed the denial of the motion as to claims that the equipment itself had failed or malfunctioned.
City of Dallas v. Sanchez, No. 05-13-01651-CV
An investor in an office building sued the building’s architect and engineering consulting firm for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy. The investor did not file a certificate of merit with the original petition, so the defendants moved to dismiss. The claims against the engineering firm were dismissed without prejudice, and the plaintiff refiled with a new complaint that included a certificate of merit. After consolidating the old and new cases, the trial court granted a motion to dismiss as to all claims against the engineering firm, but only as to the negligent misrepresentation claim for the architects. An interlocutory appeal ensured, and the Court of Appeals ended up siding with the plaintiff. As to the plaintiff’s claim against the engineering firm, the Court held that dismissal without prejudice did not prevent the plaintiff from refiling a new lawsuit — the one under appeal — that included a certificate of merit. As to the claims against the architecture firm, no certificate of merit was required because the plaintiff’s case was based on the allegation that the firm knew of defects in the building due to its occupancy in the building, not in connection with any professional services that the firm had provided. Accordingly, no certificate of merit was necessary, and all of the plaintiff’s claims against the architecture firm were also remanded for further proceedings.
TIC N. Central Dallas 3, LLC v. Envirobusiness, Inc., No. 05-13-01021-CV
The Court of Appeals has issued a lengthy opinion affirming the denial of a special appearance. The appeal arises out of an apparently contentious case involving claims and counterclaims for breach of contract, fraud, and defamation. Defendant Sebastian Lombardo — an Italian citizen who lives in Belgium and works in France — challenged personal jurisdiction by invoking the fiduciary shield doctrine, which protects officers of corporations from being personally haled into court in Texas due to their contacts as representatives of the corporation. Unfortunately for Lombardo, his argument in the trial court had presented that issue as a matter of general personal jurisdiction, and the trial court had found him to be subject to specific personal jurisdiction. Having failed to present the fiduciary shield doctrine as a bar to the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, the issue was also waived on appeal. The opinion goes on to affirm the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings of jurisdictional facts, as well as its application of the law to those facts, and therefore affirmed denial of the special appearance.
Lombardo v. Bhattacharyya, No. 05-13-01583-CV
Last November, the Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further consideration in a case where the Dallas Court of Appeals had concluded that the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded a waiver of sovereign immunity through the use of tangible property. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had not alleged a “use” of property for a whiteboard that fell on his head, because Dallas Metrocare had only made the board available for use by patients. On remand, the Court of Appeals had to consider the alternative question of whether the plaintiff’s claims alleged injury through a “condition” of property. The Court concluded that he had pleaded such a claim, based on the allegation that the whiteboard was in an unsafe condition because it was not properly secured. The case was therefore remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Dallas Metrocare Servs. v. Juarez, No. 05-11-01144-CV
Cornerstone Healthcare owns and operates a group of hospitals located in several states. It filed suit against Nautic Management VI, the general partner or manager of several private equity funds. NMVI filed a special appearance to challenge personal jurisdiction, but the trial court overruled it. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and rendered judgment dismissing NMVI from the case. Cornerstone argued that NMVI should be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Texas because it controlled the funds whose representatives had traveled to Texas and conducted the business that got them all sued. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding Cornerstone to its word that it was not attempting to pierce the corporate veil and therefore refusing to attribute the contacts of the funds to NMVI.
Nautic Mgmt. VI, LP v. Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding, Inc., No. 05-13-00859-CV
The Texas Citizens Participation Act continues to be a fruitful source of appellate activity. In this instance, the Court of Appeals has reversed the trial court’s order denying a motion to dismiss in a case arising out of a bad review on Angie’s List. Barbara Young hired Perennial Properties to construct an outdoor living space at her home, but Young claimed that Perennial failed to perform its work as required. McKinney Lumber Company then filed a lien against Young’s property for $9,779 in lumber that Perennial had failed to pay for. After the lumber company sued everyone involved, Young wrote up her experience in an online review, giving Perennial an overall grade of “F” and describing Perennial’s owners as incompetent crooks. Those owners then intervened in the lawsuit in order to sue Young and her attorney for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Court of Appeals first held that Young had met her initial burden of showing that the online review was an exercise of her right to free speech because it was a communication made to the public in connection with a good, product, or service. That brought it within the scope of the TCPA and shifted the burden to Perennial’s owners to establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each element of their claims. That they failed to do, according to the Court of Appeals. The defamation claim failed because the owners had not provided any evidence that the allegedly false statements were defamatory (as opposed to non-actionable opinions) or that Young had been negligent in making them. The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim failed because that cause of action is only a “gap-filler” tort, and there were no different or distinguishing facts from the defamation claim to permit it to proceed separately. The Court of Appeals therefore dismissed both claims and remanded the case for further proceedings under the TCPA, presumably to consider an award of attorney fees to Young.
Young v. Krantz, No. 05-13-00853-CV
If “blogger” sounds like an unusual pastime for the son of an oil-and-gas billionaire, this colorful case may be the one for you. T. Boone Pickens and several of his children sued Michael Pickens. Michael is T. Boone’s son and a recovering drug addict who has chronicled his life and his recovery in his blog, “5 Days in Connecticut” (which is now closed to uninvited readers). The blog has not been very kind to the other members of Michael’s family, which led them to sue for invasion of privacy, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Michael moved to dismiss based on the Texas Citizens Participation Act, our version of the “anti-SLAPP” laws that have been enacted around the country in recent years. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Michael’s statements about his life and his family did not qualify for protection under the TCPA because they were not “made in connection with a matter of public concern.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(3).
Although the TCPA defines “public concern” to include statements relating to “a public figure,” the Court drew a distinction between general-purpose public figures and limited-purpose public figures. To qualify as a matter of public concern under the TCPA, the speech must either relate to a general-purpose public figure (whose entire life is followed by the public) or a limited-purpose public figure (who is only followed at times, or on certain topics). If it is a limited-purpose public figure, then the defendant’s speech only qualifies as a matter of public concern if the statements relate to the subject matter that makes the person a limited-purpose public figure. Here, the Court concluded that Michael’s evidence was insufficient to show that T. Boone was a public figure for all purposes, and that he was only a public figure for the limited purpose of his opinions and activities in the energy industry. Because Michael’s statements related to T. Boone’s family life, and not the energy industry, they did not qualify as matter of public interest under the TCPA, and therefore Michael’s motion to dismiss had to be denied.
Pickens v. Cordia, No. 05-13-00780-CV