RECENT CASES:


U.S. FIFTH CIRCUIT and DALLAS COURT OF APPEALS


LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN



DAVID S. COALE Dallas Bar Association June 12, 2025


1





























Ethridge v. Samsung, 137 F.4th 309 (5th Cir. 2025)

- "Since January 2019, Samsung has shipped 18650 batteries to Black & Decker's Texas manufacturing facility to be incorporated into sealed power tool battery packs." .
- "For a number of years (at all times relevant to this litigation), Samsung has also shipped 18650 batteries to HP and Dell to be used as samples or for laptop repairs in their Texas service centers."
- "Samsung sells 18650 batteries to 'sophisticate and qualified' businesses, which typically use them in battery packs. Some of these battery packs end up in products that are sold to Texas ated consumers."



LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN

10

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 8th District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021)

"In conducting so much business in Montana and Minnesota, Ford 'enjoys the benefits and protection of [their] laws;—the enforcement of [their] laws;—the enforcement of contracts, the defense of property, the resulting formation of effective markets.... All that assistance to Ford's in-state business creates reciprocal obligations—most relevant here, that the car models Ford so extensively markets in Montana and Minnesota be safe for their citizens to use there."



LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN

Ethridge v. Samsung, 137 F.4th 309 (5th Cir. 2025) (dissent)

"[A]n unbroken string of Supreme Court cases, with a recent, narrow exception in <u>Ford</u>, focus on the purposeful actions of the defendant in a forum state. ... [B]ecause Ethridge purchased the battery for his vape pen through a channel that <u>Samsung never authorized</u>, the fact of his injury should not make Texas a valid forum consistent with Due Process."



Western Trails Charters & Tours LLC v. Provance, No. 05-24-01089-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas May 29, 2025)

TWJe conclude that the liability allegations in this case are principally concerned with the driver's operation of the bus in Utah and SLE's conduct in employing the driver and otherwise providing the bus transportation in question.... Appellees do not allege that SLE's allegedly tortious conduct relating specifically to this bus driver and this bus took place in Texas. Although appellees refer to violations of Texas motorvehicle regulations, we do not see how those accident that occurred during travel from Boise, Idaho, to Salt Lake City, Utah."



LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN


13

Conexiones Tornado v. Ramirez de Munoz, No. 05-23-00353-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 23, 2024)

"The facts before us are different, as Appellees allege that they suffered an out-ofstate injury because of Conexiones's negligence in operating a bus, the tickets for which were advertised and sold in Texas. Unlike Montana and Minnesota in <u>Ford Motor</u> *Co.*, Texas has no interest in regulating the operation of a Mexican bus on Mexican roads by a Mexican driver."



LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN




Cook v. Marshall, 126 F.4th 103 (5th Cir. 2025)




"No authority says we must also consider the citizenship of non-party trustees. To the contrary, consider how the Seventh Circuit approached this issue ... [holding that] a non-party cotrustee's citizenship was irrelevant to diversity jurisdiction because "traditional trusts ... were not considered distinct legal entities at common law, and hence cannot sue or be sued in their own name."


LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN

16











Hipps v. CBRE, Inc., No. 05-24-00056-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 15, 2024)

"CBRE distinguishes our holdings in <u>Computek</u> and <u>McCaskill</u> on the ground that in both cases, the employee was not the only party enjoined from contacting former clients; the injunctions included the employees' new employers who 'cannot be presumed to have knowledge of who [the employees] interacted with as a client' at their former businesses."

LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN

22

Hipps v. CBRE, Inc., No. 05-24-00056-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 15, 2024)

"In sum, we conclude that the Amended Order has alleviated the issues Hipps has identified. The amendments clarify the activities restrained by adding language from the RCA and EA and attaching both agreements to the Amended Order. The amendments also add specific time limitations to paragraphs 12.a through 12.k, and further define the category of "CBRE Clients" who may not be solicited."


LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN

23

SpaceX v. NLRB, 129 F.4th 906 (5th Cir. 2025)



"Appeal cannot be achieved simply by asserting that the trial court has failed to act as promptly as wished by a party seeking an injunction. ... The **district court did not effectively deny the motion** for injunctive relief in failing to rule during months of procedural challenges—and within a week of SpaceX's first request for expedited consideration."



U.S. Trinity Energy Services, L.L.C. v. Southeast Directional Drilling, L.L.C., 135 F.4th 303 (5th Cir. 2025)

"Grafting 'manifest disregard of the law' as a basis for a losing party at arbitration to prevail under § 10(a)(4) would risk tension with <u>Hall Street</u> and would run headlong into <u>Oxford</u> <u>Health</u>—by forcing us to conduct a less deferential review of a panel's award than the FAA contemplates. Indeed, adopting [Appellant's] reading essentially would rewrite the question a judge must ask from 'whether the arbitrators construed the contract at all' to whether they construed it correctly."



LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN

26

Baker Hughes Saudia Arabia Co. v. Dynamic Indus., Inc., 126 F.4th 1073 (5th Cir. 2025)



"(T)he core dispute is novel, at least in this circuit: whether a designated forum remains available where a functionally identical successor forum exists... Decree 34, by its very terms, "abolished" the DAI, which administered the DIFC-LCIA. That seems like strong evidence that the forum no longer exists. But the counterargument is far from fivolous. The DIFC-LCIA's successor institution, the DIAC, is functionally identical to its predecessor in many key respects."

Exencial Wealth Advisors LLC v. Sipes, No. 05-24-00964-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 31, 2025)

Exencial offered only an affidavit from the company's Chief Operating Officer regarding his familiarity with a 2021 operating agreement. While this affidavit may be sufficient to authenticate the 2021 operating agreement by way of the affiant's position and personal knowledge that an operating agreement existed, the testimony is insufficient to determine whether Sipes was bound to it. Additionally. Exercise asserted Sipes did sign the operating agreement but did not offer the signed version into evidence the a signeture. Again, it's not in the can admit in 0 evidence where that we can admit in 0 evidence where be did arrow there in it.



LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN



29

Exporttek, Inc v. Vista Bank, No. 05-24-00915-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 24, 2025)

Anese general and conclusivy assertions do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 252. At best, Borrowers provided a vague description of the discovery they sought. Further, Borrowers failed to establish the materiality of any proposed discovery. Borrowers' claims are for breach of contract and the contract at issue contained entire-agreement and nowaiver provisions. Motivations are not germane to the resolution of Borrowers' barcoh of contract claims. Moreover, Borrowers did not provide any information regarding the diligence on their pat in obtaining discovery prior to



Elsell v. Encore Wire Corp., No. 05-23-00588-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas March 14, 2025)

"Bouchard's heavy reliance on the credibility of Davis, given Davis's own termination by Encore for document fraud and dishonesty, raises genuine issues of material fact as to whether (1) Bouchard actually considered Davis to be credible, (2) Bouchard actually grounded hills decision to fire Elsell on Davis's above-described record of credibility, and (3) Bouchard actually decided to fire Elsell for the stated reason that Elsell lied. ... Additionally, reasonable and fair-minded persons could differ on whether Bouchard's stated reason fring Elsell was actually based on an interview of Elsell that was objectively brief, conjectural, and uninformed."

LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN

31



32

8fig, Inc. v. Stepup Funny, LLC, 135 F.4th 285 (5th Cir. 2025)

"'The public has a common law right of access to judicial records.' ... A court may seal a judicial record only on a **case-by-case, documentby-document, line-by-line** basis and must balance 'the public's common law right of access against the interests favoring nondisclosure.""





Santander Consumer USA v. Enterprise Fin. Group, ₦o. 05-23-0770-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 3, 2025)

"The use of a global denial of objections and requests based solely on the parties' pretrial submission of proposed jury charges does not preserve issues of charge error for appellate review."



LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN

J.A. Masters Investments v. Beltramini, 117 F.4th 321 (5th Cir. 2025)

"Plaintiffs' objection to Mauro's testimony cannot be squared with their later assent to admit Joint Exhibit 1, an exhibit that included Mauro's expenses calculations—the same exact content of his testimony. Plaintiffs have therefore waived any right to complain about it on appeal.





LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN

37

Zyla Life Sciences v. Wells Pharma, 134 F.4th 326 (5th Cir. 2025)

"[P]reemption doctrine comes from the Supremacy Clause. But as the Supreme Court explained over a century ago, when state law mirrors federal law, it 'recognizes the supremacy of the national law' by 'conform[ing] to it."







Luxottica of Am., Inc. v. Gray, No. 05-23-00020-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas May 5, 2025)

"The assignment agreement for each store, signed in June 2016 by Luxottica and Brave Optical, indicated that Brave Optical 'is familiar with all obligations being assumed' under the license agreement and ancillary agreements and that if irrevocably and absolutely assumes each and every duty and obligation of [Gutman Vision]."

- "The license agreement for each store states, 'No representations or warranties have been made by [Luxottica] regarding Franchisee's future success relating to the Franchise Business, and Franchisee did not rely on any incidental statements about success made by [Luxottica], its affiliates or employees.""
- "The purchase agreement contained an 'as-is' provision (stating, in part, the business/property is being conveyed 'AS IS WHERE IS, WITHOUT WARRANTY EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED) ... and made the sale contingent on the results of due diligence by appellees ..."


LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN

40



LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN

41



Keiland Constr. Weeks Marine, 109 F.4th 406 (5th Cir. 2024)

COMPENSATION: As full consideration for the satisfactory performance by [Keiland] of this subcontract, [Weeks] shall pay to [Keiland] compensation in accordance with the prices set forth below. [Keiland] shall be unit

[Keilan] halb entitled to the actual and necessary expense of finishing its Work through the date of termination, the actual and necessary expenses of withdrawing from the Project site, and twenty-one percent (215) for overhead and profit associated with its Work through the date of termination....

"Keiland's reading, that the sections required compensation for pretermination work on a lump-sum basis and post-termination work on a costplus basis, is plausible. But so is Weeks's, namely that Section 9 operated to convert all compensation due Keiland to cost-plus upon terminationparticularly given that Section 9 specifies payment for 21% of costs "for overhead and profit associated with Work through the date of termination."

LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN

43



44

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Xerox State & Local Solutions, Inc., No. 05-18-01421-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 12, 2024)

"It is inappropriate for the courts of Texas to disrupt the system of agreements of the different states with Xerox for protection of those states" retailers. Nor is it appropriate for Texas's courts to provide common-law protection for Wai-Mart when the statutes, regulations, and contracts governing the SNAP EBT program failed to do so. We conclude the economic loss rule precludes our finding Xerox had a general common-law duty to prevent Wai-Mart's losses from the store-andforward transactions"





Layla's Day Spa, Inc. v. HD Salon Group, LLC, No. 05-24-00065-CV, (Tex. App.—Dallas May 21, 2025)



"[C]alculation of lost-profit damages must be based on net profits, not on gross revenue or gross profits."

LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN



McConathy v. Foundation Energy Fund, 111 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2024)


"AWI's position elides the distinction between 'finality' for the purposes of appealability and 'finality' for the purposes of res judicata. These are related, but separate concepts. Thus, 'finality for purposes of appeal is not the same as finality for purposes of preclusion.'

... Res judicata does not tie a bankruptcy court's hands to prevent the protection, disposition, or sale of estate property by lifting or modifying the automatic stay as changed conditions warrant."





LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN

















DIFFICULT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE

LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN

55

Little v. Llano County, 106 F.4th 426 (5th Cir. 2025) (en banc)

- <u>Majority:</u> "We hold that plaintiffs cannot challenge the library's decision to remove the 17 books by invoking a right to receive information. Their Free Speech claims must therefore be dismissed."
- <u>Concurrence</u>: "[W]hen a government funds and operates a museum, it necessarily acts as a curator for the public's benefit—and there is no First Amendment claim when the government is curating, not regulating."
- <u>Dissent</u>, "By eliminating the public's right to challenge government censorship of public library books, our court's holding becomes a Trojan horse for the government speech doctrine that fails to command a majority in its own name.... The government may not order books removed from public libraries out of hostility to disfavored ideas and information."

LYNN PINKER HURST SCHWEGMANN

56



DAVID S. COALE Dallas Bar Association June 12, 2025