

REVERSE AND RENDER and Opinion Filed September 14, 2026



**In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

No. 05-26-00215-CV

**ONLINE TRANSPORT SYSTEM INC., Appellant
V.
LORALIN HANKS, Appellee**

**On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-23-11968**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Kennedy, Clinton, and Rossini
Opinion by Justice Kennedy

In this accelerated appeal, OnLine Transport System, Inc. (OLTS) appeals the trial court's order denying its special appearance.¹ In three issues, OLTS argues it is not subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas, it is a separate entity and not the alter ego of any resident corporation, and the trial court's finding of personal jurisdiction in Texas does not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Because we conclude that appellee Loralin Hanks's claims against OLTS do not

¹ See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(7) (permitting an appeal from an interlocutory order that grants or denies a special appearance under TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a, which allows a defendant to specially appear and object to the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant).

arise from or relate to OLTS's contacts with Texas nor is it an alter ego of a resident corporation and, therefore, the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over OLTS, we reverse and render judgment dismissing Hanks's claims against OLTS. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. *See* TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4.

BACKGROUND

On August 18, 2023, Hanks filed the lawsuit in the instant proceedings and later amended her petition to include appellee OLTS and several defendants not parties to this appeal. In her fourth amended petition, her live pleading at the time the trial court denied OLTS's special appearance, Hanks alleged the following.

On November 1, 2022, Hanks was severely injured when the car she was a passenger in collided with a tractor-trailer that was stopped or was moving slowly on a dark interstate highway in Colorado. The trailer that was being hauled was owned or leased by Swift Logistics, LLC (Swift), "hailed by Texas-based Model 2 Transport," and "loaded with boxes that were being shipped by FC Meyer Packaging by virtue of an agreement or agreements with or between Online Transport and [OLTS]." Hanks asserted claims for negligence against the individual driver of the tractor-trailer Iseyas Gebreselase, Model 2 Transport, Swift, Online Transport, OLTS, and FC Meyer Packaging.

According to Hanks, Online Transport and OLTS were closely related entities and had breached their duties to investigate, qualify, monitor, and select a qualified

motor carrier to move freight in intrastate and interstate commerce to customers and the driving public and were negligent in selecting, retaining, entrusting, and monitoring Model 2 Transport and the tractor-trailer driver. Regarding personal jurisdiction, Hanks acknowledged that both Online Transport and OLTS are Indiana corporations and asserted they were both subject to jurisdiction in Texas because of their extensive, constant, and pervasive business contacts and operations in Texas and had availed themselves of the privileges and benefits of conducting business in Texas by contracting with Texas entity Model 2 Transport, conducting business in Texas, and acquiring Mustang, a Texas-based and organized business, in June 2023.

Both Online Transport and OLTS separately filed special appearances and moved to dismiss Hanks's claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction. In its motion, OLTS represented and offered evidence that it is incorporated and headquartered in Indiana and that it was the broker in the contract between Model 2 Transport and FC Meyer Packaging, LLC. OLTS denied engaging in any purposeful, forum-directed activities relating to Hanks's claims. In its motion, Online Transport represented and offered evidence that Online Transport is a motor carrier incorporated and headquartered in Indiana and that it did not contract with Model 2 Transport to haul the load involved in the instant litigation "nor did it have any other cognizable connection to the events made the basis of this lawsuit."

Hanks responded to OLTS's special appearance by asserting that OLTS had continuous, systematic, and purposeful contacts with Texas, offering evidence that

OLTS contracted with “over 1200 Texas motor carriers to haul loads during the two-year period before the crash,” contracted with Texas-based Model 2 Transport for two years prior to the accident, and pointing to OLTS’s discovery responses admitting that during that same two-year period, 7% of all its brokered loads had a destination or origination point in Texas and 7% of its overall revenue came from loads going into or through Texas. She also argued that OLTS was negligent in selecting Texas-based Model 2 Transport to haul the load involved in the accident, such that a substantial connection exists between the underlying litigation and Texas. As part of her response, Hanks asserted that OLTS and Online Transport were closely related entities, either as alter egos, or agent and principal, or otherwise, such that they should be treated as one combined entity for jurisdictional purposes.

After conducting separate hearings on the special appearances of Online Transport and OLTS, the trial court granted that of Online Transport and dismissed Hanks’s claims against it, but it denied that of OLTS. This appeal follows.

APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant to issue a binding judgment.” *BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik*, 716 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tex. 2025) (quoting *LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan*, 670 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. 2023)). Texas courts, specifically, exercise personal jurisdiction over litigants by reference to the Texas long-arm statute and federal constitutional due-process guarantees. *Id.* (citing *LG Chem Am.*, 670 S.W.3d at 346; *Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom*, 414

S.W.3d 142, 149 (Tex. 2013)). While “[a]llegations that a tort was committed in Texas satisfy our long-arm statute,” those allegations “must also satisfy due-process requirements.” *Id.* at 104 (quoting *Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC*, 625 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2021)).

Our primary concern in personal-jurisdiction cases is “the constitutional right to due process.” *Id.* (quoting *LG Chem*, 670 S.W.3d at 346) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). As set forth by *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper where the nonresident defendant has “certain minimum contacts” with the forum state “such that the maintenance of the suit” against it “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” *Id.* (citing 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting *Milliken v. Meyer*, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).

Under the minimum-contacts prong of the analysis, we consider whether a defendant has established contacts with the state by purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting activities there, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of the forum’s laws. *Elecs. Rsch., Inc. v. Reyna ex rel. J.M.A.*, No. 05-24-01097-CV, 2025 WL 2076021, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 23, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing *TV Azteca, S.A.B. de C.V. v. Ruiz*, 490 S.W.3d 29, 37–38 (Tex. 2016)). Three principles guide our purposeful-avaiement analysis: (i) only the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant—not the unilateral activity of another party or a third person; (ii) the contacts must be purposeful rather than

random, fortuitous, or attenuated; and (iii) the defendant must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by availing itself of the jurisdiction. *Id.*

There are “two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general (sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called case-linked) jurisdiction.” *BRP-Rotax*, 716 S.W.3d at 104 (quoting *Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021)). Hanks contends the exercise of only specific jurisdiction is supported by the record and law in this case. Specific personal jurisdiction, “covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims” than general jurisdiction would allow. *Id.* (quoting *Ford Motor*, 592 U.S. at 359). For Texas courts to do so here, the evidence must satisfy a well-established two-prong test. *See id.* (citing *LG Chem*, 670 S.W.3d at 347). First, OLTS must have taken “some act by which [it] purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [Texas], thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” *Id.* (quoting *Hanson v. Denckla*, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). Second, the claims must “arise out of or relate to” OLTS’s Texas-focused activities. *Id.* (quoting *Ford*, 592 U.S. at 359 (quoting *Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal.*, 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017))).

In a specific-jurisdiction case, the minimum-contacts analysis focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. *Elec. Rsch.*, 2025 WL 2076021, at *3 (citing *Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg*, 221 S.W.3d 569, 575–76 (Tex. 2007)). In *Moki Mac*, the Texas Supreme Court held that specific

jurisdiction's nexus requirement is satisfied only if there a substantial connection between the defendant's forum contacts and the operative facts of the litigation. *Id.* (citing 221 S.W.3d at 585). We recently reaffirmed that the substantial-connection test still governs in specific-jurisdiction cases despite the United States Supreme Court's recent *Ford Motor Co.* decision. *Id.* (citing *Conexiones Tornado S. de RL. de CV v. Ramirez de Munoz*, No. 05-23-00353-CV, 2024 WL 4262405, at *5–7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 23, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

Finally, even if the defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state, an exercise of personal jurisdiction violates due process if it offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. *Id.* (citing *TV Azteca*, 490 S.W.3d at 55). The exercise of jurisdiction rarely offends fair play and substantial justice when the nonresident defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state. *Id.* (citing *Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co.*, 278 S.W.3d 333, 341 (Tex. 2009)).

A nonresident defendant may challenge a Texas court's personal jurisdiction over it by filing a special appearance. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a. The plaintiff bears the initial burden to plead sufficient allegations to bring the nonresident defendant within the reach of the long-arm statute. *LG Chem Am.*, 670 S.W.3d at 346 (citing *Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc.*, 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010)). The defendant then bears the burden to negate all bases of personal jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff. *Id.* The defendant can negate personal jurisdiction on either a

factual or legal basis. *Id.* It can present evidence that contradicts the plaintiff's factual allegations supporting the assertion of personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiff can then respond with its own evidence supporting its allegations. *Id.* Or the defendant can show that even if the plaintiff's alleged facts are true, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. *Id.*

Although the trial judge acts as the factfinder and must resolve any factual disputes in the special-appearance evidence, the judge must accept as true any clear, direct, and positive evidence presented in an undisputed affidavit. *Elecs. Rsch.*, 2025 WL 2076021, at *3 (citing *Forever Living Prods. Int'l, LLC v. AV Eur. GmbH*, 638 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.), and *Smith v. Patrick W.Y. Tam Tr.*, 296 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Tex. 2009) (discussing circumstances under which evidence must be taken as true as a matter of law)).

When we review a trial court's order deciding a special appearance, we review the trial court's factual findings, whether express or implied, for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. *Id.* (citing *BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand*, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794–95 (Tex. 2002)). In a legal-sufficiency review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial judge's ruling and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. *Id.* (citing *City of Keller v. Wilson*, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005)). The evidence is legally sufficient if it enables reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the finding in question. *Id.* (citing *City of Keller*, 168 S.W.2d at 827). In a factual-sufficiency review, we consider all the

evidence and set the finding aside only if the evidence supporting it is so weak, or the contrary evidence is so overwhelming, that the finding is clearly wrong and unjust. *Id.* (citing *Hoss v. Alardin*, 338 S.W.3d 635, 651 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.)).

The ultimate question of whether the trial court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant presents a question of law that we review de novo. *See BRP-Rotax*, 716 S.W.3d at 103 (citing *Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell*, 549 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2018)). Where the “relevant facts” are undisputed, “we consider only the legal question [of] whether [those] facts establish Texas jurisdiction.” *Id.* (quoting *Old Republic*, 549 S.W.3d at 558).

DISCUSSION

In its first issue, OLTS argues that it demonstrated it does not have minimum contacts with Texas, the operative facts in this case are not substantially connected to Texas, its alleged conduct occurred in Pennsylvania such that the trial court erred by denying its special appearance, and the Colorado accident did not arise out of and was not related to any contacts OLTS may have had with Texas.

As explained above, specific-jurisdiction minimum contacts are present if the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum and the defendant’s alleged liability arises from or relates to the defendant’s forum contacts. *Elecs. Rsch.*, 2025 WL 2076021, at *4 (citing *Moki Mac*, 221 S.W.3d at 576). The second element requires a substantial connection between the defendant’s forum contacts and the

operative facts of the case. *Id.* (citing *Moki Mac*, 221 S.W.3d at 585). In applying the substantial-connection test, we consider factors such as what the claim is principally concerned with, whether the defendant’s forum contacts will be the focus of the trial and consume most if not all of the litigation’s attention, and whether the contacts are related to the operative facts of the claim. *Id.* (citing *TV Azteca*, 490 S.W.3d at 53).

The trial judge implicitly found that OLTS failed to negate the two elements of specific jurisdiction. We discuss each in turn.

As for purposeful availment, in her live pleading at the time the trial court denied OLTS’s special appearance, Hanks alleged the trial court has personal jurisdiction over OLTS for its own contacts and that of Online Transport, which she asserts is “a DBA, alter-ego, joint venture, related entity, associated business, joint enterprise or AKA of Defendant Online Transport.” More specifically, Hanks asserted OLTS is amenable to personal jurisdiction in Texas for (1) contracting with Model 2, a Texas entity that is also a defendant in this litigation, and (2) its extensive, constant, and pervasive business contacts and operations in Texas.² In her response

² Relevant excerpts of Hanks’s petition include the following:

- OLTS and Online Transport “have availed themselves of the privileges and benefits of conducting business in the State of Texas by engaging in continuous, systematic, and purposeful business in the State of Texas, and/or by contracting directly or indirectly with Model 2 Transport, a Texas company, in connection with the facts and circumstances relevant to this lawsuit. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to these Defendants’ contacts with Texas.”

to OLTS’s special appearance and on appeal, Hanks’ arguments rely on evidence that OLTS engaged in significant business contacts with Texas, including brokering with 1,206 motor carriers incorporated in Texas in the two years preceding the accident in Colorado and OLTS’s discovery responses admitting that during that same two-year period, 7% of all its brokered loads had a destination or origination point in Texas and 7% of its overall revenue came from loads going into or through Texas. Hanks also points out that the brokerage contract between OLTS and Texas-based Model 2 Transport renewed automatically and that OLTS had booked four previous loads to Model 2 Transport, two of which had delivery endpoints in Texas. Hanks argues these contacts demonstrate OLTS sought some benefit, advantage, or profit from its contacts with Texas, such that it “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Texas.” On appeal, OLTS argues these contacts

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- “The Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over [OLTS and Online Transport] does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
 - OLTS and Online Transport “are subject to jurisdiction in the State of Texas because of their extensive, constant, and pervasive business contacts and operations in the state.”
 - OLTS and Online Transport “or their subsidiaries, affiliated businesses, alter-egos, or other related or associated businesses or entities operate commercial vehicles in Texas, employ Texas residents and solicit Texas residents for employment, own, lease and/or operate commercial real estate properties in Texas, and generally conduct and direct substantial, core business operations from and within the State of Texas.”
 - “Online Transport acquired Mustang, a Texas based and organized business, in or around June 2023, and Mustang conducts business in Texas, on behalf of or as a part of Online Transport and Online Transport System, under the name of Online Transport and Online Transport System, from its headquarters in Texas.”

We note that neither party addresses Online Transport’s acquisition of Mustang, likely because as mentioned in the petition, the acquisition took place in 2023 after the 2022 accident.

are insufficient to establish purposeful availment because they are at most evidence that OLTS communicated with Texas residents and sent money to Texas residents.

As a necessary corollary to the principle that jurisdiction exists only when the defendant's forum contacts are purposeful, contacts that are "random, isolated, or fortuitous" are not sufficient to hale a nonresident defendant into the jurisdiction. *State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft*, 669 S.W.3d 399, 420 (Tex. 2023) (citing *Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten*, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005) (quoting *Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc.*, 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984))). In other words, for Texas courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over non-resident brokers, their contacts with Texas cannot be accidental, mere happenstance, or simply foreseeable. *See id.* But, even assuming, without deciding, the contacts here were not merely fortuitous and were indeed purposeful, there must be a substantial connection between those contacts and the operative facts of the litigation. *See Old Republic*, 549 S.W.3d at 560 (citing *Moki Mac*, 221 S.W.3d at 585, and *Michiana*, 168 S.W.3d at 795).

The factual bases of Hanks's negligence claims against OLTS are that it breached its duties to investigate, qualify, monitor, and select a qualified motor carrier to move freight in intrastate and interstate commerce for customers and the driving public and was negligent in selecting, retaining, entrusting, and monitoring Model 2 Transport and the tractor-trailer driver. In particular, Hanks's fourth amended petition alleged OLTS was negligent by:

- not utilizing or ignoring the information available regarding Model 2 Transport and/or Gebreselase (individual driver of the tractor-trailer who contracted with Model 2 Transport);
- selecting and retaining Model 2 Transport when it did not have an adequate motor carrier safety rating;
- failing to further investigate Model 2 Transport and/or Gebreselase, its driver, to determine the qualifications of Gebreselase;
- failing to perform or improperly perform background, driving record, physical fitness, and/or other character investigations that would have revealed that Model 2 Transport and/or Gebreselase were unsafe or incompetent to perform the task assigned;
- failing to further investigate Model 2 Transport to ensure that it had proven and documented safety management controls in place;
- failing to adopt policies and procedures reasonably likely to prevent or limit the selection of unqualified and unsafe motor carriers and drivers from transporting freight;
- failing to enforce policies and procedures reasonably likely to prevent or limit the selection of unqualified and unsafe motor carriers and drivers from transporting freight;
- failing to adopt or enforce policies and procedures that were reasonably likely to prevent or limit motor carriers and drivers from violating state traffic laws and the FMCSRs while hauling freight;
- hiring and retaining Model 2 Transport and/or Gebreselase, despite the existence and ready availability of information indicating a deficient, or non-existent, safety rating and driving record, which were or should have been known to OLTS;
- failing to verify and ensure that Model 2 Transport hired drivers that would operate the commercial motor vehicle and trailer in a reasonably safe manner and abide by the laws governing the safe inspection, maintenance, and operation of commercial motor vehicles;
- failing to perform or improperly performing review, audit and selection actions to verify that Model 2 Transport and Gebreselase were

knowledgeable of an in compliance with laws governing the safe inspection, maintenance, and operation of commercial motor vehicles;

- failing to perform or improperly performing performance reviews and records checks that would have revealed that Model 2 Transport and Gebreselase were unfit to safely operate a commercial motor vehicle and/or use a trailer; and
- entrusting the transportation of freight and trailer usage in interstate commerce to Model 2 Transport and Gebreselase who was not properly trained and did not have the proper education, background, training, or experience to safely transport the freight, and who was an incompetent and/or reckless commercial motor vehicle driver.

OLTS argues it offered evidence that all of the foregoing bases for Hanks's claims took place outside of Texas. Its representative who arranged for Model 2 Transport to transport the freight to Colorado was physically located in Pennsylvania. The contract between OLTS and Model 2 Transport provides it "shall be deemed to have been drawn in accordance with the statute and laws of the State of Indiana and in the event of any disagreement or dispute, the laws of this state shall apply and a suit must be brought in this state."

We note that of the purposeful availment allegations discussed above, the only act that has any connection to Hanks's claims is that Model 2 Transport is a Texas-based entity. However, that fact has nothing to do with the operative facts of Hanks's claims, which is whether OLTS was negligent in entering into a brokerage contract with Model 2 Transport to transport product to Colorado. Likewise, the facts that OLTS has brokered with other carriers incorporated in Texas, 7% of all its brokered loads had a destination or origination point in Texas, and 7% of its overall revenue

came from loads going into or through Texas will not be at issue at trial, nor do Hanks’s claims principally concern any of those facts. Thus, these alleged facts lack a substantial connection to Hanks’s claims, cannot support the trial judge’s ruling, and must be disregarded. *Elecs. Rsch.*, 2025 WL 2076021, at *5 (citing *TV Azteca*, 490 S.W.3d at 36 n.4, for holding that specially appearing defendant can prevail by showing that plaintiff’s allegations, even if true, do not meet personal-jurisdiction requirements); *see also, e.g., Conexiones Tornado S. de RL. de CV v. Ramirez de Munoz*, No. 05-23-00353-CV, 2024 WL 4262405, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 23, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (similarly holding lack of substantial connection in suit involving bus crash in Mexico allegedly caused by driver negligence because “[t]he operative facts of the litigation are limited to questions of whether the bus driver acted as a reasonably prudent person while operating the vehicle and whether Conexiones acted as a reasonably prudent person in placing that driver behind the wheel” [such that] “there is no dispute that the acts and omissions Appellees complain of occurred in Mexico.”).

Hanks urges that the important jurisdictional fact in this case is that OLTS selected a Texas-based carrier and that it had contracted with more than 1,000 other Texas-based carriers such that a substantial connection exists between Texas and the underlying litigation. However, such reasoning was rejected in *Moki Mac*, in which the defendant challenging personal jurisdiction in Texas had purposefully availed itself of Texas by marketing and advertising activities purposefully directed at

gaining Texas customers, but the operative facts of the suit concerned principally the guides' conduct of the hiking expedition and whether they exercised reasonable care in their supervision of their charges. 221 S.W.3d at 585. Similarly, we conclude that in this case, the forum contact allegations that OLTS brokered agreements with numerous Texas entities and entered into such an agreement with the Texas-based carrier involved in this accident is not substantially related to the operative facts of Hanks's claim that OLTS was negligent in contracting with Model 2 Transport. *See id.*

Indeed, we conclude the analysis here is similar to that in our recent opinion of *Electronics Research, Inc. v. Reyna ex rel. J.M.A.*, in which a Texas resident died in an accident at a construction site in Indiana, and the defendants were two Indiana corporations who were alleged to have, among other things, failed to hire competent employees and to adequately train and supervise its employees despite the fact that the defendants recruited the Texas resident who died and other Texas residents. *See Elecs. Rsch.*, 2025 WL 2076021, at *5.

Because we conclude that Hanks's claims against OLTS do not arise from or relate to OLTS's contacts with Texas, we sustain OLTS's first issue.

In its second issue, OLTS argues that it is a separate entity and not the alter ego of third party Online Transport. However, in order for Hanks to assert that OLTS is the alter ego of Online Transport and thus subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas, she "must prove that [OLTS] is actually the alter ego of a resident

corporation.” *Creation Techs. Tex., LLC v. AEG Power Sols. B.V.*, No. 05-19-00331-CV, 2019 WL 5884431, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 12, 2019, no pet.) (quoting *Nichols v. Tseng Hsiang Lin*, 282 S.W.3d 743, 750 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.)). The trial court has already ruled that Online Transport is not a Texas resident corporation and is not otherwise subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas, and Hanks has not appealed that ruling. Accordingly, if the trial court based its ruling on OLTS’s special appearance on an alter ego theory, it erred in doing so. Therefore, we sustain OLTS’s second issue.

In its third issue, OLTS asserts that the trial court’s finding of personal jurisdiction in Texas does not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In light of our resolution of OLTS’s first two issues, we need not address its third. *See, e.g., Elecs. Rsch.*, 2025 WL 2076021, at *12; *see also* TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

CONCLUSION

Because we conclude that Hanks’s claims against OLTS do not arise from or relate to OLTS’s contacts with Texas nor is it an alter ego of a resident corporation and, therefore, the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over OLTS, we

reverse and render judgment dismissing Hanks's claims against OLTs.

/Nancy Kennedy/
NANCY KENNEDY
JUSTICE