While Bruce Adams was carrying out his duties as a senior “troubleshooter” for defendant Oncor, he fell 25 feet from a utility pole and broke his back.  Adams spent weeks in the hospital and underwent several surgeries.  While Adams recovered, he received his full salary under Oncor’s salary continuation policy, but, when it appeared that Adams would no longer be able to return to work as a troubleshooter, Oncor sent him its standard letter informing him, among other things, that if he could not return to perform the “essential job duties of [his] occupation” within several months he would be terminated.  Although Oncor worked with Adams to find a position as a dispatcher, this new position did not work out.  Adams sued, alleging that Oncor violated section 451.001 of the Texas Labor Code by wrongfully terminating his employment in retaliation for his filing a workers’ compensation claim.

The Court granted Oncor’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Adams had presented no evidence demonstrating that his termination was the result of his filing a workers’ compensation claim.  Instead, the Court held that Oncor had terminated Adams “based on the uniform application of a reasonable absence control policy.”

Adams v. Oncor Electric Delivery Co., LLC, NO05-11-00618

The Dallas Court of Appeals’ recent series of shareholder oppression cases is making its way to the Texas Supreme Court.  Today’s list of petitions granted included Ritchie v. Rupe, in which the Dallas Court of Appeals held that held a minority shareholder who had sought to leave the company was entitled to “fair market value” for her shares, including “discounts for lack of marketability and for the [s]tock’s minority position.“  That holding was quite different than the subsequent opinion in Cardiac Perfusion Services, Inc. v. Hughes, in which the court of appeals held that the minority shareholder was entitled to a “fair value” buyout, with no discounts, because the shareholder was being forced out of the company.

You can find links to the parties’ briefs in the Ritchie case here.  Oral argument is set for February 26.  In the meantime, the motion for rehearing at the court of appeals is still pending in the Cardiac Perfusion case.

While the blog has been quiet for a while, the justices at the original 600 Commerce have been clearing out a lot of summary dismissals lately (not to mention handling their usual docket of criminal and family law cases, which we generally don’t blog about here).  Three of those short dismissal opinions today turn on issues that may be of some interest.

In Earth Energy Utility Corp. v. Environmentally Engineered Equipment, Inc., No. 05-10-01610-CV, the court of appeals had previously granted leave for the appellant’s attorneys to withdraw.  The court instructed the appellant corporation that it needed to provide notice of the identity of substitute counsel, and even granted an additional 45 days to do so.  Four months later, the appellant still had not obtained successor counsel, and so the court dismissed the appeal.  The lesson: Corporations still can’t represent themselves pro se.

In Bryant v. US Bank, N.A., No. 05-11-00121-CV, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal due to the appellant’s lack of standing.  The appellant had certainly had standing to defend the case when US Bank sued her in a forcible detainer proceeding, but the trial court subsequently dismissed the bank’s case for want of prosecution.  For some reason, the defendant sought appellate review of the DWOP.  Because her rights were not prejudiced when the trial court dismissed the bank’s case against her, the court of appeals determined that she lacked standing to appeal.

Finally, in Olanya v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 05-11-00878, the bank had actually been awarded judgment for possession in another forcible detainer case.  But the defendant did not supercede the judgment pending appeal, and the bank took possession of the property.  Since the entire point of a forcible detainer claim is to obtain immediate possession of the property, and that had already occurred, the issue of immediate possession had been rendered moot.  Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal.

It has been a slow couple weeks here at 600 Commerce, as the court of appeals has been taking it easy with commercial cases recently.  We’ll be back as soon as the court issues any new ones.  In the meantime, feel free to drop by our sister blog, 600 Camp, to see what kind of “persuasive authority” the Fifth Circuit has been issuing .