In Conexiones Tornado S. de Rl. de CV, the Fifth Court reversed the denial of a special appearance, made by a Mexican bus company sued for negligence after a bus crash in Mexico. A key issue presented was whether, on this record, the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court required reconsideration of the Texas Supreme Court’s focus on the “operative facts” of a case as part of the inquiry about specific jurisdiction.

Legally, the Court held that the supreme court’s “‘“substantial connection’ test was not abrogated by Ford Motor,” and factually, the Court found that Ford Motor was distinguishable, noting: “Unlike Ford, Conexiones has not conceded purposeful availment in Texas. Conexiones argues not only that it lacks Texas contacts, but also that it has structured its business in such a way as to avoid subjecting itself to personal jurisdiction here.” No. 05-23-00353-CV (Sept. 23, 2024) (mem. op.).

In Virtuolotry LLC v. Westwood Motorcars LLC, among other holdings, the Fifth Court reversed a judgment that awarded actual and exemplary damages to a tenant who claimed to have been constructively evicted by the landlord’s owner. The damages were assessed against the owner, individually. The Court noted that the tenant was actually evicted as a result of an FED case, and thus held that “[i]f an actual eviction occurs, there can be no constructive eviction.” In this regard, the Court also noted the distinction between constructive eviction and wrongful eviction claims. No. 05-19-01055-CV (Sept. 17, 2024) (mem. op.). LPHS represented Virtuolotry in the case.

Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. MB2 Dental Solutions, LLC declined to take a permissive appeal, stating:

Regarding [Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code] section 51.014(d)’s second requirement, generally, a trial court will make a finding that an appeal will facilitate final resolution of the case “when resolution of the legal question dramatically affects recovery in a lawsuit.” Conversely, when other issues are left pending in the litigation, ultimate termination of the litigation is not advanced by allowing immediate appeal of an otherwise interlocutory order.

No. 05-24-00288-CV (Sept. 20, 2024) (mem. op.).

In re Dallas HERO grants mandamus relief in a dispute about amendments to the Dallas city charter. The supreme court held that the City’s additions to an election ballot about proposed amendments failed to satisfy the necessary standards for clarity and definiteness, stating:

… the propositions contradict each other, and the ballot language as a whole will confuse and mislead voters because it does not acknowledge these contradictions or address the effect of the primacy provisions, which are chief features central to the character and purpose of the council-initiated propositions. Because the citizen-initiated propositions must appear on the ballot and the parties have agreed to the ballot language for those propositions, we conclude the proper remedy is to direct the city council not to include its duplicative propositions on the ballot.

No. 24-0678 (Tex. Sept. 11, 2024).

A party sought to avoid the effect of a “prevailing party” attorneys’ fee provision in MRT of Kemp TX-SNF, LLC v. Lloyd Douglase Enterprises LC. The Fifth Court disagreed:

“MRT is not a party to PSA 1. But MRT embraced PSA 1 by seeking to enforce its terms. By doing so, MRT subjected itself to the entirety of the terms of PSA 1, including the attorney’s fee provision in Article 28.”

No. 05-23-00574-CV (Sept. 5, 2024).

State of Texas v. Richardson presented an interesting issue–whether the allocation of cases among intermediate appellate districts creates constitutional or Voting Rights Act problems–but did not present a claim against any of the defendants: “[T]he Secretary [of State] or Governor … play ‘no role in the redistricting procedure delegated’ to the legislature, the supreme court, the Judicial Districts Board, or the Legislative Redistricting Board.” No. 05-23-00325-CV (Aug. 29, 2024) (mem. op.).

TCHDallas2, LLC v. Espinoza, a dispute about the certificate of occupancy for a poker club, turns on an issue about the standard of review for a Board of Adjustment decision about zoning. As the Fifth Court sumarized:

The verified record reflects that the BOA’s decision was based upon significant historical facts relating to governmental oversight, review, and approval. Specifically, TCH was issued a C.O. after two years of due diligence during which time TCH worked with the city attorney and the city council to ensure the planned  operations would comply with all relevant laws and local ordinances. TCH conducted its operations without making any changes for nearly fourteen months after the issuance of the C.O., and TCH was not prosecuted by the district attorney or any other agency. Nevertheless, in December 2021, the building official revoked TCH’s C.O. on the basis that TCH’s operations at the location as described in the land use statement violated Texas Penal Code section 47.04. The discussion among the members of the BOA reflected that the issue of whether TCH’s operations were legal or illegal had not been determined by a court of law, and it was not clear whether TCH’s operations came under the safe harbor provision of penal code section 47.04. In this specific context, the BOA voted unanimously to reverse the building official’s revocation of TCH’s C.O. 

Acknowledging that a question of law (the legality of the club’s operations in light of the state’s gambling laws) was presented to some degree, the Court held that the BOA was within its discretion this specific decision, such that “the trial court effectively substituted its discretion for that of the BOA in this case in which the BOA could have reached multiple decisions.” No. 05-22-01278-CV (Aug. 27, 2024) (mem. op.).

In Powerhouse Ministries v. Friendly Church, the Fifth Court reversed a trial court’s judgment that awarded church property to a group of members who had left the original church and formed a new and independent entity.

The Court first held that ecclesiastical immunity didn’t apply to the trespass-to-try-title claim in the case. Then, the Court determined that the original church, which had changed its name to “Powerhouse,” was the same entity that had acquired the property over time through five deeds–while the new entity, which had adopted the name “Friendly,” had no claim to the property based on its name alone.

“[T]he fact that the entity later changed its name does not change the facts of its acquisition, possession, and operation of the Property,” said the Court, and “when the members of the Separated Friendly Church left the Original Friendly Church, they abandoned any claim to the Property.” No. 05-23-00824-CV (Aug. 27, 2024) (mem. op.).