Bone-Martin v. Moss addressed federal copyright preemption in the context of a judgment-collection action. The Fifth Court held that the the trial court lacked jurisdiction to divest the appellants of their federal copyrights and transfer ownership of certain copyrighted videos to the appellees.

The Court emphasized that the Copyright Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts over matters related to copyright ownership and transfer. Therefore, “the trial court had no jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the videos and whether the purported transfer of videos to Google or another virtual platform was a ‘voluntary transfer’ under the Copyright Act.” No. 05-22-00439-CV (Feb. 13, 2025) (mem. op.).

Vincent v. Deutsche Bank reversed a judgment in a FE&D case when:

The trial court’s June 12 written notice that trial was set for July 14, following the trial court’s instruction to “reset” the case, establishes that the trial court “reset” the case on July 14, but then proceeded to trial on June 15 without notice to Vincent. When a case previously has been set for trial, the trial court “may reset said contested case to a later date on any reasonable notice to the parties or by agreement of the parties.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 245. Here, however, there is nothing in the record to show that that Vincent received “reasonable”—or any—notice of the proceedings on June 15.

No. 05-23-00705-CV (Feb. 20, 2025) (mem. op.).

The supreme court rejected a claim of an informal fiduciary duty arising from an accountant-client / business relationship in Pitts v. Rivas:

This evidence comes nowhere close to creating a fiduciary relationship under our precedents. There is no evidence that a special relationship of trust and confidence preceded the parties’ business agreement. Rivas’s subjective trust in the Accountants is no evidence of a fiduciary relationship. Providing discounted commercial services— like home-building—to a business associate does not impose fiduciary duties on the recipient. And the evidence offered to show a special personal relationship between Rivas and the Accountants amounts only to business conversations, a few dinners, and a close friendship between their sons.

A four-Justice concurrence, written by Justice Huddle, questioned the validity of the entire concept of an informal fiduciary duty:

In these contexts, heightened legal duties are justified because the fiduciary is empowered—if not to direct, at least to impact—the rights and affairs of others. But the same is not true in the context of so-called “informal” fiduciary relationships. The construct is flawed because the so-called “informal” fiduciary wields no legal authority to direct another’s affairs that could justify a corresponding heightened fiduciary duty. The Court’s refusal to find that an informal fiduciary duty arose in any case in almost fifty years, despite the theory’s frequent invocation, proves it is time to disavow the notion that “certain informal relationships may give rise to a fiduciary duty.”

No. 23-0427 (Tex. Feb. 21, 2025).

In re Ruff found that an order was too vague to enforce by contempt. The order involved discovery obligations and the relevant paragraph was as follows:

The Fifth Court held: “[R]reasonable people could come to different conclusions as to what relator was supposed to do in order to comply with this provision of the March 23, 2021 order. Consequently, that provision is too unclear to support a judgment of contempt.” Specifically:

• How to comply? “The first sentence of the provision requires him to “organize” both (i) boxes and documents that he previously produced in response to the court’s November 29, 2018 order and (ii) any other documents responsive to that order. It is unclear how relator is supposed to “organize” the category (i) materials because those materials—boxes and documents that he previously produced in response to a specific court order—are by definition no longer in his possession.”
• What documents? And category (ii) of this first sentence is ambiguous because it is not clear whether this category of “other documents responsive” to the court’s November 29, 2018 order is limited to documents that relator had previously produced in this litigation or whether it also extends to unproduced documents.”
• How to comply, and what documents? “Finally, the last sentence of the provision requires relator to “produce and deliver the documents, organized and identified as aforesaid.” This requirement is also unclear. As noted above, the provision directs relator to organize the boxes and documents that relator had already produced in response to the court’s November 29, 2018 order. Those are specific, existing materials that by definition are no longer in his possession. But the last sentence of the provision implies, contrary to the first sentence, that relator is supposed to produce and deliver a new collection of “organized and identified” materials to RPI’s attorney.”

The case of Totus Group LLC v. Pruitt Family Living Trust provides a “Restatement of TRCP 683” for the Fifth Court’s precedent, reversing a temporary injunction for failing to comply with that rule in many ways, including:

• Failure to explain why the order was necessary (p. 15 quotes the inadequate language used)
• Vague acts to be restrained (pages 18-20)
• Failure to identify a nexus between the restrained acts and the alleged injury (pages 20-21)
• Impermissible use of undefined terms / reference to external documents (pages 22-23 – this is often a challenge in trade-secret cases that involve “Confidential Information” defined in various agreements)

No. 05-23-01222-CV (Feb. 14, 2025) (mem. op.).

Texas law favors arbitration agreements – but even the most favorable view of the topic requires an agreement. In Exencial Wealth Advisors, LLC v. Sipes, the relevant contract required a signature to become effective, and the record did not contain a signed copy of that instrument. Therefore, the contract failed for lack mutual assent, and arbitration of the parties’ dispute was not required. No. 05-24-00964-CV (Jan. 31, 2025) (mem. op.).

The Fifth Court affirmed the temporary injunction against the Dallas short-term rental ordinances, stating:

The Texas Constitution provides: “No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of law of the land.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19. Appellees have “a vested right to lease their properties and this right is sufficient to support a viable due-course-of law claim.” City of Grapevine, 651 S.W.3d at 347. Under the circumstances, we conclude appellees proved their probable right of recovery under their due-course-of-law argument because they alleged they possessed wellestablished rights to lease their property and presented evidence tending to show that the City would deny them those rights by enforcing the two ordinances at issue.

City of Dallas v. DSTRA, No. 05-23-01309-CV (Feb. 7, 2025) (mem. op.). LPHS represents the Appellees in this litigation.

In Expo Group v. Purdy, the Fifth Court addressed whether the temporary injunction and related bond satisfied Rule 684, which requires that the trial court “fix the amount of security to be given by the applicant,” i.e., set a bond. Because the temporary injunction order did not set a specific bond amount, the order was void from inception.

The Court further clarified that the cash already deposited into the court’s registry for a different purpose could not be used to satisfy the bond requirement under Rule 684. It referenced the supreme court’s opinion in Ex parte Lesher, which held that the intent of Rule 684 is to require a bond payable to the party against whom the injunction is issued before the order may lawfully issue. No. 05-24-00653-CV, Jan. 27, 2025 (mem. op.)

My friend Arturo Ayala at CSBA recently wrote this useful article about what happens to a supersedeas bond when the appeal ends.