In mandamus practice, there is an important exception to the “four-month rule” and other laches-related doctrines, which is that “the doctrine of laches does not apply to a void order ….” In re Reiss, No. 05-21-00600 (Feb. 18, 2022) (mem. op.).

In case the point wasn’t clear from the Fifth Court’s recent opinion in In re Tekin & Assocs., No. 05-21-00219-CV (Feb. 9, 2022) (mem. op.), the Court restated it in In re Perez-Merino: “Under prior holdings of this court and others, an unexplained delay of four months or more can constitute laches and result in denial of mandamus relief.” No. 05-22-00082-CV (Feb. 14, 2022) (mem. op.).

“Under prior holdings of this court and others, an unexplained delay of four months or more can constitute laches and result in denial of mandamus relief. Here, relator’s April 6, 2021 petition for mandamus was filed seven months and six days after the trial court’s August 31, 2020 order denying the [Rule 91a] motion to dismiss. We conclude that relator’s unexplained delay bars his right to mandamus relief.” In re Tekin & Assocs., No. 05-21-00219-CV (Feb. 9, 2022) (mem. op.).

The Texas Supreme Court heard arguments today in In re: Estate of Johnson, No. 05-18-01193-CV (Nov. 4, 2019) (mem. op.), which presents a fundamental issue in Texas probate law–whether a beneficiary’s acceptance of benefits under a will defeats that beneficiary’s standing to challenge that will.

Equitable doctrines such as unjust enrichment, unclean hands, and quasi-estoppel are frequently cited, but by their nature, they are difficult to define with specificity. An uncommon “data point” about unjust enrichment appeared in Hawkins v. Jenkins, No. 05-19-01396-CV (Jan. 8, 2021) (mem. op.) The trial court awarded roughly $10,000 in connection with certain home improvements; the Fifth Court affirmed, noting that “the record contains evidence that appellant reaped a financial benefit from the improvements: she sold the house for $77,000 above its value before appellees made the improvements.”

While affirming a relatively straightforward judgment in a home loan dispute, the Fifth Court observed: “The unjust enrichment doctrine applies principles of restitution to disputes where there is no actual contract and is based on the equitable principle that one who receives benefits which would be unjust for him to retain ought to make restitution.” Ihde v. First Horizon Home Loans, No. 05-15-01084-CV (Nov. 28, 2016) (mem. op.) (emphasis added) A counterpoint in this practical but rarely-visited area of remedies law appears in City of Harker Heights v. Sun Meadows Land Ltd., 830 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex. App.–Austin 1992, no writ), which observes: “An action for money had and received may be founded upon an express agreement or one implied in fact, but it is not dependent upon either.” (emphasis added).

A memorandum opinion provides a short lesson in the nature of equitable remedies. Monterey Mushrooms sued Majestic Realty Co. and McLane Foodservice after one of Monterey’s employees slipped and fell on ice located on their property, causing Monterey to pay the worker through its ERISA injury benefits plan. Monterey sued the defendants for equitable subrogation, unjust enrichment, and money had and received. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed no-evidence summary judgment for the defendants. Although Monterey had evidence supporting an equitable right of subrogation, that subrogation claim only put it in the shoes of its injured worker, and there was no evidence that he would have a claim against the defendants. The Court distinguished between haveing a right of subrogation and having the ability to recover under that right. Monterey’s unjust enrichment claim failed because there was no evidence that the defendants received any benefit from Monterey’s payment of its injured worker’s benefits. Nor was there a claim for money had and received because there was no evidence teh defendants received any money or benefits belonging to Monterey.

Monterey Mushrooms, Inc. v. Majestic Realty Co., No. 05-13-01015-CV