A recent order in a long-running commercial dispute illustrates the challenge of crafting protective orders in Texas state court: “On January 24, 2023, we transferred sealed volumes 9 and 10 of the clerk’s record filed in appellate cause number 05-13-01700-CV into this appeal. We gave the parties an opportunity to obtain a sealing order in compliance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a and cautioned that we would order the volumes unsealed should the parties fail to file either a sealing order or status report by February 23, 2022.” At that point, having not received either one, the court ordered the volumes unsealed. Orca Assets GP v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 22-40043-CV (March 23, 2023) (order).
Category Archives: Sealing
Toyota Motor Sales v. Reavis, a companion case to a still-ongoing appeal of a major products-liability judgment, affirmed the denial of Toyota’s motion to seal certain trial exhibits. After reviewing Toyota’s case for confidentiality, the Fifth Court then turned to available less-restrictive means, holding: “Beyond Toyota’s blanket assertions that a total seal is necessary and redaction would be meaningless, Toyota did not offer any additional testimony or evidence regarding whether the Toyota documents could be redacted or otherwise altered while still protecting its interest. Toyota also contends on appeal that it showed sealing was the least restrictive means to protect its interest here because it sought to seal ‘just four exhibits from a trial involving over 900 exhibits and [covering] pages of closed-courtroom testimony from more than 3,200 pages of trial
transcripts.’ This argument misses the point. Rule 76a imposes strict requirements to obtain a sealing order, and parties are not rewarded with a sealing order simply because they ask the court to only seal a few exhibits or a small amount of testimony. No matter how many exhibits a party seeks to seal, that party must still meet the
requirements of the rule.” No. 05-19-00284-CV (Feb. 4, 2021) (mem. op.).
Toyota Motor Sales v. Reavis, a companion case to a still-ongoing appeal of a major products-liability judgment, affirmed the denial of Toyota’s motion to seal certain trial exhibits. Noting the general presumption in favor of open records, the Fifth Court observed, inter alia:
- “[E]ven assuming the court records contain trade secrets, the existence of trade secrets standing alone is insufficient to overcome the presumption of openness and allow the records to be permanently sealed.”
- “Because Toyota did not take adequate steps during trial to protect the exhibits and related testimony from public disclosure and did not seek an instruction prohibiting the jury and other non-parties from discussing the documents beyond the setting of the trial, we conclude any interest Toyota had in maintaining secrecy of the records does not “clearly outweigh” the presumption of openness.”
No. 05-19-00284-CV (Feb. 4, 2021) (mem. op.).
The Court of Appeals has reversed the district court’s order sustaining the special appearance of an Iowa company formed by one of the plaintiff’s former employees. Interestingly, the opinion starts out with some discussion of a recurring problem in Texas practice — namely, the use and treatment of documents filed under seal. In this instance, much of the evidence necessary to determine the special appearance had been sealed by the trial court, including an exhibit that was “the only evidence of the terms of the relationship” between two of the defendants. The Court of Appeals resolved this difficulty by stating that it had made every effort to preserve the confidentiality of the designated materials, but that the appeal could not be decided without mention of some key jurisdictional facts. The lesson here appears to be that the Court will do what it can to preserve the litigants’ confidential information, but if the details are essential to the appeal, you can reasonably expect some of them to come out in an opinion that is a matter of public record.
Moving on to the merits of the special appearance, the evidence showed that Eco Technologies was an Iowa company that had all of its operations located in that state, but that it distributed its products to independent dealers in Texas and elsewhere. One of those dealers in Texas is owned by the plaintiff’s former employee Billy Cox, a Texas resident who also is a part owner of Eco Technologies itself. The plaintiff alleged that Eco Technologies and Cox had interfered with the plaintiff’s Texas contracts and unfairly competed with the plaintiff in Texas, and the Court held that those allegations were sufficient to bring Eco Technologies within the reach of the Texas long arm statute. Citing Iowa law, the Court held that as a member of a member-managed LLC, Cox was an agent of Eco Technologies, and that his recruitment of the plaintiff’s distributors in Texas to enter into relationships with Eco Technologies were jurisdictional contacts attributable to Eco Technologies. The company therefore fell short of its burden to negate the jurisdictional grounds alleged by the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the order sustaining the special appearance and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Masterguard, L.P. v. Eco Techs. Int’l LLC, No. 05-12-01318-CV