The supreme court granted mandamus relief with respect to the denial of a pro hac vice motion in In re AutoZoners, LLC. Among other matters that didn’t support the trial court’s ruling, the Court noted:

Listing out-of-state attorneys whose pro hac vice motions have not yet been granted on a signature block below the name and signature of a Texas attorney is not a problematic practice and provides no grounds for denying a pending or subsequent pro hac vice motion.

The Court further held: “Kern’s participation in one or two Texas cases in the last two years—and five cases in fifteen years—is not ‘appearing in courts in  Texas on a frequent basis” as contemplated by [Tex.R. Govern. Bar Adm’n] 19. Facilitating this kind of rare, occasional participation in Texas cases by an out-of-state attorney is precisely why we allow pro hac vice admission in Texas courts. No. 22-0719 (Tex. April 26, 2024).

The panel majority in Winstead PC v. Moore concluded that the TCPA applied to two of three tort claims by a client against his legal counsel, holding that they implicated the firm’s right of petition, while the third did not have a sufficient connection to the exercise of that right. No. 05-20-00050-CV (Aug. 20, 2021). A dissent would have applied the TCPA to all claims and, from there, concluded that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden.

Two rulings about the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege were recently reversed, by both the Fifth Circuit and Dallas’s Fifth District, in response to mandamus petitions. (This is a cross-post with 600Camp.com.)

  • In the Fifth Circuit: “[A]s Boeing argues, the district court clearly erred in finding that Plaintiffs established a prima facie case that the contested documents were subject to the crime-fraud exception. The district court concluded that the contested documents were reasonably connected to the fraud based on one finding only—that the documents sought ‘f[e]ll within the period Boeing admit to hav[ing] knowingly and intentionally committed “fraud” in the DPA. However, a temporal nexus between the contested documents and the fraudulent activity alone is insufficient to satisfy the second element for a prima facie showing that the crime-fraud exception applies.” In re The Boeing Co., No. 21-40190 (July 29, 2021, unpublished).
  • In the Fifth District, the Court noted: “[A] determination at the TCPA stage as to a prima facie showing does not automatically translate to a prima facie showing for purposes of application of the crime–fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege. The exception UDF attempts to invoke is for crime–fraud, not crime–tort.” From there, it declined to follow a broad view of the exception defined by another Texas intermediate court, “and note that, notwithstanding certain language in the [relevant] opinion, the El Paso court continues to apply the elements of common-law fraud when determining the applicability of the crime fraud exception, rather than requiring proof of a false statement only.” In re Bass, No. 05-21-00102-CV (July 30, 2021) (mem. op.).

In Ferrant v. Lewis Brisbois, No. 05-19-01552-CV (July 14, 2021) (mem. op.), a law firm client contended that no evidence established his consent to an hourly billing arrangement; the Fifth Court affirmed the judgment against him based on this “acknowledgment” at the time the client moved his business from another law firm —

and a “yes” answer to this jury question:

 

 

By early 2019, the attorney-client relationship between Klein and McCray was disintegrating. With a summary judgment hearing looming, Klein moved for continuance and asked for latitude at the hearing “because my client has not provided me with key materials” and discussing the topic of his withdrawal. The trial court then granted summary judgment against McCray (in an order that Klein agreed to “as to form”), after which Klein moved for withdrawal and was allowed to do so.

McCray sought relief from the judgment, “denying he received notice of the summary judgment motion from Klein.” This request led to a difficult, but outcome-determinative question, as to whether Klein’s knowledge should be imputed to McCray, despite their deteriorated relationship:

If [McCray] is correct in his position on the law and facts, then Craddock applies to his claim because it means he would have had no notice of the motion, the failure to respond, or the summary judgment hearing, and a motion for new trial is the proper method to challenge the summary judgment. If he is incorrect on his no-imputation argument, then Carpenter applies and he is required to challenge the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion, which he has not done.

The Fifth Court held that “[b]ecause Klein was still actively (if not sufficiently) representing [McCray] prior to and at the summary judgment hearing, Klein’s knowledge is imputed to [McCray].” McCray v. McCray, No. 05-19-00556-CV (Feb. 20, 2020).

An in-house lawyer for Ruhrpumpen, Inc., a company involved in substantial patent litigation, claimed an interest in the contingent fee agreement of the company’s outside counsel. The Fifth Court rejected the claim, holding: “[W]e conclude that a company’s general counsel owes the company a fiduciary duty not to accept compensation from anyone other than the company for working on a case for the company or for referring the case to a law firm without disclosing that compensation to the company and getting the company’s consent. In this case, Moore did not have authority to consent on Ruhrpumpen’s behalf to the fee-sharing agreement unless he had disclosed the agreement to the management of Ruhrpumpen other than himself.The record establishes that Moore did not disclose the fee-sharing agreement to Ruhrpumpen’s managers. Therefore, Moore did not have authority to consent to the fee-sharing agreement on Ruhrpumpen’s behalf.” Cokinos, Bosien & Young v. Moore, No. 05-18-01340-CV (Feb. 4, 2020) (mem op.)

Ghidoni, the plaintiff in a legal-malpractice case involving the handling of a lawsuit about the noise caused by water wells, offered Anderson as an expert witness. Anderson was a trial lawyer of thirty years’ experience, but had not handled matters involving the specific water-law problem at issue in the underlying case. The Fifth Court affirmed the decision to exclude Anderson:

“By way of analogy, ‘there is no validity . . . to the notion that every licensed medical doctor should be automatically qualified to testify as an expert on every medical question.’ Extending this principle to the topic of legal malpractice, ‘that a person may be a licensed attorney . . . who holds years of experience in the practice of law, standing alone, will not qualify him or her to give an opinion on every conceivable legal question, including legal malpractice issues.” While the record in this case shows that Anderson has handled several malpractice cases as an attorney and has testified as an expert witness in two such cases, it contains no evidence about the particular issues that Anderson handled or addressed in these capacities. Nor did Ghidoni offer evidence regarding the specific water law issues that Anderson has handled. Absent such proof, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Anderson’s testimony.”

Ghidoni v. Skeins. No. 05-18-00355-CV (May 10, 2019) (mem. op.) (citations omitted).

Wyde sued Francesconi for unpaid legal bills; among other defenses, she argued that Wyde did not mitigate his damages by withdrawing when payment problems first became evident. The Fifth Court, noting Wyde’s testimony that “when we take on a client, we’re loathe to make it a purely financial relationship,” and “we stuck it out . . . we aren’t just lawyers who say pay us or to hell with you,” found that he had no duty to mitigate. It reasoned: “[R]equiring or encouraging attorneys to file a motion to withdraw as soon as a client fails to pay conflicts with the aspirational goals of the Texas Lawyer’s Creed.” Wyde v. Franesconi, No. 05-17-01333-CV (Dec. 19, 2018).

In the course of rejecting the plaintiff’s claim of an attorney-client relationship with the defendant, the Fifth Court noted: ‘[W]e are mindful that three Strasburger billing entries from October 6, 2009, October 14, 2009, and November 2, 2009 referred to TSI as “client” and “clients.” However, the remaining billing entries from October 6, 2009 to December 15, 2009 that TSI submitted in response to Strasburger’s summary judgment refer to “Target Strike,” “Target Strike case,” or the “Target Strike matter.” Such passing references to “client” under the facts of this case do not raise an issue of fact about whether there was an intent to create an attorney-client relationship.’ Target Strike Inc. v. Strasburger & Price LLP, No. 05-18-00434-CV (Nov. 19, 2018).

 

In Bethel v. Quilling Selander – what is now the second (here is the first) opinion to note the distinction between “issues” and “arguments” after the Fifth Court’s March 29 en banc opinion in St. John Missionary Baptist Church v. Flakes – the Court observed: “Courts may not consider issues that were not raised in the courts below, but parties are free to construct new arguments in support of issues properly before the court. Thus, to the extent Bethel’s assertion is an argument as opposed to an issue, we address it.” (emphasis in original, citation omitted). The Court was also willing to consider a defense of attorney immunity in the context of a Rule 91 motion to dismiss, notwithstanding other intermediate Texas authority that takes a narrower focus in that procedural setting. No. 05-17-00850-CV (May 30, 2018) (mem. op.)

Tex. R. Evid. 503(d)(2), a long-lived but rarely-cited exception to the attorney-client privilege, applies “[i]f the communication is relevant to an issue between parties claiming through the same deceased client.” In In re: Rittenmeyer, the Fifth Court declined to grant mandamus relief as against an order to produce documents pursuant to this exemption, finding that – like the handful of other cases that have allowed such discovery – the case “involves a dispute between a decedent’s estate and a party who claims to be a beneficiary under the estate either through a subsequent will or because the probated will does not reflect the decedent’s intentions.”  No. 05-17-01378-CV (April 18, 2017) (mem. op.)

In re Guess provides a basic reminder about the limits of pro se representation and legal services from non-lawyers: “Before the Court is relator’s October 5, 2017 petition for writ of mandamus. Bruce Bryant filed this petition for writ of mandamus as relator’s “authorized representative.” Mr Bryant is not an attorney, is not a party to the litigation and, therefore, cannot file a petition on behalf of relator.” Nos. 05-17-01163-CV et seq. (Oct. 11, 2017) (mem. op.)

alternativesIn the legal malpractice case of Ashton v. KoonsFuller, P.C., the Fifth Court affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant law firm. Among other issues addressed, the Court criticized the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert about the defendant’s billing, providing an illustration of the commonly-litigated Daubert/Robinson issue about whether an expert adequately considered alternatives to his or her conclusion: “[W]hile Hill disagrees with the amount of time KoonsFuller spent on discovery matters and preparing for mediation, the affidavit does not state how much time would have been reasonable. Similarly, Hill complains about the number of lawyers and legal assistants billing for those services, but does not suggest what an appropriate number would be.” No. 05-16-00130-CV (May 10, 2017) (mem. op.)

2000px-united_states_fallout_shelter_sign-svgHenry S. Miller Commercial Co. lost a trial on a fraud claim but succeeded in a later malpractice claim against its trial counsel. The Fifth Court resolved two issues – (1) postjudgment assignment of malpractice claims as part of a reorganization was acceptable where “Here, HSM asserted its own malpractice claim against the Lawyers in its own name. It pursued its own claim through trial and judgment. Under these circumstances, HSM’s right ‘to bring [its] own cause of action for malpractice is not vitiated’ by the assignment to its judgment creditors” (applying Tate v. Goins, Underkofler, Crawford & Langdon, 24 S.W.3d 627, 629 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied)); and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing HSM’s claim for gross negligence based on the failure to designate a key responsible third party. Accordingly, because a new trial was required on punitive damages, it was also required on compensatory damages, and thus liability as well. Henry S. Miller Comm’l Co. v. Newsom, Terry & Newsom LLP, No. 05-14-01188-CV (Sept. 14, 2016) (mem. op.)

Last Friday, blog publisher David Coale spoke about recent federal cases on sanctions and professional responsibility issues; for some ethics CLE self-study, here is the handout that he used.

movie-theaterSchultz, owner of a chain of movie theaters, did not want to pay Banowsky, a licensed Texas attorney, for helping Schultz find a theater location.  Schultz won summary judgment based on the Texas Real Estate Licensing Act,  primarily because Banowsky admitted that his work did not involve legal services.  The Fifth Court reversed: “[Schultz] argues that Banowsky’s construction of the Act is both unreasonable and favors the individual interest of an attorney over the interest in protecting the public from unlicensed, unscrupulous, or unqualified persons.  But the fact remains that the plain language of the statute exempts attorneys from all requirements of the Act.”  Banowsky v. Schultz, No. 05-14-01624-CV (Feb. 10, 2016) (mem. op.)

Highland Capital sued the Looper Reed law firm, who represented a former employee in litigation with Highland, alleging that the firm committed several torts against Highland during the course of that representation.  The Fifth Court affirmed the dismissal of those claims on immunity grounds: “[T]he actions themselves—acquiring documents from a client that are the subject of litigation against the client, reviewing the documents, copying the documents, retaining custody of the documents, analyzing the documents, making TexasBarToday_TopTen_Badge_Smalldemands on the client’s behalf, advising a client to reject counter-demands, speaking about an opposing party in a negative light, advising a client on a course of action, and even threatening particular consequences such as disclosure of confidential information if demands are not met—are the kinds of actions that are part of the discharge of an attorney’s duties in representing a party in hard-fought litigation.”  Highland Capital Management LP v. Looper Reed & McGraw, PC, No. 05-15-00055-CV  (Jan. 14, 2016) (mem. op.) (applying Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015)).

After an automobile collision, the Gomez family sued Sol Ly for negligence. Ly was represented by the Herald law firm, which also employed attorney Tim Brandenburg. But while the suit was pending, Brandenburg left Herald to join the law firm of Domingo Garcia, which represented the plaintiffs. Based on the defendant’s oral objection, the trial court granted a mistrial and ordered the defendant to file a motion to disqualify, which was subsequently granted. The plaintiffs failed to obtain substitute counsel, and the case was dismissed for want of prosecution. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The plaintiffs’ pro se motion to reinstate the case following the dismissal challenged only the disqualification, and not the plaintiffs’ failure to appear at the new trial setting. Without a showing that the failure to appear was adequately justified, the Court of Appeals could not conclude that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the motion to reinstate.

Gomez. v. Sol, No. 05-14-00893-CV

Almost a year after the Ebola virus and dozens of news crews arrived in Dallas, the Court of Appeals has conditionally granted mandamus to prevent Texas Health Resources’ insurer from being required to produce a privileged note regarding a plaintiff’s Ebola-related claims. Nina Pham, who contracted the disease while working as a nurse at Presbyterian Hospital, has sued THR on a variety of tort claims for the injuries she sustained from the disease. The single document at issue reflects a conversation among the insurer’s claims adjuster, THR’s associate general counsel, and its risk manager. Although the insurer and its claims adjuster were not parties to the lawsuit, the Court nevertheless held that the communications reflected in the document were privileged. Because the note was made in the course of investigating Pham’s claim, and because the insurer represents the employer rather than itself on claims involving the employer’s liability policy, the note reflected a confidential communication within the scope of the attorney-client privilege.

In re Texas Health Resources, No 05-15-00813-CV

The Court of Appeals has reversed a summary judgment in favor of the attorney defendants in a civil barratry case. The plaintiffs were victims of a pipeline explosion. Their case against the pipeline company eventualy settled, and the lawyers collected their 40% contingency fee. But the plaintiffs learned that they had actually been solicited by a private investigator working for their attorneys, so they sued to rescind the fee agreement and recover their contingency fees. The Court of Appeals agreed that rescission was an available remedy for barratry, and that the attorney defendants had not established their former clients would be unable to make counter-restitution for the benefits they had received from the lawyers.

Neese v. Lyon, No. 05-13-01597-CV

After a jury awarded millions of dollars in damages and the Court of Appeals affirmed, the defendants in that case decided to become plaintiffs by suing their lawyers at Andrews Kurth. The county court at law granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed. In a malpractice case based on an attorney’s conduct in connection with litigation, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that it would have prevailed in the prior case but for the lawyer’s negligence. Concluding that the plaintiffs’ proof on that point was conclusory and speculative, the Court held that there was no evidence in the summary judgment record to establish causation of any injury to the plaintiffs.

Rogers v. Zanetti, No. 05-14-00733-CV

The Dallas Court of Appeals has affirmed summary judgment in favor of former state and federal district court judge Joe Kendall and the law firm of Provost & Umphrey. The lawsuit alleged that the plaintiffs had provided Kendall with confidential information for a possible qui tam lawsuit related to the procurement practices of the Dallas and Houston Independent School Districts, and that Kendall and Provost had improperly used that information in filing a successful qui tam lawsuit on behalf of two other clients. Kendall and Provost sought and obtained summary judgment, arguing that no confidential information has been shared, that no duty of loyalty was owed or breached, that there was no evidence of an attorney-client relationship, and that there was no evidence of damages. Among other things, the Court of Appeals held that there was no evidence Kendall had intended to undertake a legal representation of the plaintiffs by meeting with one of them to discuss the “possibility” of a qui tam lawsuit, and that there was no evidence Kendall had actually disclosed any of the plaintiffs’ confidential information in connection with the lawsuit that was actually filed.

Gillis v. Provost & Umphrey Law Firm, LLP, No. 05-13-00892-CV

Soon after the Plaintiff was sued for an alleged debt, she received a letter from a lawyer soliciting her to speak with him about representing her in the lawsuit.  The attorney’s letter violated a Texas law that made it a crime for lawyers to solicit clients within 31 days of a lawsuit being filed against them.  The Plaintiff brought a civil action against the lawyer pursuant to the 2012 version of the Texas Civil Barratry Statute, which allowed plaintiffs to bring civil barratry claims against attorneys who violated “the laws of this state.”

The trial court granted the lawyer’s motion for summary judgment, based on its findings that the Civil Barratry Statute was unconstitutional and that liability under the statute is predicated upon a criminal prosecution or conviction.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 2012 statute does not require a criminal conviction.  Additionally, the Court overturned the trial court’s holding that the statute was unconstitutional, because deciding the constitutionality of a criminal statute requires the participation of a party “with authority to enforce” the law, which in this case was the Dallas County District Attorney.

Shearer v. Reister, No. 05-12-01475-CV

Marquis Acquisitions and several related entities were sued after a fire at an apartment complex killed three people. The defendants were covered by several layers of insurance, which assumed the defense of the case in successive order as policy limits were exhausted. At each layer, one or another of the defendants sought to reject the insurers’ choice of defense counsel and to be represented instead by the business partner and personal attorney of the defendants’ primary owner. Marquis eventually filed suit against Steadfast Insurance, and that move finally created a conflict between Marquis and the insurer’s chosen counsel that caused the attorney to withdraw. Marquis thereafter sued the insurer to recover “the attorney fees it expended in getting Steadfast to retain separate counsel” for Marquis and some of the other insureds. The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurer, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Marquis could not recover for breach of the insurance contract because it could not identify any specific terms or conditions that required Steadfast to immediately hire separate counsel based on an insured’s unspecified and unsubstantiated allegations of a conflict of interest. Marquis also could not recover the attorney fees it paid to Shaw as damages, since attorney fees are only recoverable “in addition to” the recovery of actual damages, not as independent damages themselves. The court went on to reject Marquis’ claim that Steadfast’s conduct had constituted an unfair or deceptive act or practice under the Insurance Code because Marquis could not point to any alleged misrepresentation by Steadfast, and further held there was no evidence that the insurer had any duty to independently identify conflicts among its insureds when appointing legal counsel to defend them.

Marquis Acquisitions, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., No. 05-11-01663-CV

Timothy Brown, a professional golfer, started a company and then sold it to Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. (“GTPS”).  Brown then worked for GTPS for a while, but the relationship deteriorated and he left the company shortly thereafter.  Brown, however, remained bound by a non-compete agreement with GTPS.  Still, he entered into discussions with Jeff Blankinship to pursue a similar idea to his former company, but this time apart from GTPS.  As Brown negotiated a contract with Blankinship, Brown had his lawyer, Gary Blanscet, review the agreement.  Blanscet required changes to the agreement to reflect Brown’s prior dealings with GTPS.  Blankinship signed the revised agreement without reading it and, a week later, found out about GTPS.  Blankinship sued Brown and Blanscet for, among other things, fraud and negligent misrepresentation.  The trial court granted Blanscet’s no evidence summary judgment motion.  Later, the jury found in favor of Blankinship as against Brown.  Blankinship appealed the trial court’s summary judgment decision concerning Blanscet.

On appeal, the Court found that Blankinship could not establish the reliance element of his causes of action because, among other things, Blankinship admitted at trial that he never read the contract before he signed it.  Blankinship tried to argue that Blanscet had a duty to him under the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct not to make any misrepresentations, but the Court of Appeals found that a non-client cannot rely on an attorney’s representation unless the attorney invites that reliance, such as when the attorney issues an opinion letter or some other type of evaluation.  Because that was not the case here, the Court upheld the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Blanscet.

Blankinship v. Brown

On the eve of trial, the district court granted a motion to withdraw filed by the attorneys for L’Arte de la Mode, Inc., but denied the company’s request for a continuance because it was the client’s fault they had not been paying their bills. The case was called to trial, but nobody appeared for L’Arte. The trial court therefore granted a default judgment for Neiman Marcus, awarding it more than $150,000 in compensatory damages and twice that amount for exemplary damages, all attributable to Neiman’s claim for money had and received.  L’Arte retained substitute counsel, but the trial court denied the company’s motion for new trial. The court of appeals reversed, holding that L’Arte had established all of the elements for a new trial.

The court of appeals analyzed the case under the venerable standards of Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939), which requires the movant to establish that (1) the failure to appear was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but was the result of an accident or mistake, (2) the movant has a meritorious defense, and (3) granting the motion will occasion no delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff. L’Arte established the first element through the affidavit of its in-house counsel, who stated that L’Arte had not received either the attorneys’ motion to withdraw or the order granting the withdrawal. L’Arte also established that it had a meritorious defense through its contention that Wells Fargo actually holds Neiman’s money, thanks to its factoring arrangement with L’Arte. Finally, the court of appeals held that L’Arte had satisfactorily assured that a new trial would not injure Neiman Marcus by agreeing to pay its attorney fees incurred in obtaining the default judgment, despite Neiman’s objection that the promise was hollow in light of L’Arte’s inability to pay its own attorneys and its failure to post a bond to supersede the existing judgment. The court of appeals therefore reversed the default and remanded to the district court for a trial on the merits.

L’Arte de la Mode, Inc. v. Neiman Marcus Group, No. 05-11-01440-CV

The court affirmed the dismissal of a condemnation case in which the defendant failed to appear at trial. The City petitioned for condemnation and special commissioners made an award to McKinney for the taking. McKinney filed an objection, but when the case was called for trial McKinney’s attorney withdrew and another person, Boles, attempted to file a motion for continuance on behalf of McKinney, who was absent. Boles stated that he had “power of attorney” to represent McKinney, though he was not, in fact, a licensed attorney. The court refused to consider the motion and dismissed the case due to McKinney’s absence. On pro se appeal, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because McKinney presented no evidence that he was not negligent for failing to find representation to replace his original attorney, and the could determine that such a failure was his own fault.

W.A. McKinney v. City of Cedar Hill, No. 05-12-00368-CV

James Owen did not have a winning case.  In fact, the lawsuit he filed on behalf of Rhonda Krisle against Rusty Wallis Volkswagen asserted the precise claim (under the Texas Finance Code) that the Court of Appeals had rejected several years earlier.  What’s more, Owen knew about this earlier case because he had been counsel for the losing appellant.  Despite this, Owen still brought suit.  After motion practice, which ended in a non-suit of all claims by Krisle, Rusty Wallis moved for sanctions.  Not surprisingly, the trial court sanctioned Owen to the tune of $20,000.

Owen appealed.  The Court of Appeals, however, was equally unimpressed was Owen’s reasons why he should not be sanctioned, which included the claim that the decisions by the Court of Appeals do not have binding precedential value unless they are explicitly approved by the Texas Supreme Court.   Among other things, the Court found that, based on the explicit precedent rejecting Krisle’s claim, as well as Owen’s clear awareness of this precedent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Owen.  After rejecting the rest of Owen’s arguments against sanctions, the Court then concluded that Owen’s appeal was “objectively frivolous” and cited him for an additional $7,500.

Owen v. Rusty Wallis Volkswagen, No. 05-10-01021

The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant on a breach of fiduciary duty claim. Balestri was a lawyer who left his practice to become CFO of an internet company. Balestri’s friend Kiger later contacted Balestri to ask about certain industry contacts that Kiger believed could help him to implement a new business idea. Kiger’s business never materialized. Balestri subsequently invested in a business in the same industry, and Kiger sued for breach of fiduciary duty. Kiger alleged that Balestri acted as his attorney and then revealed his confidential and trade secret information to the new business. The trial court granted both traditional and no evidence summary judgment against Kiger. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that despite Kiger’s contention that an implied attorney-client relationship existed between him and Balestri, no evidence of such a relationship existed in the record. Additionally, even if Kiger believed that such a relationship formed, one party’s subjective beliefs are not evidence of an implied attorney-client relationship.

Kiger v. Balestri, 05-10-01308-CV

In Green v. McKay, the Court of Appeals addressed the causation requirement in a legal malpractice action.  Appellants were charged by the City of Dallas with certain code violations on a property they had sold to a debtor, who had executed a deed of trust in their favor, but who was later forced to file in Chapter 13 bankruptcy.  In response to the suit, appellants sought legal advice from appellee, McKay, who told appellants that they did not have to do anything and that “it would go away.”  The City ultimately obtained a default judgment of $562,275 against appellants, who then turned around and sued McKay for legal malpractice.  The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision, finding that the appellants had not presented any evidence of “causation.”  According to the Court, in a legal malpractice action, “[c]ausation requires that a plantiff prove a meritorious defense to the underlying case.”  Based on principles of bankruptcy law—which established that under the vendor’s lien held by appellants, they held legal title to the property in question—the Court found the appellants would not have been able to establish a meritorious defense in the code violations lawsuit even if McKay had filed an answer.  Accordingly, the Court concluded that the appellants could not establish the causation element of their malpractice claim and upheld the trial court’s dismissal.