The history-minded will recall that Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), turned on a tension between the Judiciary Act and the Constitution’s grant of federal-court jurisdiction. So too, Justice Young’s concurrence in the denial of the mandamus petition in In re Dailey, No. 24-0382 (Tex. July 5, 2024), in which the petitioner challenged the handling of an FED petition by a justice of the peace:

Article V, § 3(a) of the Texas Constitution, however, provides that “[t]he Legislature may confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue writs of quo warranto and mandamus in such cases as may be specified, except as against the Governor of the State.” In turn, the statute describing this Court’s general mandamus jurisdiction simultaneously announces some proper respondents (“a statutory county court judge, a statutory probate court judge, a district judge, a court of appeals or justice of a court of appeals, or any officer of state government”) and excludes some potential respondents (“the governor, the court of criminal appeals, or a judge of the court of criminal appeals”). Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(a). The only constitutionally impermissible respondent is the governor. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 3(a). But given the enumeration in the current statute, and that the enumeration does not include justice courts (although they are not expressly disclaimed by statute, either), the sounder approach has been to regard this Court’s mandamus jurisdiction as not reaching such courts unless it is necessary to enforce our own jurisdiction. See Pope v. Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950, 952 (Tex. 1969).

No. 24-0382 (Tex. July 5, 2024).

The Emperor Justinian (right) ruled the Byzantine Empire, a society often criticized for its complex legal system. Justinian would likely feel at home with the Texas system of trial courts, which distinguishes among courts created by the state constitution and “statutory” courts created by the Legislature.

In Ditech Servicing, LLC v.  Perez, No. 21-1109 (May 19, 2023), the Texas Supreme Court reviewed that system to conclude that a county-specific statute controlled over a general, statewide limitation on statutory-court jurisdiction, letting a Hidalgo County court at law hear a counterclaim allowing a foreclosure.

The comprehensive review of the statutes, and the relevant canons for their interpretation, is a useful general reference. It remains to be seen if the new business-court system will create other such conflicts.

Olivares v. Chevron Phillips Chem.Co. distinguishes two closely related doctrines about the limits of judicial power, which are distinguished procedurally:

“Unlike the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, exclusive remedy is an affirmative defense. As an affirmative defense, exclusive remedy should not be disposed of with a motion to dismiss such as a plea to the jurisdiction; it should instead be raised through a motion for summary judgment or proven at trial. ‘Thus, pursuing the exclusive-remedy defense through a plea to the jurisdiction ‘is problematic and not to be encouraged.’”

No. 05-22-00057-CV (March 14, 2023) (mem. op.) (citations omitted).

My colleague Kyle Gardner and I wrote this article for the most recent Headnotes about two cases–one federal, one state–that summarize basic personal-jurisdiction principles for Texas in business cases.

In Southwest Airlines Pilots Union v. The Boeing Co., a dispute related to the 737 Max, the Fifth Court held: “[W]e conclude that SWAPA has standing to assert claims on its own behalf, but at the time the suit was filed, lacked standing to assert claims on behalf of its members. Although SWAPA’s subsequently acquired assignments of member interests do not cure the jurisdictional defects in the present case, the assignments might confer standing on SWAPA to file suit in the future. Thus, while the trial court properly dismissed the suit without providing SWAPA an opportunity to amend its pleadings, the dismissal should have been without prejudice. We further conclude that the RLA does not preempt SWAPA’s state law claims.” No. 05-20-01067-CV (March 30, 2022) (mem. op.). (LPHS represented the appellant in this case.)

This timeline led the Fifth Court to deny a request for leave to file a late notice of appeal:

• December 15, 2020. Trial court signs a final divorce decree.
• January 14, 2021. Appellants first learn of the decree by seeing it on the court’s docket. They file a motion for new trial that same day.
• March 15, 2021 became the new deadline for filing a notice of appeal.
• March 25, 2021 was when Appellants filed their notice of appeal.

The Court found the grounds in the motion for leave unpersuasive, noting: “[A]lthough counsel and her firm may have been preoccupied with other matters between February 15 and March 5, and counsel may have been busy handling an emergency after that time, appellants fail to explain how this prevented them from timely filing the notice of appeal.” In the Interest of D.M., No. 05-21-00185-CV (May 21, 2021) (mem. op.).

Brown v. Daniels presents a detailed review of allegations against the Dallas County Sheriff’s office about the operation of the county jail during the COVID-19 pandemic; the Fifth Court ruled for the sheriff in all respects, reversing the denial of her plea to the jurisdiction, and rendering a judgment of dismissal. No. 05-20-00579-CV (May 19, 2021) (mem. op.).

The question in State of Texas v. Mesquite Creek Devel., Inc.. was whether the trial court erred in dismissing a condemnation case based on the state’s failure to timely disclose an appraisal. The Fifth Court observed: “The supreme court utilizes four principles to determine whether the legislature clearly intended a statute to set jurisdictional requirements: “(1) the plain meaning of the statute, (2) whether the statute contains specific consequences for noncompliance, (3) the purpose of the statute, and (4) the consequences that would result from each construction.”  Applying those factors, the Court found that this issue was not jurisdictional. No. 05-19-00028-CV (Dec. 31, 2020).

Associate judges play a valuable role in helping cases move along. The relevant statute sets limits, however, as illustrated by Kam v. Kam, No. No. 05-19-01293-CV (April 10, 2020) (mem. op.): “The final judgment here was signed by the associate judge but not the judge of the referring court. While the associate judge may have decided all issues and the parties may have agreed to appeal directly to this Court, the judgment is not appealable until the judge of the referring court has signed it. SeeTex. Gov’t Code §§ 54A.214(b), 54A.217(b). . . . Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal and any pending motions.”  

In re Catapult Realty arose from a foreclosure that wound a complex path through the Dallas courthouse, and offers two practice reminders about such situations:

1. The judge of one district court signed a TRO on behalf of another district judge. The resulting order was void because “[t]he record does not reflect that another temporary injunction or other evidentiary hearing was held before the 298th district judge prior to her signing the 2nd TRO.”;
2. A county court granted a plea in abatement based on her perceived inability to decide subject-matter jurisdiction. Mandamus relief was proper when this decision was incorrect legally, and where the resulting order “does not specify the circumstances that will allow for the case to be reinstated,” thus denying the plaintiff “the right to proceed to a resolution of the forcible-detainer action within a reasonable time.”

Nos. 05-19-01056-CV & -00109-CV (Feb. 20, 2020) (mem. op.)

In a thorough review of sovereign immunity principles, the Fifth Court granted a mandamus petition and found that ERCOT was protected from claims that it misrepresented information about future demand for electric power in Texas. ERCOT v. Panda Power Generation, No. 05-17-00872-CV (April 16, 2018) (applying, inter alia,Brown & Gay v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3dd 117 (Tex. 2015)). Notably, in its discussion of mandamus standards, after noting that a trial court lacks discretion to misapply the law, the Court observed: “This principle applies even when the law is unsettled.” (citing In re: J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex 2016) (orig. proceeding).

Enterprise Fleet Management obtained a judgment against Brazos Rock, and then sued several other parties in Dallas County for fraudulent transfers related to payment of that judgment. In the meantime, a receiver was appointed in Parker County to manage Brazos Rock’s assets. The Dallas defendants lost their plea to the jurisdiction and sought a writ of mandamus to compel transfer to Parker County, where they lived. The Fifth Court rejected their argument, finding no showing of interference with Parker County’s jurisdiction (and thus, an injury that cannot be addressed by direct appeal). “These are two separate suits seeking diffferent relief from different parties. . . . A judgment on the  claims asserted in Dallas County will not interfere with the Parker County court’s ability to manage the receivership or render a judgment in the Parker County suit. Enterprise’s collection efforts may ultimately be impacted by the Parker County suit, but that does not deprive the Dallas County court of jurisdiction over Enterprise’s claims.” In re Ameri-Fab LLC, No. 05-17-01458-CV (Feb. 7, 2018) (mem. op.)

The Fifht Court granted mandamus relief against a lawsuit about a student’s discipline by a private school, based on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. The Court’s thorough analysis observes: “We acknowledge that the dispute does not expressly concern religious doctrine in all respects. But we also note that [In re: St. Thomas High School, 495 S.W.3d 500, 506 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding). and [In re: Vida, No. 04-14-00636-CV, 2015 WL 82717, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 7, 2015, orig.
proceeding) (mem. op.)] did not do so either. St. Thomas involved the expulsion of a student based on the school handbook. Vida concerned age requirements in the school’s policy manual. And as the St. Thomas court observed, ‘exclusive focus on the presence or absence of an express dispute concerning religious doctrine demonstrates an unduly narrow conception of [the doctrine’s] applicable protections.'” In re Episcopal School of Dallas, No. 05-17-00493-CV (Oct. 11, 2017). The opinion also reviews and rejects a challenge to the mandamus petition based on the doctrine of laches.

In one of the more unlikely topics for litigation, an upset player of the Texas Lottery sued for the amount she believed she should have won had the ticket accurately described the rules. The answer will never be known, however, because Fifth Court concluded that the defendant (a contractor to the Lottery Commission), was entitled to sovereign immunity as if it was the Commission. The Court noted the limited discretion given to the defendant and the detailed oversight of it by the Commission. Nettles v. GTECH Corp., No. 05-15-01559-CV (July 21, 2017) (mem. op.) (applying Brown & Gay Engineering v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. 2015)).

Plaintiff sued two insurance companies, headquartered out-of-state, who produced evidence that their business was limited to out-of-state activity. As to an allegation that the companies and their agents met in Toronto where they “conspired to forge [Plaintiff’s signature,” the Court reminded that “the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant may not be based solely upon the effects or consequences of an alleged conspiracy with a resident in the forum state.” Friend v. Acadia Holding Corp., No. 05-16-00286-CV (April 27, 2017) (applying Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. 1995)).

A useful reminder about timeliness appears in Duchouquette v. McWhorter, in which the appellant filed a late notice of appeal within the 15-day grace period, but neglected to move for leave to extend the deadline. In addition to dismissing the appellant’s appeal, the Fifth Court dismissed the cross-appeal noticed 8 days after the appellant’s: “[T]he Court does not have jurisdiction over a cross-appeal where the original notice of appeal is untimely.” No. 05-17-00041-CV (March 13, 2017) (mem. op.)

The Dallas Court of Appeals was pulled into one of the wide-ranging disputes concerning the prosecution of Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, this one concerning the payment of private attorneys appointed to prosecute Paxton. The Dallas Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction because the claims were moot and were not yet ripe.

Attorneys were appointed to prosecute Paxton after the Collin County Criminal District Attorney recused his office. The appointed attorneys were to be paid $300 per hour, which was more than fixed $1000 for most court appointed attorneys for indigent defendants under the Collin County local rules, which also apply to appointed prosecutors. However, the local rules also provided “Payment can vary from the fee schedule in unusual circumstances or where the fee would be manifestly inappropriate because of circumstances beyond the control of the appointed counsel.”

On December 11, 2015, the appointed prosecutors sought an interim payment of $254,908.85 from Collin County. Three weeks later, Collin County taxpayer Jeffory Blackard sued seeking a temporary restraining order and injunction preventing payment, asserting that as a taxpayer he had standing to seek to enforce the local rules fixing most fees at a flat $1000. The Collin County judge recused himself, and the taxpayer suit was assigned to County Court at Law No. 5 in Dallas County.

A week after Blackard filed his taxpayer suit, the presiding judge over the criminal prosecution, a Tarrant County judge, approved the payment of the request for interim fees and ordered that the fees be presented to the Collin County Commissioner’s Court for payment. The next day, Blackard filed a supplemental application for temporary restraining order in the Dallas County taxpayer suit, which was denied one day later. Three days after that, only one month after the initial request for interim fees was made, the Collin County Commissioners Court voted to pay. Blackard then filed an amended petition seeking injunctive relief preventing any future requests for attorney’s fees by the appointed prosecutors. The County Court at Law determined that it lacked jurisdiction and granted the defendants’ pleas to the jurisdiction. Blackard appealed.

The Dallas Court began its analysis by noting that mootness and ripeness are threshold issues that implicate subject matter jurisdiction. Rendering opinions under either circumstance violates the prohibition against rendering advisory opinions because such cases present no justiciable controversy.

The Dallas Court held that Blackard’s claims relating to the interim fees were moot because the fees had already been paid and, under Texas law, taxpayers have standing only to seek to enjoin future payments, not to recover funds that have already been paid. Blackard asserted on appeal that his claims fell within the exception to mootness for claims “capable of repetition, yet evading review” because the appointed attorneys stipulated that they anticipated submitting future invoices. But the Dallas Court rejected that exception, which “applies only in rare circumstances.” It noted that the exception had previously only been used to challenge unconstitutional acts performed by the government, and held that the process by which fees would be requested in the future provided sufficient time for Blackard to seek judicial review prior to payment, pointing to the month between the initial request for interim fees and payment.

In addition, the Dallas Court held that claims relating to future invoices were not yet ripe. While it was stipulated that additional fees would be requested, it was not stipulated that the additional requests would be for $300 an hour or otherwise would be inconsistent with the Collin County fee schedule. So the Dallas Court concluded there was no live controversy concerning future requests for fees.

Blackard v. Attorney Pro Tem Kent A. Schafer, et al.

A classic example of a “too soon” appeal appears in Bolden v. Fidelity Nat’l Title: “In the original petition, appellee sought both damages for breach of warranty of title and attorney’s fees. The trial court signed a default judgment awarding damages for breach of warranty of title. The default judgment is silent as to appellee’s claim for attorney’s fees. Because the claim for attorney’s fees remains pending, the judgment is not final.” No. 05-16-00398-CV (Oct. 14, 2016) (mem. op.)

Texas’s far-flung and complicated court system produces a stream of litigation about conflicts between different jurisdictions. In Enexco v. Staley, the Fifth Court took the unusual step of granting a writ of prohibition against a district court in Nacogdoches County, finding that “the Nacogdoches proceeding must be stayed to prevent interference with this Court’s jurisdiction in deciding this pending appeal.” No. 05-15-01047-CV (June 21, 2016) (mem. op. & order)

Edwards Sims paid A-1 $5,000 for an engine he claimed was faulty, and A-1 refused to provide a refund. Sims filed a petition in justice court seeking total damages of about $7000, within the $10,000 jurisdictional limit. After A-1 failed to appear for trial, the justice court entered a judgment for $7155.

A-1 then appealed the judgment to county court. Sims amended his petition to seek additional damages, including rental fees incurred due to the passage of time, and attorney’s fees in county court. After A-1 failed to respond to requests for admission, which were deemed admitted, county court entered a judgment for $35,730, including $21,206 in damages, including additional damages “due to the passage of time,” and $14,384 in attorney’s fees.

On appeal, A-1 claimed that the county court’s judgment exceeded the jurisdiction maximum of $10,000 for small claims cases. The court of appeals recognized that when a case is originally filed in justice court and is appealed to the county court, the county court’s appellate jurisdiction is also restricted to the $10,000 maximum. But the court held that additional damages accrued “due to the passage of time” do not deprive the court of jurisdiction. The damages incurred after the justice court judgment and the attorney’s fees incurred in county court were due to the passage of time. Thus, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a $35,730 judgment on a claim that when filed was subject to a $10,000 jurisdictional maximum.

A-1 Parts Stop, Inc. v Sims

An opinion denying mandamus relief features one of the more awesome opening sentences in recent history:

“This case involves a gun in exchange for the design of a website deal gone badly.”

Who could have foreseen this becoming problematic? In any event, Thoroughbred Rifles, LLC failed to deliver the rifle promised for the design of its website, so Thomas King filed suit in a Harris County justice court for damages of less than $10,000. Thoroughbred subsequently filed suit in Collin county for damages between $100,000 and $200,000. The district court denied King’s plea in abatement and motion to transfer to Houston, and the Court of Appeals denied King’s mandamus petition. Because Thoroughbred’s damages exceeded the jurisdiction of the Harris County justice court, that court could not acquire dominant jurisdiction over them, making transfer of the claims impossible.

Good on Justice Schenck for the epic opening.

In re King, No. 05-15-01035-CV

After a bidding process, TXU entered into a contract with Fort Bend I.S.D. in 2010 to supply electricity for one year. The following year, the parties extended the contract period to 2014. But in 2012, the school district decided not to continue purchasing electricity because the extension has not been competitively procured as required by the Texas Education Code. TXU sued, but the trial court granted the school district’s plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Because the extension had not gone through a competitive bidding process, it was not “authorized by statute,” and therefore there was not waiver of governmental immunity under the Local Government Contract Claims Act.

TXU Energy Retail Co. L.L.C. v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 05-14-01515-CV

Readers may recall the recent dust-up over a collection of movie posters held by an auction house. In a new case, the disputed collection consists of Broadway theater window cards, which a Texas resident had shipped to an Internet reseller in Vermont. The owner filed suit in Dallas, alleging the reseller had breached the parties’ oral contract by failing to pay him for the cards sold, failing to return the unsold cards to him, and failing to safeguard the cards. The defendants filed a special appearance, which the trial court granted and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Although the primary defendant had made payment to the plaintiff in Texas, an agreement to make payments in the forum state does not weigh heavily in the “calculus of [minimum] contacts.” Although there were multiple conflicts in the parties’ accounts of their dealings, the Court of Appeals deferred to the trial court’s resolution of the factual discrepancies, and the remaining, undisputed facts did not demonstrate purposeful availment of Texas as a forum for the transactions at issue.

Klug v. Wickert, No. 05-14-00080-CV

In this case involving corporate infighting, the defendant filed a third-party claim against Troy Brown.  Mr. Brown filed a special appearance asserting that the court did not have personal jurisdiction, which the trial court denied.  Mr. Brown appealed.

The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that Brown did not have minimum contacts with Texas such that he was subject to personal jurisdiction here.  The Court specifically found that several emails Brown sent to people in Texas did not “constitute a contact demonstrating purposeful availment.”

Brown v. Pennington

Sign Effects Sign Company (the redundancy is sic) obtained a $22,000 default judgment in Ohia against SignWarehouse.com. Six years later, SESC sought to domesticate that judgment in Texas. SignWarehouse argued that the Ohio judgment was invalid because the company was not subject to personal jurisdiction in that state. The trial court and the Dallas Court of Appeals agreed. Relying on Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005), the Court of Appeals held that simply shipping purchased good to another state was insufficient to establish minimum contacts for specific personal jurisdiction, particularly where the parties’ contract specified that venue for any dispute was to be in Grayson County.

Sign Effects Sign Co., LLC v. SignWarehouse.com, No. 05-12-01301-CV

Connie Sigel used a website to book an apartment in Paris (the one in France) for a seven-night vacation. During that stay, an intruder with keys to both the apartment and its safe stole most of Sigel’s possessions. Sigel sued the booking agency on multiple contract and tort claims. The trial court denied My Vacation Europe’s special appearance, but the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed and rendered. The Court held that Sigel’s act of accessing MVE’s website and renting an apartment while she was located in Dallas did not constitute a purposeful availment of Texas by MVE, and there was no evidence that MVE specifically targeted Texas residents for its services. The Court of Appeals also held that there could be no specific jurisdiction in Texas because the claims all arose from a burglary that occurred in France, meaning that the relationship between Texas and the operative facts of the litigation was too tenuous to support jurisdiction.

My Vacation Europe, Inc. v. Sigel, No. 05-14-00435-CV

Update: Threepeat. The dream is alive.

In 2000, the union representing DART’s employees sued DART, alleging that it was improperly denying its employees’ grievances and requests for appeals.  As a result, the parties entered into a settlement agreement providing that DART was required to modify the employee grievance procedures in its employment manual.

Years later, in 2010, a dispute arose between DART and a former employee (who had been terminated) over DART’s grievance procedures.  The union ultimately sued DART, alleging that it had breached the prior settlement agreement.  DART filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting sovereign immunity, which the trial court denied.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, noting that when “a governmental entity agrees to settle a lawsuit in which it has waived governmental immunity, it cannot claim immunity from suit for breach of the settlement agreement.”  Because DART had waived immunity in the 2000 lawsuit and the union was claiming it had breached that agreement, DART could not claim immunity from the suit.

Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local No. 1338

In this breach of contract action, the Court of Appeals held that nonresident limited partners who were passive investors in a Texas limited partnership were not subject to personal jurisdiction simply because the limited partnership was formed under Texas law.

Nacho Remodeling v. Calsherm Partners

The appellant (brother to appellee) claimed the probate court lacked personal jurisdiction over him.  Appellee asserted that the appellant’s individual assistance to the parties’ quadriplegic mother in a probate matter in 2008 (the appellant’s only contact with Texas) required the court to exercise jurisdiction over her brother.  The Court held, however, that at the time he assisted his mother in the prior lawsuit, the appellant was not serving as trustee of the Trust at issue in the present lawsuit, and thus his contact with the state was in a separate, individual capacity.

Stauffer v. Nicholson

The Court of Appeals has issued a lengthy opinion affirming the denial of a special appearance. The appeal arises out of an apparently contentious case involving claims and counterclaims for breach of contract, fraud, and defamation. Defendant Sebastian Lombardo — an Italian citizen who lives in Belgium and works in France — challenged personal jurisdiction by invoking the fiduciary shield doctrine, which protects officers of corporations from being personally haled into court in Texas due to their contacts as representatives of the corporation. Unfortunately for Lombardo, his argument in the trial court had presented that issue as a matter of general personal jurisdiction, and the trial court had found him to be subject to specific personal jurisdiction. Having failed to present the fiduciary shield doctrine as a bar to the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, the issue was also waived on appeal. The opinion goes on to affirm the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings of jurisdictional facts, as well as its application of the law to those facts, and therefore affirmed denial of the special appearance.

Lombardo v. Bhattacharyya, No. 05-13-01583-CV

Len Rao filed suit against his former employer, David Weekley Homes. Weekley moved to abate the lawsuit and initiated an arbitration proceeding with the AAA. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, and the Court of Appeals — after first granting an emergency motion to stay the proceedings — ultimately affirmed the denial of arbitration. After the case moved back to the trial court, however, Rao added new claims against the AAA, which responded with a plea to the jurisdiction based on the doctrine of arbitral immunity. The trial court granted the plea, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Arbitral immunity, the Court held, extends not only to arbitrators themselves, but also to the association that administers their proceedings.

Rao v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n., No. 05-13-00462-CV

Last November, the Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further consideration in a case where the Dallas Court of Appeals had concluded that the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded a waiver of sovereign immunity through the use of tangible property. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had not alleged a “use” of property for a whiteboard that fell on his head, because Dallas Metrocare had only made the board available for use by patients. On remand, the Court of Appeals had to consider the alternative question of whether the plaintiff’s claims alleged injury through a “condition” of property. The Court concluded that he had pleaded such a claim, based on the allegation that the whiteboard was in an unsafe condition because it was not properly secured. The case was therefore remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Dallas Metrocare Servs. v. Juarez, No. 05-11-01144-CV

Television reporter Brett Shipp was sued for defamation by Dr. Richard Malouf, founder of the All Smiles Dental Center. Shipp broadcast a story on allegations of Medicaid fraud involving Malouf, and closed by reporting that Malouf “has yet to comment on the allegations but filed for bankruptcy and is in the process of divesting his once impressive empire.” Malouf alleged that statement was defamatory because it was All Smiles Dental Center that filed for bankruptcy, not Malouf personally. Shipp filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. The trial court denied both the plea and the motion, and Shipp took the matters up on interlocutory review.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the plea to the jurisdiction, but reversed and rendered based on on the TCPA. The plea to the jurisdiction claimed that the county court at law was without jurisdiction because it would deny Shipp the right to a 12-person jury. The Court quickly disposed of that issue, citing its own case law establishing that the size of the available jury does not negate subject matter jurisdiction that has otherwise been properly conferred on a court. As to the TCPA, the Court held that Shipp had met his initial burden of showing that the lawsuit arose out of his exercise of the right to free speech because the subject matter of his report as a whole — not just the statement about the bankruptcy filing — was made in connection with a matter of public concern. That shifted the burden to Malouf to come forward with a prima facie case, based on “clear and specific evidence,” for each element of his defamation claim. Malouf argued that a false accusation of personal bankruptcy was defamation per se, which would have given rise to a presumption of damages. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that it was not defamation per se because it did not “touch Malouf in a way that is harmful to one engaged in the profession of dentistry.” Without any other clear and specific evidence of damages, the Court held that the motion to dismiss under the TCPA should have been granted.

Shipp v. Malouf, No. 05-13-01080-CV

Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding, Inc., a provider of post acute care hospital services, was pursuing acquisition opportunities of rehabilitation facilities in Texas.  In the midst of these efforts, several of its executives left the company.  Around the same time, New Reliant, a Delaware limited liability company, acquired a rehabilitation hospital in Texas called “Old Reliant.”  Cornerstone filed suit against New Reliant and a few other entities that had indirect ownership stakes in New Reliant via a chain of subsidiaries, alleging that several of Cornerstone’s recently-departed executives had usurped a corporate opportunity from Cornerstone.

The entities with ownership stakes in New Reliant filed special appearances, asserting that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them.  Cornerstone argued that the entities were subject to jurisdiction in Texas based on their indirect ownership interest in New Reliant–a company doing business in Texas–and the fact that they held 100% of the stock of every entity involved in the purchase of the hospitals.  The entities argued that they were separate companies (based in Delaware) and that their only contact with Texas was their passive, indirect ownership interests in New Reliant. The trial court granted the entities’ special appearances, and Cornerstone appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Cornerstone’s argument that the subsidiaries in between the entity defendants and New Reliant should be ignored.  The Court further explained that nothing in the record suggested “that the degree of control exercised by appellees is greater than that normally associated with with common ownership and directorship.”

Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding, Inc. v. Reliant Splitter, L.P. et al., No. 05-11-01730-CV

In an interesting case on the scope of “minimum contacts,” the Court of Appeals held that serving as the representative plaintiff in a nationwide class action (with members from Texas) against a Texas company was not sufficient to create minimum contacts for purposes of personal jurisdiction.

The case arose out of a nationwide class action that the Appellees, as class representatives, filed in Illinois against King Supply Company, LLC alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).  King settled the class action for $20 million, but as part of the settlement the Appellees covenanted that, except for $200,000 paid by King, their only source of payment would be King’s insurance policies.  King’s Texas-based insurance companies (Appellants) then filed a declaratory action in Dallas against Appellees seeking a declaration that they had no duty to defend or indemnify King.

Appellees filed a special appearance contesting personal jurisdiction, which the trial court granted.  Appellants appealed, arguing that by representing a nationwide class (12% of which were Texas residents) against a Texas company and seeking to recover funds from Texas insurance policies, Appellees’ contacts with Texas were sufficient to warrant personal jurisdiction over them.  The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that the evidence failed to show that Appellees “purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas, thus invoking the benefits and protections of Texas law.”

Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. CE Design, Ltd., No. 05-13-00720-CV

A long-running dispute between former business parties and their attorneys has resulted in a lengthy opinion affirming the trial court’s determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The original dispute had been submitted to arbitration, which resulted in a large award of damages and attorney fees against the defendants. The Court of Appeals eventually set aside that award, holding that the arbitrator’s failure to disclose his personal relationship with plaintiffs’ counsel constituted “evident partiality” that, under the circumstances, required vacatur of the arbitration award. Karlseng v. Cooke, 346 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2011, no pet.). Following that ruling, the defendants in the original arbitration filed suit against the lawyers and law firm that represented the plaintiffs, as well as the arbitrator and the arbitration agency, for fraud and other related claims. Despite the fairly complex set of facts, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the new lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that jurisdiction was preempted by the Texas Arbitration Act because the substance of the case was a prohibited collateral attack on the vacated arbitration award. Thus, the plaintiffs could not seek to hold the arbitrator, the arbitration agency, or the attorneys liable for the expenses they incurred in defense of the original arbitration proceeding.

Patten v. Johnson, No. 05-12-01695-CV

A Dallas doctor brought lawsuits against UT Southwestern and Parkland Hospital, alleging that they retaliated against him after he raised concerns that some of their billing practices were running afoul of Medicaid laws.  The trial court granted the defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed both lawsuits on the basis of sovereign immunity. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected the doctor’s argument that the defendants had waived sovereign immunity, and held that a state entity cannot waive sovereign immunity by its conduct.  The Court specifically noted that “the Texas Supreme Court has never ruled that a doctrine of waiver of sovereign immunity by conduct exists.”

Gentilello v. UTSW, 05-13-00149-CV

Gentilello v. DCHD, 05-13-00150-CV

A pair of California residents sought to set aside a default judgment by means of a restricted appeal. The defendants claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to defective service of process, which had been accomplished through the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State’s certificate of service stated that process for both defendants had been “Unclaimed.” After the defendants failed to appear, the trial court entered default judgment for $612,500 in damages and another $13,258.27 in attorney fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Although the process server had listed the date of execution as taking place the month before he received the citation, that apparent typographical error was not enough to invalidate the return of service, particularly where the other service documents demonstrated the correct date of service. Substitute service through the Texas Secretary of State was also proper, the Court held, because the petition alleged that they were doing business in Texas by entering into a promissory note and guaranty with a Texas company, with the note also secured by real property located in Kaufman County. Nor did the “Unclaimed” notations demonstrate that the citations had not been served. Instead, the Court followed previous cases holding that it indicated only that the defendants had refused or failed to claim the citations from the Secretary of State’s mailings, not that service had not been accomplished.

Dole v. LSREF2 APEX 2, LLC, No. 05-12-01683-CV

The Texas Whistleblower Act prohibits a governmental entity from taking an adverse personnel action against an employee who in good faith reports a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority. Tex. Gov’t Code § 554.002(a). Those elements are jurisdictional, and a plaintiff who fails to adequately plead facts supporting the claim can have his claim dismissed. The Court of Appeals did just that in an appeal from a $400,000 judgment against the Dallas Independent School District. The plaintiff alleged that he had been terminated for reporting that his supervisor had directed him to perform three gas tests in a single day, which he claimed was unsafe. But the plaintiff’s petition did not allege that any actual violation of law had taken place, just that he had been pressured to do something that might be unsafe. As a result, the employee failed to state a claim in his petition, and the trial court therefore had no jurisdiction over his claim.

Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Watson, No. 05-12-00254-CV

In KingVision Pay-Per-View, Ltd. v. Dallas County, the Court affirmed the county’s plea to the jurisdiction because a statute only authorized suit against a constable and his sureties for failing to execute on the plaintiff’s judgment.  And in City of Sachse v. Wood, the Court reversed the trial court’s denial of a plea to the jurisdiction, holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish a violation of the Whistleblower Act because the he reported the alleged misconduct to fire department personnel, not an “appropriate law enforcement authority.”

In this whistleblower suit against Dallas County, the County filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity.  The plaintiff, a former deputy constable, complained of illegal activity and retaliation in his employment division to the Dallas County Commissions Court.  The County contended, however, that this entity does not fall within the confines of the Whistleblower Act and, therefore, the plaintiff did not have an objective good faith belief that he was reporting the misdeeds to an appropriate law enforcement body.  While the Court found that “an appropriate law enforcement authority must be actually responsible for regulating under or enforcing the law allegedly violated,” it nevertheless remanded the proceedings to the trial court because the record did not show that evidence was presented about the plaintiff’s good faith belief that the Commissioners Court was the appropriate body.  This was particularly true given that some of the County’s jurisdictional arguments were newly raised on appeal.

Dallas County v. Logan

Kelly Hawkins obtained a default judgment in his home state of Kansas against Texas attorney Lloyd Ward and his firms. Hawkins then brought suit in Dallas to enforce the Kansas judgment. Ward contended that the Kansas judgment was ineffective because that state lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The Kansas court had found jurisdiction based in part on the allegation that the defendants had operated as a joint venture in entering into their representation of Hawkins, and Ward failed to negate that conclusion by clear and convincing evidence. Ward also failed to negate Hawkins’ allegations of the defendants’ contacts with Hawkins in Kansas during the course of the representation. The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the trial court’s denial of Ward’s motion to vacate the Kansas judgment.

Ward v. Hawkins, No. 05-12-00712-CV

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that appellees lacked sufficient contacts with Texas in their individual capacities to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them. Appellants argued that appellees were subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas because the tortious interference and related conspiracy claims against appellees directly relate to and arise from appellees’ purposeful contacts with Texas. According to the Court, any alleged jurisdictional contacts in furtherance of tortious interference made by appellees in their capacity as corporate officers are subject to the fiduciary shield doctrine and do not constitute contacts with Texas in their individual capacities because there was no proof such contacts were motivated solely by appelees’ personal interest.  Accordingly, the Court found appellees’ evidence that none of their contacts with Texas were in their individual capacities, combined with the fact that appellees could not be liable in their individual capacities for their conduct on behalf of out of state entities, negated appellant’s jurisdictional allegations.

Kaye-Bassman Int’l v. Dankuka

Donald and Ida Mae Card owned the headstone that once marked the grave of Lee Harvey Oswald.  During the 1980s, the Cards gave the headstone to Ida Mae’s sister and brother-in-law for safekeeping.  The Cards, in turn, gave the  marker to their son, Johnny Ragan.  Donald and Ida Mae died, and ownership of the Oswald gravestone passed to their children, who demanded it back from the Ragans.  As it turns out, the Ragans had sold it to an Illinois resident, Wayne Lensing, who had arranged for its exhibition at a museum in Illinois.  The Card children sued to get the headstone back.   Lensing filed a special appearance challenging the court’s personal jurisdiction.  The Court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged jurisdiction because they established that Lensing had committed several relevant acts in Texas, including flying to Fort Worth to take possession of the headstone.  Accordingly, the Court upheld the trial court’s finding of personal jurisdiction.

Lensing v. Card

According to the operators of Hank’s Texas Grill, the City of McKinney and its police officers have been wrongfully harassing the restaurant, its employees, and its customers for the last ten years. In response, the city alleges that Hank’s violates numerous city ordinances. The city filed a plea to the jurisdiction to invoke its governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea, and the city appealed. Summarizing the recent (and conflicting) string of cases challenging local ordinances, the Court of Appeals concluded that “the Declaratory Judgments Act waives governmental immunity against claims that a statute or ordinance is invalid,” but “does not waive a governmental entity’s immunity against a claim that government actors have violated the law.” Construing Hank’s pleadings, the Court concluded that they did not demonstrate that Hank’s claim was outside the scope of the city’s governmental immunity. However, the pleading also did not demonstrate that the claim was barred by governmental immunity, meaning that Hank’s had to be given the opportunity to amend. The Court also affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Hank’s claim for damages was not barred by immunity to the extent that it was an offset against the city’s own damage claims. Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected the city’s claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin its enforcement of state laws and local ordinances, ruling that the pleadings and arguments at this stage of the case were still too unclear to affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue an injunction.

City of McKinney v. Hank’s Restaurant Group, L.P., No. 05-123-01359-CV

The Court of Appeals has reversed the district court’s order sustaining the special appearance of an Iowa company formed by one of the plaintiff’s former employees. Interestingly, the opinion starts out with some discussion of a recurring problem in Texas practice — namely, the use and treatment of documents filed under seal. In this instance, much of the evidence necessary to determine the special appearance had been sealed by the trial court, including an exhibit that was “the only evidence of the terms of the relationship” between two of the defendants. The Court of Appeals resolved this difficulty by stating that it had made every effort to preserve the confidentiality of the designated materials, but that the appeal could not be decided without mention of some key jurisdictional facts. The lesson here appears to be that the Court will do what it can to preserve the litigants’ confidential information, but if the details are essential to the appeal, you can reasonably expect some of them to come out in an opinion that is a matter of public record.

Moving on to the merits of the special appearance, the evidence showed that Eco Technologies was an Iowa company that had all of its operations located in that state, but that it distributed its products to independent dealers in Texas and elsewhere. One of those dealers in Texas is owned by the plaintiff’s former employee Billy Cox, a Texas resident who also is a part owner of Eco Technologies itself. The plaintiff alleged that Eco Technologies and Cox had interfered with the plaintiff’s Texas contracts and unfairly competed with the plaintiff in Texas, and the Court held that those allegations were sufficient to bring Eco Technologies within the reach of the Texas long arm statute. Citing Iowa law, the Court held that as a member of a member-managed LLC, Cox was an agent of Eco Technologies, and that his recruitment of the plaintiff’s distributors in Texas to enter into relationships with Eco Technologies were jurisdictional contacts attributable to Eco Technologies. The company therefore fell short of its burden to negate the jurisdictional grounds alleged by the plaintiff.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the order sustaining the special appearance and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Masterguard, L.P. v. Eco Techs. Int’l LLC, No. 05-12-01318-CV

In April 2009, American Home’s insured allegedly fell asleep while the stove was still on in her apartment, leading to a fire that damaged her unit and that of her neighbor, who was insured through Allstate. Allstate paid its insured’s claim for $18,000 in damages, then sought subrogation from American Home. However, American Home’s policy limit was $100,000, and the claim languished while American Home sought to determine the complete extent of the damage caused by the fire. After a year of waiting, Allstate filed for arbitration with Arbitration Forums, Inc. Both Allstate and American Home are signatories to AFI’s arbitration agreement, which requires parties to arbitrate subrogation claims “not in excess of $100,000.” The AFI arbitrator promptly ruled in favor of Allstate. American Home filed a post-hearing appeal as permitted by the AFI rules, arguing that arbitration was not compulsory because the overall damages from the fire were in excess of $600,000. The AFI arbitrator agreed and voided the prior award.

In the meantime, however, Allstate had filed an application to confirm the initial arbitration award. After the arbitrator voided that award, American Home moved to dismiss the court case. The county court at law apparently agreed with Allstate’s argument that the order declaring the initial award to be void was itself invalid because American Home had allegedly misrepresented its policy limits in order to obtain that order. It entered a final judgment confirming the initial award in favor of Allstate, and American Home appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment on a voided arbitration award. The court of appeals agreed, noting that “Necessarily embedded in the trial court’s ability to confirm an award is the presence of an award itself.” The court of appeals also rejected Allstate’s attempt to argue that the arbitrator’s decision to void the initial award was invalid, ruling that the documents relied upon for that argument did not constitute any evidence of misrepresentations being made by American Home. The case was therefore reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

American Modern Home Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 05-11-00997-CV

The court of appeals conditionally granted mandamus relief after the trial court appointed a receiver over relators and then expanded the powers of that receiver.  The court of appeals found that the trial court’s orders were void as to relators because they were not served with process or otherwise notified of the receivership proceedings, which meant the trial court had no jurisdiction over relators.

In re C.D. Henderson Construction Servs., No. 05-13-00593-CV

Michael Tabasso was a salesman for BearCom Group, Inc., a Garland-based wireless equipment dealer. Tabasso was based out of BearCom’s office in Philadelphia, and was in charge of a sales region that did not include Texas. Nevertheless, the company disciplined Tabasso for attempting to make sales outside of his sales region, including contracting with a Texas company and then referring a portion of that contract to another party at BearCom’s expense. After Tabasso was terminated, he apparently continued to fulfill service requests by BearCom customers and forwarded confidential information to his personal email account. All of that led to BearCom filing suit against Tabasso in Dallas County. Tabasso filed a special appearance, which the district court denied.

On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. BearCom’s pleading raised a plethora of alleged jurisdictional contacts, including contacts with BearCom’s customers in Texas. That pleading shifted the burden to Tabasso to negate each of the alleged jurisdictional contacts, but he did not do so. Instead, the trial court deemed his affidavits to be “not credible in light of the record,” and there was ample evidence of Tabasso’s communications and dealings with those Texas customers. Tabasso also failed to preserve any objections to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. In light of the entire record, the court of appeals found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the denial of the special appearance.

Tabasso v. BearCom Group, Inc., No. 05-11-01674-CV

Suzann Ruff asked the probate court to stay arbitration of her dispute with Michael Ruff and Frost Bank. The probate court agreed and issued an order staying the arbitration, denying Michael’s motion to stay the judicial proceedings, and stating that the court would conduct a hearing to determine whether to grant of deny Michael and the bank’s motions to compel arbitration. Michael and the bank filed a notice of interlocutory appeal, and Suzann moved to dismiss. The court of appeals agreed with Suzann. An interlocutory order staying arbitration is appealable under CPRC § 171.098, and an order denying the stay of judicial proceedings in favor of arbitration is appealable under CPRC § 51.016 and 9 U.S.C. 171.098(a)(2), but those statutes first require a final decision as to whether the case is subject to arbitration. No such decision had been made in this case, because the court’s order also stated that it would proceed to a hearing on the merits of the motions to compel arbitration. Since the probate court had not determined whether the dispute was subject to arbitration, the court of appeals had no jurisdiction to hear the attempted appeal.

Ruff v. Ruff, No. 05-13-00317-CV

The court of appeals has dismissed Glenda Rhone’s appeal from the trial court’s summary judgment order. Ordinarily, this would be a bad thing for the appellant. In this instance, however, the dismissal is as good as a win. As it turns out, the lawsuit was originally dismissed for want of prosecution in January 2012, and the trial court did not enter any order reinstating the case until after the motion to reinstate had already been overruled  by operation of law under Rule 165a(3). The parties apparently proceeded to litigate the case anyway, and the trial court entered the summary judgment order in March 2013. Rhone appealed, but the court of appeals determined it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Because the case had not been timely reinstated, the final judgment was actually the January 2012 dismissal order, which would have to have been appealed within 90 days (thanks to the motion to reinstate extending the appellate deadlines). Thus, Rhone could not appeal the case, but the summary judgment order turns out to have been void in any event because it was issued after expiration of the trial court’s plenary power.

Rhone v. Geer, No. 05-13-00492-cv

Voltaix is a New Jersey company that manufactures a specialty gas used in the semiconductor and solar energy industries.   Voltaix alleged that two of its former employees at its New Jersey plant stole its trade secrets, moved to Texas, and started a competing company based in Texas named Metaloid Precursors.   Voltaix sued these employees, their new company, and John Ajongwen (the chairman and a major investor in Metaloid) in Texas for, among other things, misappropriation of trade secrets.  Ajongwen, however, filed a special appearance because, in his view, he was a New Jersey resident with no minimum contacts in Texas.  The trial court agreed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.  It found that Ajongwen came to Texas only one time, for half a day, to oversee set up of the plant’s water purification system and to conduct a safety inspection of the plant.  Because neither of these events had any connection with the trade secret misappropriation allegations, the court held Texas courts lacked personal jurisdiction over Ajongwen in this suit.

Voltaix LLC v Ajongwen

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting CFC’s special appearance and dismissed NexBank’s claims against it.  CFC negated personal jurisdiction by producing an affidavit, which alleged that CFC is a holding company that does not have business operations in Texas, does not own property or other assets in Texas, and does not maintain employees in Texas.  NexBank’s evidence showed only that CFC’s subsidiaries may have had sufficient contact with Texas.  But the court noted that it cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over a holding company based on the actions of its subsidiaries.  NexBank also cited three unrelated cases as evidence that CFC sought relief in Texas courts.  However, the court found that CFC defending itself in a lawsuit, failing to contest jurisdiction in two other suits, and filing a counter-claim in a third suit did not waive CFC’s right to contest jurisdiction in this matter.  Thus, NexBank failed to establish that CFC has some minimum, purposeful contact with Texas.

NexBank, SSB v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 05-12-00567-CV

A low-speed collision involving two eighteen-wheelers in Wythe County, Virginia has ended up in the Dallas Court of Appeals. Fernando Garza was injured in the accident, leading him to file suit against the other driver, Timothy Jones. Jones, however, is a resident of Memphis, Tennessee, and he therefore filed a special appearance to contest the district court’s jurisdiction to hear the case, which the trial court denied.  On interlocutory appeal, Garza argued that Jones had minimum contacts with Texas because the rig he was driving bore the name of a Texas-based corporation.  According to Garza, that made Jones a statutory employee of a Texas company. The court of appeals rejected that argument as a basis for personal jurisdiction because it was aimed at the forum contacts of the employer, not of the specially appearing defendant. The court therefore rendered judgment dismissing Garza’s claims for lack of jurisdiction.

Jones v. Garza, No. 05-12-00532-CV

Natalie Holmes, a graduate student at SMU, has taken and failed twice the graduate comprehensive exam (“GCE”)–which she needed to pass to receive her Master’s Degree in Music Education.  After both tests, Holmes appealed the results to SMU’s internal academic appeals board as either “arbitrary and capricious” or “beyond the scope of the coursework.”  SMU offered Holmes the chance to re-take the exam a third time, but Holmes refused and instead insisted that SMU giver her the degree as well as monetary damages.  While her second appeal remained pending, Holmes sued SMU for breach of contract, fraud and DTPA violations.  SMU moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Holmes had failed to exhaust her administrative appeal rights before bringing suit.  The trial court agreed with SMU and dismissed the case.

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court, finding that SMU had failed to submit any evidence to establish that Holmes was required to proceed through an administrative appeal before bringing suit.  According to the Court, SMU’s only evidence was a “short and conclusory” affidavit that did not address the appeals process, and this was not enough to establish that the trial court lacked jurisdiction.

Holmes v SMU

Back in December, the Dallas Court of Appeals became one of the first courts to issue a ruling on the merits under our new anti-SLAPP statute, the Texas Citizens Participation Act. As we noted previously, the TCPA permits defamation defendants to file a motion to dismiss, which then puts the plaintiff to the burden of producing prima facie evidence in support of their claim. The statute may also permit an interlocutory appeal if the trial court denies the motion to dismiss (although maybe not so much under the Fort Worth Court of Appeals’ reading of the statute). But to invoke the right to an interlocutory appeal, the defendant still has to follow the deadlines established by the TCPA, which requires the notice of appeal to be filed within 60 days after the motion to dismiss is denied, whether by order of the trial court or by operation of law.

Defendant Ravinder Jain timely filed his motion to dismiss, and the trial court heard the motion on February 2, 2012. But the court did not issue a ruling on the motion within 30 days, at which time the TCPA deems the motion to be denied by operation of law. On May 17, the trial court issued an order expressly denying the motion to dismiss, and Jain filed his notice of appeal only a few days after that order. However, the court of appeals held that the notice of appeal needed to be filed within 60 days of the date that the motion was originally denied by operation of law (i.e., early March), making Rain’s late-May notice of appeal untimely. The court therefore dismissed the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Jain v. Cambridge Petroleum Group, Inc., No. 05-12-0677-CV

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment for the appellant on count one and for apellee on counts two and four, but said nothing about counts three and five other than invoking a Mother Hubbard clause in the order, which reads: “All relief requested and not expressly granted herein is hereby denied.”   With its order, the trial court granted appellee permanent injunctive relief, exonerated appellee’s bond, and taxed costs against appellant.

On appeal, the Court avoided the substantive issues and only addressed its own jurisdiction.  Following Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001), the Court held that the trial court’s order was not “final” because it neglected to address claims three and five, and because the Mother Hubbard clause and the permanent injunction did not suffice to render those claims final.

Auroura Loan Services v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC

The court affirmed the dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Jennison, a former Episcopal Priest, sued Prasifka, an Episcopal Church parishioner, for slander, tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and wrongful discharge, stemming from complaints she made to a church official in response to a request by the church in connection with internal church disciplinary proceedings against Jennison. The proceedings resulted in his discharge from the priesthood. Prasifka filed, and the court granted, a motion to dismiss because the action involved church matters outside of the court’s jurisdiction.

On appeal, the court noted that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine removes most issues related to a church’s ministerial employment decisions from the jurisdiction of the civil courts. In this case, Prasifka’s defamatory statements were made entirely in connection with church disciplinary proceedings. These statements and Jennison’s claims were inextricably intertwined with the church’s investigation and thus closely related to internal matters of church governance and discipline. Further, a causation determination would require an analysis of the church’s disciplinary decision-making process. Thus, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applied and the district court lacked jurisdiction.

Jennison v. Prasifka,   05-11-01253-CV

In this Memorandum Opinion, the Court of Appeals addressed whether it may exercise jurisdiction over an order granting an interlocutory summary judgment order for permanent injunctive relief, but which did not dispose of the defendant’s counterclaims. The Court refused to exercise jurisdiction, holding that “[a] summary judgment that fails to dispose of all claims, even if it grants a permanent injunction, is interlocutory and unappealable.”  Notably, however, the court pointed out that the appellant could have tried to challenge the injunction as actually being an appealable temporary injunction, but the appellant had not attempted to use that procedure.

Young v. Golfing Green Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 05-12-00651

The court dismissed an appeal from post-judgment orders following foreclosure proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. After trial, the trial court entered one order denying Knoles’s efforts to avoid a writ of execution and prohibiting him from challenging the writ going forward and a second order sanctioning Knoles’s counsel for actions related to the writ. In a letter brief to the court of appeals, Knoles argued that the orders were appealable final judgments because they adjudicated a new set of facts and followed a conventional trial on the merits. The court rejected this argument, holding that the orders were issued to aid in the enforcement of the underlying unappealed judgment and that Knoles has no standing to appeal the order imposing sanctions against his counsel. Thus, the court had no jurisdiction over the appeal.

Knoles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 05-12-00473-CV

Few defendants are willing to take the risk of not answering a lawsuit when service of process has been defective.  After all, moving to quash service in Texas only gets you additional time to file an answer (see TRCP 122), and there is always the chance that a default judgment will be sustained if the attack on service is unsuccessful.  But whether by  luck or design, Bailey’s Furniture, Inc. has reversed the trial court’s entry of default judgment by challenging the plaintiff’s attempted service of process.  According to the process server’s affidavit, he had attempted to serve “Defendant Charles Bailey” on five occasions.  But while the petition identified Charles Bailey as the registered agent of Bailey’s Furniture, nothing in the process server’s affidavit indicated that he was being served in that capacity, and he was not in fact the defendant named in the lawsuit.  Because proper service had not been made prior to entry of the default judgment, the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over Bailey’s, rendering the judgment void.  The court of appeals therefore reversed and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

Bailey’s Furniture, Inc. v. Graham-Rutledge & Co., No. 05-11-00710-CV

Richardson Hospital Authority (“RHA”) hired Plaintiff, Placidus Duru, as a nursing assistant.  But when Duru was indicted for sexually abusing a patient, the hospital terminated him.  Four years later, when the prosecution dismissed the criminal case against Duru, he turned around and sued RHA for malicious prosecution, business disparagement, breach of contract and unjust enrichment.  RHA moved to dismiss these claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the trial court denied their motion for all claims except malicious prosecution.  The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the business disparagement, breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims (the malicious prosecution claim’s dismissal was not appealed), finding that the Texas Tort Claims Act did not waive the sovereign immunity enjoyed by RHA, a public institution, because Duru’s pleadings “affirmatively negate jurisdiction.”

Richardson Hospital Authority v. Placidus Duru, No. 05-12-00165-CV

A pro se litigant has managed to obtain mandamus relief from the court of appeals.  The litigation started after Mr. Florance filed a $129 lien against the property of the Colin County Clerk.  The trial court invalidated the lien, and the court of appeals rejected both Florance’s appeal and a subsequent bill of review.  But the trial court had also declared Florance to be a vexatious litigant, a ruling that came well after the court lost its plenary power.  The court of appeals footnoted that problem in one of its previous opinions, and Florance took the opportunity to challenge the vexatious litigant finding by filing for a writ of mandamus.  Although the court of appeals initially denied any relief, the panel changed its mind after Florance filed a motion for en banc rehearing.   The panel held that the vexatious litigant order was not an exercise of the trial court’s continuing power to enforce its prior judgment, and that it was otherwise void because it was signed after the expiration of plenary power.  Because mandamus is the appropriate mechanism to require a trial court to vacate a void order, the court of appeals conditionally granted the writ.

In re Florance, No. 05-12-00713-CV (mandamus)

In re a Purported Lien or Claim Against Collin County Clerk Brenda Taylor, 219 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (first appeal)

Florance v. State, 352 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (appeal from bill of review)

Florance v. State, No. 05-08-00984-CR (memorandum opinion affirming conviction and 6-month sentence for failure to release fraudulent lien)

Florance v. Buchmeyer, 500 F.Supp.2d 618 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (dismissing lawsuit against state judge, federal judge, district attorney and assistant district attorneys, district attorney’s investigator, county clerk, unknown clerks, city prosecutor, assistant attorney general, Collin County, the State of Texas, and the federal government)

In this memorandum opinion, the court reaffirmed some basic litigation procedures. The plaintiff was fired by his law firm employer and sued alleging 37 separate claims. The trial court granted summary judgment, and Cruz appealed the first time. The court of appeals affirmed on every claim but two and remanded. The trial court severed those claims and Cruz appealed a second time. On appeal, the court first determined that on remand, the trial court only had jurisdiction to consider issues regarding the two claims included in the scope of the remand as stated in the court of appeals’ mandate. Thus, Cruz’s issues related to claims outside the trial court’s jurisdiction were rejected. Because of the court’s limited jurisdiction, issues that Cruz failed to preserve prior to the first appeal were not reopened by the mandate and the trial court did not err by limiting discovery to the remaining matters over which it had jurisdiction. Finally, the trial court did not err by severing Cruz’s remaining claims and requiring him to replead under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 41 and 68.

Cruz v. Schell, Beene & Vaughn, L.L.P., et al., 05-01-00565-CV