Intermediate Court Oddities

Whether Texas needed a 15th Court of Appeals was (and on some points, continues to be) a matter of considerable debate. The supreme court’s recent opinion in In the Interest of AB and DB highlights another aspect of Texas’ intermediate court system that just hasn’t aged well.

Appeals from Gregg County proceed to both the Sixth and Twelfth Courts of Appeal; in that case, one parent appealed a parental-rights judgment to the Sixth Court, while the other appealed to the Twelfth. In the resulting confusion, the supreme court held that the father’s appeal was erroneously dismissed:

The Twelfth Court’s dismissal of the appeal upon Father’s motion did not divest the Sixth Court of jurisdiction. The Sixth Court concluded in error that the Twelfth Court’s dismissal fully adjudicated Father’s appeal.  Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) provides that an appellate court may not dismiss an appeal if “such disposition would prevent a party from seeking relief to which it would otherwise be entitled.” The Twelfth Court’s dismissal, which explicitly withheld adjudication under Rule 42.1(a)(1), was without prejudice to Father’s pursuit of his appellate rights in the Sixth Court. The Sixth Court improperly interpreted the dismissal as a final disposition preventing Father from seeking further relief in a court of appeals.

No. 22-0864 (Tex. Sept. 15, 2023) (per curiam).

This situation is relevant to Dallas because appeals from Hunt County (Greenville) alternate between Dallas and the Sixth Court. While the supreme court’s opinion capably reviews the applicable procedure, the more relevant question is why? It’s not readily apparent what benefit results from a system that can produce this kind of satellite proceeding.