The Texas Constitution and Appellate Stays

The Texas Supreme Court’s majority opinion in In re: Abbott–a mandamus about an appellate stay order in ongoing litigation about medical care for transgender youth–contained an intriguing footnote about the potential boundaries set by the Texas Constitution for appellate-stay orders:

“The State contends that, under an 1880 decision of this Court, courts of appeals exercising appellate jurisdiction lack any authority to “protect the parties from damage during the pendency of the appeal.” City of Laredo v Martin, 52 Tex. 548, 554 (1880). As we observed in Geomet, in which no party raised Martin, such a line of argument “amounts to a constitutional attack on Rule 29.3.” 578 S.W.3d at 89–90. We further noted in Geomet that a state of affairs in which no court can protect parties’ rights during an interlocutory appeal would raise constitutional questions about the automatic stay of trial court proceedings afforded by section 51.014(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Id. at 90. Likewise, the limitation on appellate courts’ Rule 29.3 authority suggested by the State would raise constitutional questions about the State’s statutory right to automatically supersede injunctions on appeal. We do not purport to resolve any of these questions in this expedited mandamus posture.”

No. 22-0229 (May 13, 2022).