In Luxottica of Am., Inc. v. Gray, the Court of Appeals addressed the element of justifiable reliance in the context of fraud and related claims arising from the sale of franchise stores.

The Court held that the existence of clear contractual disclaimers and “as-is” provisions in the relevant agreements conclusively negated the element of justifiable reliance, which is required to prove claims for common-law fraud, civil conspiracy, and statutory

fraud. Specifically, the court pointed to language in the franchise and purchase agreements stating that the buyer “did not rely on any incidental statements about success made by [Luxottica], its affiliates or employees” and that the business was being conveyed “AS IS WHERE IS, WITHOUT WARRANTY EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED.” No. 05-23-00020-CV (May 5, 2025) (mem. op.). (LPHS represented the successful appellant in this case.)

I recently moderated a panel at the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference about AI and the law, and was honored to meet two energetic thinkers in that important and rapidly developing area. You can learn more about them here:

• Judge Scott Schlegel, a Louisiana appellate, who publishes a lively and thoughtful blog about AI issues. I highly recommend keeping an eye on it.
• Professor Yonathan Arbel, of the University of Alabama Law School, who recently published a thought-provoking article in the NYU Law Review about how judges can productively use large language models when interpreting contracts.

I hope you enjoy their work and follow their thought leadership on the world-changing force of generative AI technology.

In the young days of the Republic, it was generally held that “estoppel could not be asserted against a sovereign.” Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of University and School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 297 n.3 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

Modern times have brought a more relaxed perspective on that principle, as summarized by the Texas Supreme Court in PDT Holdings, Inc. v. City of Dallas, No. 23-0842 (Tex. May 2, 2025):

Mistaken actions by city officials generally will not equitably estop the city from performing its governmental functions. But we have long recognized that estoppel may be necessary to prevent manifest injustice in exceptional cases where a citizen relies on affirmatively misleading government statements and suffers substantial loss as a result. …

 We agree that a mere mistake in issuing a permit is not sufficient for estoppel, but that is not what happened here. Instead, city officials affirmatively told the builder that 36 feet was the applicable height limit, issued an amended permit for that height after inspecting the construction, and stated that the duplex was “OK TO FINISH” even after they identified the ordinance violation. Accordingly, we hold that legally sufficient evidence supports the disputed elements of estoppel, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding estoppel is necessary to prevent manifest injustice.

No. 23-0842 (Tex. May 2, 2025).

In Exporttek, Inc. v. Vista Bank, the appellant offered these reasons for continuance of a summary-judgment hearing:

• The discovery has not expired.
• The discovery date expires on April 7, 2024.
• The motion for summary judgment addresses complex fact issues about what Defendant[] knew and when[,] which can only be resolved through further discovery.
• Plaintiff[s] intend to serve Defendant with written discovery prior to end of discovery deadline.
• Plaintiffs seek an amendment to the scheduling order to extend the time of the discovery to allow Plaintiffs to take the deposition of Defendant’s officer, Landon Willes[s].
• Specifically, the actions of the bank in the fast changing COVID regulatory climate while fast tracking loans for a “windfall” to clients requires serious investigation as to what Vista Bank was doing and whether they punished []Plaintiff[s] for Vista Bank’s hasty decisions.

The Fifth Court did not accept those reasons:

“These general and conclusory assertions do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 252. At best, Borrowers provided a vague description of the discovery they sought. Further, Borrowers failed to establish the materiality of any proposed discovery. Borrowers’ claims are for breach of contract and the contract at issue contained entire-agreement and no-waiver provisions. Motivations are not germane to the resolution of Borrowers’ breach of contract claims. Moreover, Borrowers did not provide any information regarding the diligence on their part in obtaining discovery prior to the hearing.”

The Court went on to review some unfavorable facts in the record about diligence. No. 05-24-00915-CV (Apr. 24, 2025) (mem. op.).

While the supreme court takes the entire case when it grants review, as a court of discretionary review it has discretion about what specific issues to address in its opinion. An example appears in First Sabrepoint Capital Mgmnt., LP v Farmland Partners Inc., which reversed on an issue about the timeliness of the trial court’s TCPA order, and then addressed a point about collateral estoppel:

While the court of appeals erred by declaring void the trial court’s order granting Sabrepoint’s TCPA motion, it correctly reversed the trial court’s order granting Sabrepoint’s motion for summary judgment based on collateral estoppel. Because collateral estoppel is the basis for the summary judgment motion and a basis for the TCPA motion, the doctrine’s application to this case will be at issue on remand. Accordingly, in the interest of judicial efficiency, we will address its application here.

No. 23-0634 (Tex. Apr. 25, 2025).

Addressing the unfortunate complexity that can arise from the interaction of judgment-finality principles and sanctions motions, the Fifth Court held in Bandas Law Firm, P.C. v. Modjarrad & Assocs., P.C.

“Based on the text of [Tex. R. Civ. P.] 329b(g), the supreme court’s opinion in [Lane Bank Equip. v. Smith Southern Equip., Inc.], and this Court’s applicable precedents construing them, we conclude that a postjudgment motion for sanctions may qualify as a plenary-power-extending rule 329b(g) motion to modify the judgment, but only if the motion for sanctions specifically requests a substantive change in the existing judgment.”

No. 05-23-01115-CV (Apr. 25, 2025) (mem. op.).

Willowgate Homeowners Ass’n v. Young rejected a HOA’s argument that the “crosshatched area” on a map was sufficient under the Statute of Frauds to describe an alleged common area. Specifically:

• Unlike the area in the map around a lake (with a description saying that “[a]ll areas except those crosshatched is common ground”), the designations for the private lots—including the lot at issue—did not use this clarifying language.
• Adding to the uncertainty, nothing in the record explained what the marks around that lot on the map were intended to mean—including crosshatched and non-crosshatched areas, as well as lines or arrows pointing to certain sections.
• Moreover, the map lacked a measurement scale, fixed markers, or other such data about the dimensions or boundaries of the crosshatched, non-crosshatched, lined, or arrowed areas.

No. 05-24-00173-CV, Apr. 21, 2025 (mem. op.).

“The difference between aming Carlos Whitfield and Donna M. Williams as WWW’s registered agent cannot be characterized as ‘minor.’ The critical distinction, however, is that an incorrectly named agent was not served pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(a). Instead, process was served in accordance with the court’s [substituted-service] order under Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(b).” Allied World Nat’l Assurance Co. v. Nisus Corp., No. 05-24-00208-CV (April 16, 2025) (mem. op.).

A “one-satisfaction” rule required reversal in Dorvil v. Mason, when all roads led to the same $2 million in damages:

It is apparent from record before us, including the pleadings, the evidence admitted at trial and the closing argument of the Masons’ attorney, that the Masons sought to recover as actual damages on each of the causes of action asserted the $2 million dollars they loaned to Agile. The jury awarded the Masons $2 million dollars in actual damages on each of their direct claims against Dorvil, except their negligent misrepresentation claim, for which actual damages were not awarded. In keeping with the trial court’s order granting partial default judgment against Agile, the final judgment awarded the Masons breach of contract damages of $2 million against Agile and, additionally, held Dorvil jointly and severally liable for same. In addition, the judgment awarded the Masons damages of $2 million dollars on their direct claims against Dorvil. As a result, the final judgment in effect awarded the Masons actual damages against Dorvil in the amount of $4 million, resulting in an improper double recovery.

No. 05-23-01020-CV (April 10, 2025) (mem. op.) (emphasis added).

A recent order from the Fifth Court that a party provide copies of several un-findable opinions suggests that, yet again, someone misused generative AI technology and relied on “hallucinated” case law.

Two concepts frame the legal-sufficiency issue in Raoger Corp. v. Myers.

First, the Dram Shop Act imposes liability on providers of alcoholic beverages if they serve a customer who is “obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presented a clear danger to himself and others.” The Act requires that the intoxication be “apparent to the provider” when the alcohol was served—a higher tandard than the common-law requirement that the provider “knew or should have known” of the customer’s intoxication.

Second, the rule against “inferences on inferences” prohibits the stacking of conclusions to establish a fact. As Raorger summarized: “Findings must be supported by facts in evidence, not conjecture, and we cannot pile speculation on speculation and inference on inference.”

In Raorger, the plaintiff relied on test results showing that a driver had BAC of .139 approximately 3-4 hours after leaving a restaurant. The supreme court held that while the BAC test results supported an inference that the driver drank a large amount of alcohol, no direct evidence linked that inference to the driver’s appearance and behavior at the restaurant.

More specifically, the Court highlighted that all relevant witnesses testified that the driver did not show signs of obvious intoxication at the restaurant. Speculation about how he “might have” appeared based on his BAC results was insufficient: “Speculative and conclusory testimony, by experts and lay witnesses alike, is incompetent and cannot support or defeat summary judgment.”

Footnote ten of the opinion analyzes the application of this holding to expert analysis more generally. No. 23-0662, April 11, 2025.

Davis v. Homeowners of Am. addressed the enforceability of a contractual limitations period in an insurance policy.

The Fifth Court held that the policy’s provision requiring suit to be filed within two years and one day from the date the claim is accepted or rejected, or three years and one day from the date of the loss, did not violate Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 16.070(a).

The Court distinguished this case from Spicewood Summit Office Condos Ass’n v. Am. First Lloyds Co. noting that the policy in Davis did not impermissibly shorten the limitations period to less than two years, as the trigger date was based on the claim’s acceptance or rejection rather than the date of loss. No. 05-24-00035-CV, Apr. 7, 2025 (mem. op.).

In Jackson v. Cole, the Fifth Court addressed the mention of insurance during trial, the preservation of that topic as appellate error, and the requirement of harmful error.

The record showed that on cross-examination, a friend of the plaintiffs described what she had been told about the car accident at issue. In doing so, the witness made two references to the exchange of insurance cards. Later, one of the plaintiffs made a similar reference to an insurance card. That testimony drew objection, after which the trial court gave a curative instruction. The plaintiffs won an approximately $300,000 verdict.

Preservation. The Court agreed that the plaintiff’s reference to insurance was improper. But the defense did not object to the curative instruction at the time it was made, and the record also showed that the jury was given then pattern instruction to “not consider or guess whether any party is covered by insurance unless I tell you to.” Error was not preserved, even as to the mention of insurance to which an objection had been made.

Harm. The Court detailed the trial evidence and held that “the mere fact that liability was ‘hotly contested’ due to conflicting testimony in this case, without more, has not demonstrated harm warranting reversal when the record contains evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.” From there, the Court observed that the references appeared to be inadvertent, that the defense had not challenged the sufficiency of the damages evidence on appeal, and that the trial court appeared to have actively supervised the handling of this issue. Thus, no harm was shown. No. 05-23-00424-CV (April 1, 2025) (mem. op.).

McDonald v. Four Rivers Devel., LLC, discussed yesterday on a procedural point, also addressed the distinction between a condition precedent and a covenant within a contract. The Fifth Court held that a 25% profit margin requirement for commission payments was not a condition precedent but rather a covenant or term of the contract.

It explained, “We do not view the 25% profit margin requirement as a condition precedent that would require a specific denial. The provision – commissions calculated at 6% for any job sold by McDonald in which the overall profit on the job was 25% or more – was the measure of calculating commissions, i.e., a covenant or term of the contract.”

A condition precedent is an event that must occur before a right can accrue to enforce an obligation, while a covenant is an agreement to act or refrain from acting in a certain way. The court emphasized that this did not indicate an “if this, then that” scenario, as typical of a condition precedent. Instead, the 25% profit margin was a term used to calculate commissions, making it a covenant. No. 05-24-00431-CV (March 28, 2025) (mem. op.).

McDonald v. Four Rivers Devel., LLC addressed, inter alia, an issue of trial by consent. The appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence about a “25% profit margin requirement,” but the Fifth Court noted that the appellant mentioned the 25% profit margin in opening statement and asked about it during direct examination, thereby making the issue relevant–before later objecting to further evidence on the subject. No. No. 05-24-00431-CV (March 28, 2025) (mem. op.). (My partner John Volney and I wrote this article in Headnotes a couple of years ago about then-recent Fifth Court cases on similar trial-by-consent issues.)

The Dallas division of the Business Court recently addressed contractual modification of partnership duties in Primexx v. Primexx, (March 9, 2025). Consistent with the supreme court’s general theme in Energy Transfer v. Enterprise, 593 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. 2020), that statutory partnership-formation requirements can be modified, Primexx held that a partnership agreement had effectively limited the (nonwaivable statutory) duties of loyalty and care to the fullest extent permitted by Texas law.

Specifically, the Court found that the agreement allowed the controlling partner to act in its sole interest and discretion, provided it met the minimum statutory requirements under the Texas Business Organizations Code. While the agreement limited the fiduciary duties, it did not eliminate the obligation to act in good faith. And the good faith obligation of the  TBOC does not rise to the level of a separate fiduciary duty but requires parties to “deal fairly” with each other.

Accordingly, the controlling partner’s actions in exercising its “drag-along” rights and forcing the sale of the partnership’s business were within the bounds of the modified fiduciary duties as outlined in the agreement.

In a flashback to a common area of litigation in 2017-18, Ruff v. Ruff addresses the applicability of the TCPA to claims involving the signing and filing of a deed. The appellant argued that her actions were protected by the TCPA as they were based on  her exercise of the right to petition. The Fifth Court saw matters otherwise, concluding:  “[T]he events on which Suzann’s claims are factually predicated are Jennifer’s signing and filing the deed, which were not communications in or pertaining to a judicial proceeding.” No. 05-24-00095-CV, Mar. 10, 2025 (mem. op.).

Kennedy v. NCAA addressed the issue of whether the plaintiffs’ claims about CTE were barred by limitations. The Fifth Court reversed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the NCAA, holding that the NCAA did not conclusively establish that defense.

The Court found fact issues as to when the plaintiffs knew, or should have known through the exercise of reasonable diligence, that their father’s injury was likely related to his participation in college football. It considerd several specific events, including: the plaintiffs’ opt-out from a class-action settlement in 2017, an October 2, 2015 email inquiry about CTE, an August 18, 2014 intake questionnaire reporting head trauma from college football, a note by a doctor on October 8, 2015, and a 1998 conversation between the decedent and his brother about cognitive decline potentially related to football. No. 05-23-00958-CV, Mar. 25, 2025 (mem. op.).

The supreme court’s detailed review of a takings issue in Commons of Lake Houston v. City of Houston turned on this basic point:

“[W]e have long rejected ‘the notion that the government’s duty to pay for taking property rights is excused by labeling the taking as an exercise of police powers.’ Indeed, whether a regulation constitutes a valid exercise of the police power—or promotes any other important public policy, purpose, or interest—is simply irrelevant to whether the regulation causes a compensable taking.”

No. 23-0474 (Tex. March 21, 2024) (citations omitted).

MPI Indus. Carolinas, LLC v. CTE Networks LLC reversed the denial of a special appearance, noting that the work performed under the disputed agreement occurred in North Carolina and South Carolina, and that the plaintiffs’ unilateral activities, such as sending invoices from Texas, were irrelevant to the jurisdictional analysis. No. 05-24-00560-CV (March 11, 2025) (mem. op.).

It’s hard to improve on the supreme court’s own summary of how it resolved a jurisdictional dispute involving the new 15th Court of Appeals, so here it is. The consistent theme in these cases has been fidelity to the statutes’ plain meaning.

To challenge a remand order by the new Business Court, the path to take is a mandamus petition rather than direct appeal, as recently confirmed by In re ETC Field Services LLC, from the 15th Court of Appeals on February 21:

ETC appealed the remand order to this Court. Tema moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was not a final order and no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal.2 ETC defended the interlocutory appeal, but alternatively filed this original proceeding for mandamus relief if interlocutory appeal was unavailable. We hold today that no interlocutory appeal is available in these circumstances. … “But that of course does not preclude mandamus review.” “[T]he Legislature’s decision to forego interlocutory review of all pending cases in no way suggests it intended interlocutory review of none of them.” Accordingly, we turn to that issue in this opinion.

No. 15-24-00131-CV (15th Ct. App.) (citations and footnotes omitted).

In Elsell v. Encore Wire Corp., the Fifth District reversed a defense summary judgment, finding a genuine issue of material fact about the credibility of the reasons provided for Plaintiff Elsell’s termination. Interestingly, the panel consists of three newly-elected Justices, two of them Republicans. The Court noted two points:

1. Encore’s director of human resources, Ronald Bouchard, claimed he fired Elsell for lying about being coerced into signing a document. However, Bouchard’s heavy reliance on the credibility of Jimmy Davis, another employee was terminated by Bouchard for document fraud and dishonesty, created a factual dispute about whether Bouchard genuinely believed Elsell was lying or if the stated reason for termination was a pretext for retaliation.
2. Bouchard’s interview with Elsell was brief and lacked thorough investigation. Bouchard did not ask Elsell why he felt coerced and instead presumed the nature of the alleged coercion.

Therefore, “reasonable and fair-minded persons could differ on whether Bouchard’s stated reason for firing Elsell was actually based on an interview of Elsell that was objectively brief, conjectural, and uninformed.” No. 05-23-00588-CV, Mar. 14, 2025 (mem. op.).

Miles-Edmond v. Skillman Prop. Inv. Dallas LLC addressed “Malooly” issues and the need for appellants to challenge all potential bases for a trial court’s summary judgment ruling.

A general issue that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment might be sufficient to allow argument on all possible grounds.  However, the appellant must then, in fact, substantively attack each basis upon which the summary judgment could have been granted.

Here,”[b]ecause the summary judgment could have been based on these no-evidence grounds, and because Miles-Edmond failed to challenge these grounds, we must affirm the trial court’s summary judgment.”  No. 05-23-00789-CV (mem. op.) (Feb. 24, 2025).

Bone-Martin v. Moss addressed federal copyright preemption in the context of a judgment-collection action. The Fifth Court held that the the trial court lacked jurisdiction to divest the appellants of their federal copyrights and transfer ownership of certain copyrighted videos to the appellees.

The Court emphasized that the Copyright Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts over matters related to copyright ownership and transfer. Therefore, “the trial court had no jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the videos and whether the purported transfer of videos to Google or another virtual platform was a ‘voluntary transfer’ under the Copyright Act.” No. 05-22-00439-CV (Feb. 13, 2025) (mem. op.).

Vincent v. Deutsche Bank reversed a judgment in a FE&D case when:

The trial court’s June 12 written notice that trial was set for July 14, following the trial court’s instruction to “reset” the case, establishes that the trial court “reset” the case on July 14, but then proceeded to trial on June 15 without notice to Vincent. When a case previously has been set for trial, the trial court “may reset said contested case to a later date on any reasonable notice to the parties or by agreement of the parties.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 245. Here, however, there is nothing in the record to show that that Vincent received “reasonable”—or any—notice of the proceedings on June 15.

No. 05-23-00705-CV (Feb. 20, 2025) (mem. op.).

The supreme court rejected a claim of an informal fiduciary duty arising from an accountant-client / business relationship in Pitts v. Rivas:

This evidence comes nowhere close to creating a fiduciary relationship under our precedents. There is no evidence that a special relationship of trust and confidence preceded the parties’ business agreement. Rivas’s subjective trust in the Accountants is no evidence of a fiduciary relationship. Providing discounted commercial services— like home-building—to a business associate does not impose fiduciary duties on the recipient. And the evidence offered to show a special personal relationship between Rivas and the Accountants amounts only to business conversations, a few dinners, and a close friendship between their sons.

A four-Justice concurrence, written by Justice Huddle, questioned the validity of the entire concept of an informal fiduciary duty:

In these contexts, heightened legal duties are justified because the fiduciary is empowered—if not to direct, at least to impact—the rights and affairs of others. But the same is not true in the context of so-called “informal” fiduciary relationships. The construct is flawed because the so-called “informal” fiduciary wields no legal authority to direct another’s affairs that could justify a corresponding heightened fiduciary duty. The Court’s refusal to find that an informal fiduciary duty arose in any case in almost fifty years, despite the theory’s frequent invocation, proves it is time to disavow the notion that “certain informal relationships may give rise to a fiduciary duty.”

No. 23-0427 (Tex. Feb. 21, 2025).

In re Ruff found that an order was too vague to enforce by contempt. The order involved discovery obligations and the relevant paragraph was as follows:

The Fifth Court held: “[R]reasonable people could come to different conclusions as to what relator was supposed to do in order to comply with this provision of the March 23, 2021 order. Consequently, that provision is too unclear to support a judgment of contempt.” Specifically:

• How to comply? “The first sentence of the provision requires him to “organize” both (i) boxes and documents that he previously produced in response to the court’s November 29, 2018 order and (ii) any other documents responsive to that order. It is unclear how relator is supposed to “organize” the category (i) materials because those materials—boxes and documents that he previously produced in response to a specific court order—are by definition no longer in his possession.”
• What documents? And category (ii) of this first sentence is ambiguous because it is not clear whether this category of “other documents responsive” to the court’s November 29, 2018 order is limited to documents that relator had previously produced in this litigation or whether it also extends to unproduced documents.”
• How to comply, and what documents? “Finally, the last sentence of the provision requires relator to “produce and deliver the documents, organized and identified as aforesaid.” This requirement is also unclear. As noted above, the provision directs relator to organize the boxes and documents that relator had already produced in response to the court’s November 29, 2018 order. Those are specific, existing materials that by definition are no longer in his possession. But the last sentence of the provision implies, contrary to the first sentence, that relator is supposed to produce and deliver a new collection of “organized and identified” materials to RPI’s attorney.”

The case of Totus Group LLC v. Pruitt Family Living Trust provides a “Restatement of TRCP 683” for the Fifth Court’s precedent, reversing a temporary injunction for failing to comply with that rule in many ways, including:

• Failure to explain why the order was necessary (p. 15 quotes the inadequate language used)
• Vague acts to be restrained (pages 18-20)
• Failure to identify a nexus between the restrained acts and the alleged injury (pages 20-21)
• Impermissible use of undefined terms / reference to external documents (pages 22-23 – this is often a challenge in trade-secret cases that involve “Confidential Information” defined in various agreements)

No. 05-23-01222-CV (Feb. 14, 2025) (mem. op.).

Texas law favors arbitration agreements – but even the most favorable view of the topic requires an agreement. In Exencial Wealth Advisors, LLC v. Sipes, the relevant contract required a signature to become effective, and the record did not contain a signed copy of that instrument. Therefore, the contract failed for lack mutual assent, and arbitration of the parties’ dispute was not required. No. 05-24-00964-CV (Jan. 31, 2025) (mem. op.).

The Fifth Court affirmed the temporary injunction against the Dallas short-term rental ordinances, stating:

The Texas Constitution provides: “No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of law of the land.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19. Appellees have “a vested right to lease their properties and this right is sufficient to support a viable due-course-of law claim.” City of Grapevine, 651 S.W.3d at 347. Under the circumstances, we conclude appellees proved their probable right of recovery under their due-course-of-law argument because they alleged they possessed wellestablished rights to lease their property and presented evidence tending to show that the City would deny them those rights by enforcing the two ordinances at issue.

City of Dallas v. DSTRA, No. 05-23-01309-CV (Feb. 7, 2025) (mem. op.). LPHS represents the Appellees in this litigation.

In Expo Group v. Purdy, the Fifth Court addressed whether the temporary injunction and related bond satisfied Rule 684, which requires that the trial court “fix the amount of security to be given by the applicant,” i.e., set a bond. Because the temporary injunction order did not set a specific bond amount, the order was void from inception.

The Court further clarified that the cash already deposited into the court’s registry for a different purpose could not be used to satisfy the bond requirement under Rule 684. It referenced the supreme court’s opinion in Ex parte Lesher, which held that the intent of Rule 684 is to require a bond payable to the party against whom the injunction is issued before the order may lawfully issue. No. 05-24-00653-CV, Jan. 27, 2025 (mem. op.)

My friend Arturo Ayala at CSBA recently wrote this useful article about what happens to a supersedeas bond when the appeal ends.

Expo Group v. Purdy clarifies a point about the statutory grant of jurisdiction over injunction orders: “[M]odifying a temporary injunction is akin to granting a temporary injunction—it creates a new or amended temporary injunction from which a party may appeal; refusing to modify does not.” No. 05-24-00653-CV (Jan. 27, 2025) (mem. op.) (citation omitted).

While much less visible than it once was, the TCPA continues to have impact in an appropriate case. For example, in High Risk Pregnancy doctors, PLLC v. Akhmedjanova, the Fifth Court addressed whether the plaintiff, Akhmedjanova, had established a prima facie case for her claims, after concluding that the TCPA applied to the defendants’ exercise of their right of petition.

The Court ruled against her on each such claim; for example, on her claim for invasion of privacy, the Court noted that Akhmedjanova’s complaint centered on the publication of her past physician-patient relationship, but she did not show that the defendants intruded or pried into her private affairs. No. 05-24-00413-CV, Jan. 15, 2025 (mem. op.).

In Santander Consumer USA Inc. v. Enterprise Fin. Group, Inc., the Fifth Court addressed preservation of charge error.

Specifically, the Court held that the appellant failed to object specifically to the broad form submission of Question No. 1, which asked if the appellant failed to comply with the agreement. It observed that the appellant “did not object to the submission of Question No. 1 at the charge conference or before the charge was read to the jury,” and reminded that submitting a proposed charge or jury questions pretrial is not enough to preserve a charge-error issue.

Importantly, this analysis means that “[t]he use of a global denial of objections and requests based solely on the parties’ pretrial submission of proposed jury charges does not preserve issues of charge error for appellate review.” No. 23-0770-CV (Dec. 31, 2024) (mem. op.).

Dallas Police & Fire Pension System v. Townsend Holdings, LLC illustrates the practical problems about objecting to allegedly improper argument–objection risks highlighting the problem, while waiting risks a waiver finding:

DPFP chose not to raise its concerns until after the jury began deliberations. DPFP’s chosen strategy risked that any error would be unpreserved if improper arguments were curable. DPFP had significant time during the five weeks of trial to consider objections and request curative action. If DPFP were concerned about provoking the ire of the jury, it could have requested admonitions outside the presence of the jury to rein in overzealous attorneys. To preserve error, DPFP should have timely objected and sought appropriate instructions from the trial court, who was in the best position to fashion the appropriate remedy.

No. 05-23-00099-CV (Dec. 17, 2024) (mem. op.).

Also in Santander Consumer USA Inc. v. Enterprise Fin. Group, Inc., discussed yesterday about charge error, the Fifth Court addressed a preservation issue about evidence that the appellant said related to unpleaded theories of contract breach. The Court found that issue was not preserved by a series of objections to relevance, generally, that didn’t refer to the particular contract issue, or by a tender of exhibits as “rebuttal” to the objected-to-evidence:

“[T]he objection made by SCUSA’s Counsel did not mention Section 17.6 and did not articulate that SCUSA objected to EFG asserting unpleaded theories of breach. This objection was insufficient to put the trial court on notice of the actual objection and, therefore, did not preserve error.” 

No. 23-00770 (Dec. 31, 2024) (mem. op.).

Governor Abbott has made two appointments for the Texas Supreme Court after the recent retirement of Nathan Hecht–long serving Justice Blacklock becomes Chief, and the Governor’s general counsel becomes the newest Justice.

The parties’ lease in Lamar Advantage Outdoor Co. v. LaCore Enterprises, LLC contained this provision, which the Fifth Court held to create a right of first refusal (as opposed to a purchase option):

If LESSOR desires to sell or otherwise transfer any Interest in the property upon which the sign is situated, LESSOR grants LESSEE an option to purchase a perpetual easement (servitude) encompassing the sign and the access, utility service and visibility rights set forth herein. LESSEE must elect to exercise this option within thirty (30) days after written notification of LESSOR’s desire to sell. LESSEE’S failure to exercise this option within said period shall be a waiver of this option. … 

Following an earlier Fifth Court case about a similar clause, the Court held that because this provisision was not “limit[ed to] the right of first refusal to the first sale or transfer of the Property or contemplating waiver of the right if not utilized in conjunction with prior transactions.” No. 05-23-00210-CV (Dec. 31, 2024) (mem. op.).

In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Xerox State & Local Solutions, Inc., on remand from the Texas Supreme Court, the Fifth Court concluded that various tort claims were precluded by the economic-loss rule in the context of the particular industry involved:

It is inappropriate for the courts of Texas to disrupt the system of agreements of the different states with Xerox for protection of those states’ retailers. Nor is it appropriate for Texas’s courts to provide common-law protection for Wal-Mart when the statutes, regulations, and contracts governing the SNAP EBT program failed to do so. We conclude the economic loss rule precludes our finding Xerox had a general common-law duty to prevent Wal-Mart’s losses from the store-andforward transactions subject to Xerox’s second motion for summary judgment.

No. 05-18-01421-CV (Dec. 12, 2024) (mem. op.). LPHS represented Xerox in this appeal.

Estrada v. Boss Exotics, LLC reverses a default judgment, despite finding conscious indifference, because the alleged unliquidated damages were not supported by competent evidence: “On this record, we conclude that appellees’ counsel’s unsworn statement indicating that the balance due on the vehicle was $75,000 does not constitute evidence.”

A dissent questioned whether the majority’s conclusion about conscious indifference is consistent with an extensive line of cases from the Texas Supreme Court about the need to resolve cases on the merits. No. 05-23-00990-CV (Dec. 18, 2024).

Janus (right) was the Roman god of dualities. Pruitt Family Living Trust v. Totus Gift Card Mgmnt also involved a duality, in the form of evidence and substantive rulings that were not consistent:

Through these inconsistent rulings, the trial court excluded the same evidence it presumably considered when granting TGCM’s special appearance. A trial court cannot allow one party the benefit of using authenticated evidence to support a special appearance while striking the same authenticated evidence to the detriment of the other side. Because of the trial court’s misapplication of rule 120a(3), it stripped appellants of their ability to admit any evidence challenging the special appearance. Stated differently, by striking the evidence relied on by TGCM to support their special appearance, the trial court was left with no evidence upon which it could rule, let alone grant, the special appearance. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by ruling arbitrarily and without reference to any guiding rules
or legal principles.

No. 05-24-00612-CV (Dec. 27, 2024) (mem. op.).

In City of Austin v. Powell, the supreme court overhauls the general framework for resolution of a plea to the jurisdiction based on immunity, observing:

More than twenty years ago, we described the process for resolving a plea to the jurisdiction asserting immunity from suit as one that “generally mirrors that of a summary judgment.” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004). We reaffirm this description but acknowledge that dispositive-pleading practice has evolved in the interim. The conceptual similarity largely reflects that the parties’ burdens will depend on the nature of the plaintiff’s claim and how the government poses its jurisdictional challenge. Just as the Texas rules now include not only traditional summary judgment but also no-evidence summary judgment and dismissal under Rule 91a, for example, pleas to the jurisdiction may involve competing evidence, the denial of any probative evidence, or the assertion that the law compels a result regardless of the evidence.

No. 22-0662 (Dec. 31, 2024). Powell does not materially revise the actual framework, but carefully reviews a number of common quotes about that framework to be sure they are consistent with modern-day procedure.

2025 brings significant change to the Fifth Court, with J.J. Koch becoming Chief Justice, and Mike Lee, Jessica Lewis, Tina Clinton, Earl Jackson, Cynthia Barbare, and Gino Rossini joining as new Justices.

In Herrera v. Mata, the Texas Supreme Court addressed alternative pleading, particularly in the context of a party’s conditional acceptance of the opposing side’s position, to make a claim based on that position.

Specifically, homeowners argued that certain disputed charges were taxes that should be removed from the tax rolls under the Tax Code’s twenty-year limitations period. They also presented alternative claims under the Water Code, acknowledging the irrigation district’s authority to levy assessments.

The Court emphasized that recognizing the district’s position in the Water Code claim did not mean conceding its validity: “[The homeowners’ recognition of the District’s position is not a concession that the position has merit; it is plain from the pleadings that the homeowners disagree with the District’s characterization.” And the Court noted generally that this result aligns with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 48, which allows alternative pleadings. No. 23-0457 (Tex. Dec. 6, 2024).

In Baylor Scott & White v. Bostick, the Fifth Court reversed the trial court’s judgment due to errors in the jury charge regarding the definition of an invitee. The Court found that the trial court improperly included the “public invitee” component in the definition of an invitee, which is not recognized under Texas law. The correct definition, as established by the Texas Supreme Court, is that an invitee is “one who enters the property of another with the owner’s knowledge and for the mutual benefit of both,” with the requisite mutual benefit being a shared business or economic interest.

The Court went on to hold that the error in the jury charge was harmful because it related to a contested and critical issue—the plaintiff’s status as an invitee. The evidence was sharply conflicting on this point, and the improper definition let the jury find Bostick was an invitee based on the fact that he entered the hospital as a member of the public. No. 05-23-00606-CV, Dec. 6, 2024 (mem. op.).

In In re Turtle Creek North Condo Mgmnt Assoc., the Fifth District addressed the issue of designating responsible third parties (RTPs) in a lawsuit concerning water damage in a condominium unit. The court found that the trial judge abused his discretion by denying the relators’ motion to designate RTPs.

The relators moved to designate sixteen other condominium residents and three contractors as RTPs, arguing that these parties contributed to the water damage. Specifically, that the contractors did negligent work on the refrigerator water line connection, and that the residents owned units adjacent to the plaintiff’s and breached their duties to mitigate water intrusion originating in their respective units.

The Fifth Court held that the relators’ allegations were sufficient to meet the fair-notice standard. It also rejected an objection that the relators had not produced evidence to support the RTPs’ inclusion, clarifying that such an evidence-based challenge is premature at the motion-for-leave-to-designate stage.No. 05-24-00990-CV, Nov. 27, 2024 (mem. op.).

In Texas Right to Life v. Van Stean, the Texas Supreme Court reversed a lower-court ruling that the TCPA did not apply to a particular case, remanding for consideration of the threshold issue of subject matter jurisdiction (here, the plaintiffs’ standing). Two notes:

• The defendants had filed a plea to the jurisdiction. Because they were not governmental entites, they had no statutory right of interlocutory appeal from the denial of that plea. That said: “[J]urisdiction must be addressed in a properly filed interlocutory appeal, regardless of the order appealed. Thus, the act that [defendants] could formally appeal only the order denying its TCPA motion was no bar to the court of appeals’ determining whether the plaintiffs had standing.” citation omitted).
• This case did not address the topic analyzed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999)l ,which reminded: “Customarily, a federal court first resolves doubts about its jurisdiction over the subject matter, but there are circumstances in which a district court appropriately accords priority to a personal jurisdiction inquiry.” 

The Texas Supreme Court recently gave final approval to several changes in the Rules of Appellate Procedure, all of which require the (helpful!) step of bookmarking the various components of an appellate submission.

In In re Schrandt, the Fifth Court addressed the petitioner’s entitlement to advancement of legal fees under company bylaws. The Court agreed with the petitioner’s position, concluding that  the bylaws did not condition entitlement to advancement on whether a party did or did not initiate a suit, or even on whether a suit was pending at all. It also found that mandamus relief was proper for a fee-advancement claim under Fifth Court precedent. No. 05-24-01041-CV, Nov. 22, 2024 (mem .op.). LPHS represented the successful petitioner.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 176 and 205 set out a detailed process for obtaining discovery from a nonparty; after review of a record involving notices, subpoenas, and motions to quash, the Fifth Court granted mandamus relief, holding: “Respondent abused her discretion by ordering discovery from nonparties without hearing their motions for protective orders regarding the subpoenas served on February 28, 2024.” In re Creuzot, No. 05-24-00450-CV (Nov. 14, 2024) (mem. op.).

Mandamus issued in a failure-to-rule case when: “Megatel filed its motion to compel arbitration on June 30, 2022, and the motion was initially set for hearing two years ago on November 2, 2022. For various reasons and despite three hearings, two additional settings, and multiple requests, the trial judge failed to rule on the motion to compel arbitration and instead set a jury trial date.” In re Megatel, No. 05-24-01161-CV (Nov. 18, 2024).

Rockwall County is on the edge of the rapidly expanding Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area. That surging growth inevitably brings friction, such asCity of McLendon-Chisholm v. City of Heath, in which one Rockwall city sued the other, and the Fifth Court held that the City of Heath had standing to challenge its neighbor’s land-use decision.

Specifically, the Court found that Heath had demonstrated concrete and particularized injuries, including a projected 358% increase in traffic and a significant decrease in property values, which would negatively impact Heath’s tax base and public services. These injuries were enough for standing because they were distinct from general public injuries and directly traceable to McLendon-Chisholm’s actions.

The Court also held that Heath had standing to bring claims under the Texas Open Meetings Act, noting that TOMA ‘broadly confers standing on any person who shares an injury in common with the general public,” and that Heath alleged specific TOMA violations that directly affected it in a way different from the general public—including the adoption of the challenged land-use actions. No. 05-23-00881-CV, Nov. 8, 2024.

As further detailed in today’s Texas Lawbook, Republicans did not completely sweep the eight races for positions on the Fifth Court. Mail-in and provisional ballots moved Hon. Tina Clinton into a lead over her Republican opponent.

Dallas Palms LLC v. Jones involved claims that were dismissed because of a failure to provide a certificate of merit, when the movant did not establish that he was, in fact, a licensed architect. The statement of facts describes the various proof deficiencies, which could likely have been avoided with a straightfoward affidavit on the subject. No. 05-23-00156-CV (Nov. 8, 2024) (mem .op.).

In addition to resolving a thorny question about a legislative subpoena’s interaction with a death sentence, In re Texas House of Representatives reminded of this fundamental point:

With competing claims from (and in some instances within) the three branches of government, it falls to this Court to resolve as a matter of law which branch’s authority must prevail in this situation. In properly adjudicated cases, “[t]he final authority to determine adherence to the Constitution resides with the Judiciary.” 

No. 24-0884 (Tex. Nov. 15, 2024).

Last Friday I received the inaugural “Lawyer’s Lawyer” award from the Dallas Bar Association, described by President Bill Mateja as a lawyer who “eats, breathes, and sleeps law” in comment and public thought about it. (Next to me is Courtney Marcus, filling in for Glenn West, who also received it.) Many thanks to Bill and the DBA, and to readers of this blog: longtime or new; enthusiastic or not!

Republican candidates swept the eight races for positions on the Fifth Court; the Texas Lawbook has a good summary.

An arbitration provision was not illusory when:

“[T]he arbitration provisions apply equally to all parties. The arbitration provisions cannot be amended or terminated unilaterally by the LPs—that would require the approval of partners owning the requisite supermajority of capital interests under the partnership agreements. As previously discussed, amendments to partnership agreements may be duly adopted in accordance with the terms of the partnership agreement to which the limited partner initially agreed.”

Caprocq Core Real Estate Fund, LP v. Essa K. Alley Revocable Trust No. 2, No. 05-22-01021-CV (Oct. 25, 2024) (mem. op.).

Hyde v. GACP Fin. Co., LLC reversed a $1.7 million judgment because of a pleading-amendment problem. The Fifth Court found that the trial court erred by allowing GACP to amend its petition during trial, to argue for the first time that it sought damages as an agent on behalf of another entity, rather than its own damages. The Court said:  “Fair notice is not notice to dig deeper to determine the parties’ claims and damages,” and detailed why GACP’s second amended petition did not give adequate notice of the agency relationship it later claimed.

As a fallback, GACP argued that this challenge failed for lack of a special exception or a verified denial. The Court held that appellants were justified in relying on the second amended petition (which didn’t assert agency), and that the appellants had no reason to file a verified denial about capacity when the relevant agency claim wasn’t in the pleading in the first place. The Court concluded that the appellants timely raised the capacity issue as soon as it became apparent at trial. No. 05-23-00873-CV, Oct. 24, 2024 (mem. op.).

Despite adequate service, a default judgment nevertheless failed to withstand a restricted appeal when the pleaded cause of action didn’t match the judgment:

The Agreement as described by Struge conflicts with the terms of the Agreement attached to the petition. Because none of the alleged breaches, taken as true, actually constitute breaches of the Agreement under its plain terms, Struge’s pleadings fail to state a valid breach of contract claim and the petition cannot support a default judgment on the grounds of breach of contract.

Albanian-American Cultural Center, Inc. v. Struge Cultural Center, Inc., No. 05-23-01134-CV (Oct. 15, 2024) (mem. op.) Incidentally, the Albanian-American Cultural Center appears to be a thriving celebration of Albanian culture in the Dallas area, which I was unaware of but am certainly happy to see.

The dispute about the execution of Robert Roberson reached the Texas Supreme Court late last week, producing a stay order until lower courts can evaluate the merits of the Legislature’s last-minute subpoena to Mr. Roberson. A concurrence, joined by three Justices, mused about the separation-of-power questions at issue. Despite the obvious merits of Mr. Roberson’s case, one does wonder what future mischief may be enabled by encouragement of assertive exercise of the Legislature’s subpoena power.

The Fifth Court of Appeals has open staff attorney positions. If you or someone you might recommend for employment is interested is pursuing such an opportunity, please click the link for additional information – Full-Time Central Staff Attorney

Combs v. Crepeau involved a substantial judgment on a fiduciary-duty claim. The Fifth Court found legally insufficient damages evidence, holding as to past damages:

… there is no evidence of the value of the estate absent Michael’s fraud or breaches of fiduciary duty and no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find Diane and Lari’s combined one-half share of the estate was valued at $1,300,000.

That straightforward, high-level holding is supported by a painstaking review of many discrete components of that award. This case, and the damages arguments advanced in it, warrants study by anyone involved in document-intensive litigation about closely-held companies and family finances. No. 05-23-00088-CV (Oct. 7, 2024) (mem. op.).

In Gore v. Trans Union LLC, the Fifth Court addressed whether the Fair Credit Reporting Act preempts Texas statutes about the award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a credit-reporting dispute.

The Court rejected this argument, noting that the FCRA does not expressly preempt the attorney’s fees provision in TBCC Section 20.08(c).  The court emphasized that the FCRA’s preemption provisions “have a narrow and targeted scope,” and Sections 1681n(c) and 1681o(b) of the FCRA, which govern attorney’s fees, are not among the provisions intended to preempt state law. No conflict arises: “That TBCC Section 20.08(c) allows attorney’s fees for the prevailing party in the absence of a finding of bad faith or harassment by the opposing party does not create an impossibility for compliance or stand as an obstacle to accomplishing Congress’s purposes in enacting the FCRA.” No. 05-23-00659-CV, Oct. 9, 2024.

In In re Peters, the Texas Supreme Court addressed an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the context of civil discovery—an uncommon but critically important Constitutional limit on discovery. The case arose from a tort lawsuit against a defendant who was allegedly driving while intoxicated. Among other holdings, the Court said:

• Ongoing Criminal Proceedings: Active criminal proceedings are not required to claim the privilege. Here, the State was prosecuting Peters on the same facts underlying the civil case, which justified his assertion of the privilege.
• Waiver of Privilege: For a waiver to be valid, it must be “made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” The court found that Peters’ statements to a police officer at the time of the accident did not meet this high standard for waiver, given his confused and disoriented state at the time.
• Potential for Further Incrimination: The court concluded that compelling Peters to disclose the names of the bars he visited could further incriminate him by leading to evidence that he drank more than he claimed. The court emphasized that the amount of evidence already collected against Peters is irrelevant; the witness need only show that an answer to the specific question at hand is likely to be hazardous to him.

No. 23-0611 (Tex. Oct. 4, 2024).

As part of a broader arc of cases in which the Texas Supreme Court has reversed lower-court rulings that it sees as overly technical, that Court reversed the Fifth Court in Verhalen v. Akhtar, concluding:

When a litigant demonstrates good cause to file a late response to a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must allow the filing. Johnston did not raise this argument in her briefing. We hold that when, as here, a litigant shares the response with the opposing party one day after the response deadline, files an affidavit explaining that the late filing was the result of a mere mistake, and no prejudice will result to the opposing party, the denial of that motion is an abuse of discretion.

No. 23-0885 (Tex. Oct. 4, 2024).

If you enjoyed my article in the Cornell Law Review Online earlier this year about the party-presentation principle, hopefully you will also enjoy a new article of mine in the Texas Law Review Online. Examining cases from the 2023-24 Supreme Court term, it considers whether “originalism” and modern economic theory can comfortably coexist.

Last week, the supreme court denied mandamus review, of the Fifteenth Court’s denial of emergency relief, in the Attorney General’s lawsuit against the firearms ban of the State Fair of Texas. A concurring opinion noted some oddities in the Attorney General’s litigation position, including:

1. “The State’s presentation to this Court takes no position on whether the State Fair of Texas, a private entity, has the legal authority to exclude patrons carrying handguns from the Fair.”
2. During the litigation, the Attorney General withdrew a 2016 opinion involving the Fort Worth Zoo that appeared inconsistent with its position in the State Fair case, as to which the opinion noted: “Withdrawing the Opinion is not the same thing as repudiating its analysis or explaining why it was wrong, which the State has not attempted to do in this Court.”

No. 24-0813 (Sept. 26, 2024).

In in re Mescioglu, the Fifth Court denied a mandamus petition because it:  (1) it lacked a proper Tex. R. App. P. 52.3(j) certification stating that every factual statement in the petition was supported by competent evidence; (2) omitted or mismatched relevant exhibits admitted into evidence at the hearing; and (3) failed to include every document that was material to the petitioner’s claim for relief and that was filed in the underlying proceeding.  No.  05-24-01096-CV (Sep. 27, 2024) (mem. op.).

In Conexiones Tornado S. de Rl. de CV, the Fifth Court reversed the denial of a special appearance, made by a Mexican bus company sued for negligence after a bus crash in Mexico. A key issue presented was whether, on this record, the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court required reconsideration of the Texas Supreme Court’s focus on the “operative facts” of a case as part of the inquiry about specific jurisdiction.

Legally, the Court held that the supreme court’s “‘“substantial connection’ test was not abrogated by Ford Motor,” and factually, the Court found that Ford Motor was distinguishable, noting: “Unlike Ford, Conexiones has not conceded purposeful availment in Texas. Conexiones argues not only that it lacks Texas contacts, but also that it has structured its business in such a way as to avoid subjecting itself to personal jurisdiction here.” No. 05-23-00353-CV (Sept. 23, 2024) (mem. op.).

In Virtuolotry LLC v. Westwood Motorcars LLC, among other holdings, the Fifth Court reversed a judgment that awarded actual and exemplary damages to a tenant who claimed to have been constructively evicted by the landlord’s owner. The damages were assessed against the owner, individually. The Court noted that the tenant was actually evicted as a result of an FED case, and thus held that “[i]f an actual eviction occurs, there can be no constructive eviction.” In this regard, the Court also noted the distinction between constructive eviction and wrongful eviction claims. No. 05-19-01055-CV (Sept. 17, 2024) (mem. op.). LPHS represented Virtuolotry in the case.

Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. MB2 Dental Solutions, LLC declined to take a permissive appeal, stating:

Regarding [Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code] section 51.014(d)’s second requirement, generally, a trial court will make a finding that an appeal will facilitate final resolution of the case “when resolution of the legal question dramatically affects recovery in a lawsuit.” Conversely, when other issues are left pending in the litigation, ultimate termination of the litigation is not advanced by allowing immediate appeal of an otherwise interlocutory order.

No. 05-24-00288-CV (Sept. 20, 2024) (mem. op.).

In re Dallas HERO grants mandamus relief in a dispute about amendments to the Dallas city charter. The supreme court held that the City’s additions to an election ballot about proposed amendments failed to satisfy the necessary standards for clarity and definiteness, stating:

… the propositions contradict each other, and the ballot language as a whole will confuse and mislead voters because it does not acknowledge these contradictions or address the effect of the primacy provisions, which are chief features central to the character and purpose of the council-initiated propositions. Because the citizen-initiated propositions must appear on the ballot and the parties have agreed to the ballot language for those propositions, we conclude the proper remedy is to direct the city council not to include its duplicative propositions on the ballot.

No. 24-0678 (Tex. Sept. 11, 2024).

A party sought to avoid the effect of a “prevailing party” attorneys’ fee provision in MRT of Kemp TX-SNF, LLC v. Lloyd Douglase Enterprises LC. The Fifth Court disagreed:

“MRT is not a party to PSA 1. But MRT embraced PSA 1 by seeking to enforce its terms. By doing so, MRT subjected itself to the entirety of the terms of PSA 1, including the attorney’s fee provision in Article 28.”

No. 05-23-00574-CV (Sept. 5, 2024).

State of Texas v. Richardson presented an interesting issue–whether the allocation of cases among intermediate appellate districts creates constitutional or Voting Rights Act problems–but did not present a claim against any of the defendants: “[T]he Secretary [of State] or Governor … play ‘no role in the redistricting procedure delegated’ to the legislature, the supreme court, the Judicial Districts Board, or the Legislative Redistricting Board.” No. 05-23-00325-CV (Aug. 29, 2024) (mem. op.).

TCHDallas2, LLC v. Espinoza, a dispute about the certificate of occupancy for a poker club, turns on an issue about the standard of review for a Board of Adjustment decision about zoning. As the Fifth Court sumarized:

The verified record reflects that the BOA’s decision was based upon significant historical facts relating to governmental oversight, review, and approval. Specifically, TCH was issued a C.O. after two years of due diligence during which time TCH worked with the city attorney and the city council to ensure the planned  operations would comply with all relevant laws and local ordinances. TCH conducted its operations without making any changes for nearly fourteen months after the issuance of the C.O., and TCH was not prosecuted by the district attorney or any other agency. Nevertheless, in December 2021, the building official revoked TCH’s C.O. on the basis that TCH’s operations at the location as described in the land use statement violated Texas Penal Code section 47.04. The discussion among the members of the BOA reflected that the issue of whether TCH’s operations were legal or illegal had not been determined by a court of law, and it was not clear whether TCH’s operations came under the safe harbor provision of penal code section 47.04. In this specific context, the BOA voted unanimously to reverse the building official’s revocation of TCH’s C.O. 

Acknowledging that a question of law (the legality of the club’s operations in light of the state’s gambling laws) was presented to some degree, the Court held that the BOA was within its discretion this specific decision, such that “the trial court effectively substituted its discretion for that of the BOA in this case in which the BOA could have reached multiple decisions.” No. 05-22-01278-CV (Aug. 27, 2024) (mem. op.).

In Powerhouse Ministries v. Friendly Church, the Fifth Court reversed a trial court’s judgment that awarded church property to a group of members who had left the original church and formed a new and independent entity.

The Court first held that ecclesiastical immunity didn’t apply to the trespass-to-try-title claim in the case. Then, the Court determined that the original church, which had changed its name to “Powerhouse,” was the same entity that had acquired the property over time through five deeds–while the new entity, which had adopted the name “Friendly,” had no claim to the property based on its name alone.

“[T]he fact that the entity later changed its name does not change the facts of its acquisition, possession, and operation of the Property,” said the Court, and “when the members of the Separated Friendly Church left the Original Friendly Church, they abandoned any claim to the Property.” No. 05-23-00824-CV (Aug. 27, 2024) (mem. op.).

In In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., the Fifth Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering an attorney to pay up to $88,240 as a sanction before final judgment, without making express written findings as to why the sanctions did not impair State Farm’s access to the courts.

Reviewing the supreme court’s precedent in the area, the Court held that when a litigant contends that a monetary sanction precludes access to the court, the sanctioning court must either (1) provide that the sanction is payable only at a date that coincides with or follows entry of a final order terminating the litigation, or (2) make express written findings, after a prompt hearing, as to why the award does not have such a preclusive effect. No. 05-24-00229-CV (Aug. 23, 2024) (mem. op.).

Ostteen v. Holmes presented a conflict between a developer and a neighborhood activist. The Fifth Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Ostteen’s motion to dismiss under the TCPA, concluding that Holmes’s claims were not based on or in response to TCPA-protected activity: “Holmes’s allegations and claims indicate his suit was based on or in response to Ostteen’s trespassing, interference or harassment of Holmes’s agents and contractors, and disparaging remarks about Holmes or the property allegedly made to locals or social media followers.”

The Court also reversed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees because Homes did not provide sufficient detail about the particular services performed, who performed them, and the reasonable amount of time required for those services. No. 05-23-01150-CV, Aug. 22, 2024 (mem. op.).

In Feeney v. Morfin Capital Group, the Fifth Court considered whether the fiduciary-shield doctrine could protect a corporate officer from personal jurisdiction in Texas. The officer, at the time CEO of One Health Medical Systems, was alleged to have traveled to Texas to negotiate the purchase of MedOne’s assets. During these meetings, Feeney and other defendants allegedly made false representations about One Health’s financial capability to complete the transaction, inducing MedOne to enter the asset purchase agreement.

The Court found that the officer’s actions, which included making specific fraudulent statements during face-to-face meetings in Texas, were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. The fiduciary-shield doctrine does not apply when an officer is alleged to have personally committed a tort. No. 05-22-01375-CV, August 21, 2024 (mem. op.).

The Texas Supreme Court ended debate over the constitutionality of the 15th Court of Appeals in In re Dallas County, No. 24-0426 (Aug. 23, 2024), concluding that its statewide jurisdiction was permissible:

So whatever else it means for the State to be divided into appellate districts, it does not mean that each district will be a distinct division of the State, that any case is free from being sent across Texas to a far-flung court of appeals, or that one court may not be given effective statewide reach over at least some cases. These departures from a purely geography-based appellate system—in which each appellate court would resolve every appeal arising from its geographic territory—confirm that flexibility is a paramount value of [Tex. Const.] Article V, § 6(a).

No. 24-0426 (Tex. Aug. 23, 2024).

In Hurt v. Goswami, the Fifth Court reversed part of the trial court’s summary judgment concerning the award of damages for repairs to a leased property. The Court found that the evidence provided by the landlord was insufficient to establish the reasonableness and necessity of the claimed repair costs. Specifically, the Court noted that “[m]ere proof of amounts charged or paid does not raise an issue of reasonableness,” and without expert testimony or other supporting evidence, the summary judgment awarding over $32,000 in repair costs could not stand. No. 05-22-00389-CV (Aug. 6, 2024).

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Kingdom Group Investments, Inc. reversed a default judgment due to improper service of process. Kingdom Group tried to serve Deutsche Bank using substituted service through the Secretary of State, claiming that the bank was a foreign fiduciary without a registered agent or place of business in Texas.

But Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.028 specifies that service on a financial institution must be carried out by serving either the registered agent of the institution or, if no registered agent exists, serving the president or a branch manager at any office within Texas. These steps are not optional; they are exclusive and mandatory for valid service on financial institutions. Kingdom Group’s failure to follow these specific procedures meant service was invalid. No. 05-23-00656-CV. Aug. 12, 2024 (mem. op.)

Hipps v. CBRE Inc. summarizes the present state of the law on several key issues about the enforcement of noncompetes (while federal-court litigation proceeds, nationwide, about the viability of the FTC’s new regulation that would substantially ban them). The Fifth Court’s holdings include:

• Global? The worldwide restriction imposed by the agreement was unjustified because there was no evidence that the appellant’s work responsibilities extended to all the areas covered by the covenant.
• Harm. The Court agreed that irreparable harm had been established, citing evidence showing that the appellant had already engaged in activities that violated the noncompetition and non-solicitation provisions, including furthering business relationships with the appellee’s clients on behalf of a competitor.
• Consideration.  The appellee had provided substantial consideration, including access to additional training, clients, proprietary information, and a substantial financial incentive.
• Specificity. The opinion quotes the provisions of the temporary injunction that satisfied the requirements for specificity about (a) the “reasons for issuance” of the injunction under Tex. R. Civ. P. 683, (b) the relevant confidential information, (c) prohibited conduct, and (d) prohibited clients (noting that “the trial court’s injunction order restrains only [the employee]” and not the new employer).

No. 05-24-00056-CV, August 16, 2024 (mem. op.).

In re Marsana de Monserat denied a mandamus petition about the grant of a new trial. As one basis for its holding, the Fifth Court said:

The mandamus record also fails to show that relator made a predicate request to the trial court to correct the alleged deficiencies in its written order. See In re Eagleridge Operating, LLC, 642 S.W.3d 518, 525 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (“Due to the extraordinary nature of the remedy, the right to mandamus relief generally requires a predicate request for action by the respondent, and the respondent’s erroneous refusal to act.”). Based on the circumstances here, we conclude that this is not one of those rare occasions where the predicate requirement may be relaxed.

No. 24-00466 (Aug. 9, 2024) (mem. op.). The opinion does not state whether the petitioner’s response to the motion for new trial could have potentially satisfied this requirement.

In Horton v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., the Texas Supreme Court walked back a line of authority about the Casteel harmful-error presumption for certain types of charge error, stating that the presumption does not apply to legal-sufficiency issues that arise from proof failure rather than legal infirmity:

For this reason, and in an effort to clarify the law and simplify the process, we hold that reviewing courts should not presume harm when a broad-form submission permits a jury to make a finding based on a theory or allegation that is invalid only because it lacks evidentiary support. Because the broad-form negligence question submitted in this case was erroneous only for that reason, we conclude that Casteel’s presumed-harm rule does not apply. 

Fair enough. Now what? The court explained:

After determining whether [the Casteel presumption] applies, and assuming the parties point to the record to support their conflicting positions, reviewing courts should focus on the ultimate question of whether “a review of the entire record provides [a] clear indication that the contested charge issues probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.”  Focusing on that ultimate issue, reviewing courts should explain in their opinions why the record as a whole does or does not establish harm in each particular case.

No. 21-0769 (June 28, 2024) (citations omitted). Time will tell whether this clarification enhances the efficiencies of broad-form submission, or produces Baroque case law about various indicia of harm, since a jury’s actual thought process is privileged.

Two statements in Cooper v. TCH Altera AHCC, LLC capture key concepts in appellate waiver for Texas practice today:

1. Briefing waiver. “Because briefing waiver is disfavored, we will construe appellants’ brief to also challenge the declaratory relief to the extent reasonably possible. See Anderson v. Gilbert, 897 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (“An appellate court should consider the parties’ arguments supporting each point of error and not merely the wording of the points.”).
2. Malooly waiver. “Altera raised multiple grounds attacking appellants’ breach of contract counterclaims, including a ground that appellants could not show that a condition precedent—approval of appellants’ fee by the City of Allen—had been satisfied. Appellants do not address this condition precedent argument in their appellate brief, so we must affirm the judgment on their breach-of-contract counterclaims. See Rosetta Res. Operating, LP v. Martin, 645 S.W.3d 212, 226–27 ‘(Tex. 2022); Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970).”

Madonna reached #2 on the charts in 1985 with “Material Girl.” In Bain & Schindele Tax Consulting, LLC v. EW Tax & Valuation Group, LLP, the Fifth Court found that when the trial court found a party’s breach of a non-solicitation obligation to be material and unjustified, it erred by not fully excusing the other contracting party from further performance of the contract obligations (in that case, certain note payments). No. 05-23-00560-CV (Aug. 7, 2024).

The able David Gunn has written a provocative article in the Baylor Law Review about damages under Texas law for fraudulent inducement claims. While that topic has been the subject of considerable and thoughtful attention by the Texas Supreme Court in recent years, his article points out that those opinions don’t fully mesh with the supreme court’s emphasis on horizontal stare decisis / orderliness — and much older cases from that court on that topic in years past.

This question is particularly relevant as the new business courts and 15th Court of Appeals work to identify their controlling precedent, a process that I’ve analyzed in this short article.

The supreme court is seeking comment on new rules about legal work by nonlawyers, designed to solve significant problems with access to justice. Justice Brett Busby recently provided some useful background about these important new measures.

The U.S. Eventing Association escaped personal jurisdiction in Texas when the plaintiff’s jurisdictional argument didn’t align with its live pleading, either in substance, or in relationship to the elements of the pleaded claims (the Moki Mac “operative facts” requirement). The Fifth Court also emphasized that the Association’s relevant decisionmaking occurred in Pennsylvania, and other allegations involving Texas activity involved the unilateral acts of other parties. US Eventing Association v. Pegasus Eventing, No. 05-23-01287 (Aug. 5, 2024) (mem. op.).

While most TCPA litigation has faded away after significant amendments to its scope, the statute still has impact when it applies. In Buttles v. Infinite Fin. Corp., for example, the Fifth Court reversed the denial of a TCPA motion as to a business-disparagement claim when the plaintiff’s evidence “is devoid of any specific facts illustrating how [his] alleged misrepresentations … caused any specific, demonstrable loss.” No. 05-23-00138-CV (July 30, 2024) (mem. op.).

Twice in recent days, the Fifth Court has reminded: “A relator who delays seeking mandamus relief, even a delay of only a few months, may waive the right to mandamus unless the relator can justify the delay.” So when planning for a potential mandamus, try to avoid having this sentence appear in the opinion about it:

“Based on the petition and the record before us, relators waited until the eve of trial and over ten months from the challenged ruling before seeking mandamus relief.”

E.g., In re Auto Club County Mut. Ins. Co., No. 05-24-00867-CV (July 24, 2024) (mem. op.).

Putnam wanted $6,000 back from the county courts, that he had posted earlier as a supersedeas deposit. Unsuccessful in obtaining the money from the clerk’s office, he sued the county clerk, who obtained dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. The Fifth Court, after modifying the dismissal to be “without prejudice,” encouraged Putnam to seek relief from the probate judge rathe than the clerk:

Putnam’s claim is for the return of a deposit he paid to supersede a probate court order issued in connection with the administration of Powell’s estate. We conclude his claim arises from an estate administration and is thus a probate proceeding. Further, Putnam’s claim does not fit within the examples of “matters related to a probate proceeding” in [Tex. Probate Code] § 31.002, most of which involve claims brought by or against an estate’s personal representative. The probate court had exclusive jurisdiction over Putnam’s claim, and the county court did not err in granting Warren’s plea to the jurisdiction.

No. 05-23-00235-CV (July 26, 2024) (mem. op.).

The defendant in Porturas v. Anglobaldo argued that as a citizen of Peru, she was not subjet to personal jurisdiction. But the Fifth Court affirmed the rejection of her special appearance, because she had been personally served with process in Texas. No. 05-23-00919-CV (July 22, 2024) (mem. op.) (applying Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990)).

The plaintiff in Moore v. Dallas Morning News had an unusual argument against the one-year statute of limitations claim for a libel claim: he was incarcerated and couldn’t access the article at issue. The Fifth Court didn’t accept his argument, particularly when the plaintiff was – literally – aware of his alleged injury:

Moore complains that because he had no access to a telephone with an internet connection, he did not actually see and read the Article until months after he was released from incarceration. But the Article was not hidden or undetectable; it was readily available to the public. The fact that Moore himself did not read the Article within one year did not mean his injury was undiscoverable.  It is the plaintiff’s injury that must be inherently undiscoverable to invoke the discovery rule. As we have repeated, Moore learned of the injury to his reputation when he was attacked in prison.

No. 05-22-01286-CV (July 17, 2024) (mem. op.).

In MGO, LLC v. Accessology Too, LLC, a frustrated judge said:

If I need to order additional production, if you have objections that you are not sure about, I would urge you not to make frivolous or unnecessary objections, because, on the 14th, if it looks like people are still stalling, or trying not to hand over relevant information, I have been known to award attorney’s fees for that kind of behavior. And since we are coming up on the eve of trial, if it looks like you have something that is relevant and clearly within the scope of discovery and you’re hanging it up on some kind of technicality, that Friday is not going to go very well for your client.

While sincere and pointed, that statement didn’t satisfy the prerequisite for death-penalty sanctions of considering lesser sanctions:

[A]n order compelling discovery responses, coupled with an unequivocal warning that noncompliance would result in dismissal, constitutes a lesser sanction that can support a subsequent death-penalty sanction. However, equivocal warnings of future sanctions do not constitute lesser sanctions.  The trial judge’s remarks in this case were equivocal warnings about  future sanctions and did not specifically mention the possibility of death-penalty sanctions at all.

No. 05-23-00100-CV (July 17, 2024) (mem. op.) (citations and emphasis omitted).

New TRAPs confirm that appellate filings need to include bookmarked .pdf files. A good practice anyway, the rules now make this practice an express requirement.

If you enjoyed David Coale & Ben Taylor, Judgment Rendition in Texas, 75 Baylor L. Rev. 354 (2023), then you will enjoy Serafine v. Crump‘s resolution of whether an appeal begins a new “case”:

[T]he question is whether the proceeding “commences” a new civil action or “maintains” the original one. In other words, an appeal to an intermediate appellate court and a petition for review to a supreme court are within the same “litigation” if they are a part of the same “civil action” that is simply “pending” in different courts. A long and unbroken line of our precedent answers this question clearly and unequivocally: an appeal is simply the “continuation of the action in suit brought in the trial court.”

No. 23-0272 (Tex. June 21, 2024).

At issue in Green v. City of DeSoto was whether an exception to horizontal stare decisis–an intervening decision by a higher court–allowed a plaintiff’s otherwise-barred claim to proceed. The question developed as follows:

• An earlier Fifth Court case upheld a defense summary judgment on immunity grounds because “the evidence showed the damage to the [railroad] tracks was caused by the derailment, not directly by the vehicles while placing the road-base material on the tracks.”
• An intervening supreme court case found no immunity when a government employee failed to set the emergency break in a parked van, and the van caused damage when it went into motion.
• This case was controlled by the earlier Fifth Court opinion. The collision of the van in the supreme court was a material distinction here: “[T]he Greens’ damages were not caused directly by the motorized equipment. The City’s equipment created the condition, the dirt dam, that led to the flooding of the Greens’ property and the Greens’ damages. This is insufficient to create the required nexus between the City’s use of motor-driven equipment and the Greens’ damages.”

No. 05-23-00740-CV (July 9, 2024) (mem. op.).

A recent need for maintenance on my F-150 pickup caused me to read through the manual, which led me to appreciate how well-organized and readable it was. So I wrote “Why You Should Write Briefs Like Car Manuals” for the Bar Association of the Fifth Federal Circuit (available along with many other practical short articles in the “for members” section of its website). I hope you enjoy it and find the article of some use in your practice!

The history-minded will recall that Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), turned on a tension between the Judiciary Act and the Constitution’s grant of federal-court jurisdiction. So too, Justice Young’s concurrence in the denial of the mandamus petition in In re Dailey, No. 24-0382 (Tex. July 5, 2024), in which the petitioner challenged the handling of an FED petition by a justice of the peace:

Article V, § 3(a) of the Texas Constitution, however, provides that “[t]he Legislature may confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue writs of quo warranto and mandamus in such cases as may be specified, except as against the Governor of the State.” In turn, the statute describing this Court’s general mandamus jurisdiction simultaneously announces some proper respondents (“a statutory county court judge, a statutory probate court judge, a district judge, a court of appeals or justice of a court of appeals, or any officer of state government”) and excludes some potential respondents (“the governor, the court of criminal appeals, or a judge of the court of criminal appeals”). Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(a). The only constitutionally impermissible respondent is the governor. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 3(a). But given the enumeration in the current statute, and that the enumeration does not include justice courts (although they are not expressly disclaimed by statute, either), the sounder approach has been to regard this Court’s mandamus jurisdiction as not reaching such courts unless it is necessary to enforce our own jurisdiction. See Pope v. Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950, 952 (Tex. 1969).

No. 24-0382 (Tex. July 5, 2024).

Liebbe v. Courtney, discussed earlier this week as to its holding about damages, also reversed a sanctions order, stating:

… from the record before us, we cannot conclude the evidence gives rise to an inference of intent or willfulness or indicates improper motive on Liebbe’s part. As a result, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by assessing sanctions against Liebbe under its inherent authority without finding bad faith, both with regard to the order to pay TLAP and take additional CLE hours, as well as with regard to the order to pay attorneys’ fees, a matter we address next.

No. 05-22-00158-CV (July 5, 2024) (citations omitted, emphasis added).

GDS Transport, LLC v. MV Transp., Inc. reversed a dismissal under Rule 91a, in no small part because of a mismatch between the grounds in the motion and the plainitff’s specific theories of liability.

Specifically, the plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim alleged that the defendant wrongfully deducted “maintenance costs” from the amount owed under the contract. The defendant cited a limitation-of-liability provision that, admittedly, foreclosed liability for operational costs. But “the damages sought are not maintenance costs,” said the Fifth Court: “Rather, they are the amount of an offset improperly taken from amounts owed ….” No. 05-23-00067-CV (June 24, 2024) (mem. op.).

A substantial tort judgment in favor of a doctor was reversed in Liebbe v. Courtney, in which the Fifth Court held:

there was no evidence, or, at a minimum, no more than a scintilla of evidence, of any causal link between Liebbe’s and Rute’s tortious conduct and the damages awarded on those claims. In short, we conclude there was legally insufficient evidence that Liebbe’s or Rute’s tortious conduct caused the lost profits the jury assessed at trial, particularly when appellees themselves identified the WFAA/Channel 8 stories as the root of the harm.

No. 05-22-00158-CV (July 5, 2024).

Hopefully the big water leak at 600 Commerce can be repaired soon and return the courthouse to normal operations.

The capable Doug Gladden posted this remarkable story on X about an appointed attorney in a criminal appeal who repeatedly recycles the same two, stale arguments — and explains why that practice has led to considerable injustice.

Brown v. Joe Jordan Trucks, Inc. involved a claim that the wrong Frederick Altyman Brown may have been named in the citation by the elimination of “, Jr.” after the defendnant’s name. The Fifth Court disagreed:

In the present case the petition, citation and return all identify the defendant as “Frederick Altyman Brown.” The designation or suffix “Jr.” is a nonessential part of the defendant’s name for purposes of service of process, and the omission of said designation or suffix does not render the defendant’s name misstated, rather the omission merely renders the defendant’s name abbreviated in a common form.

No. 05-23-00676-CV (June 20, 2024) (mem. op.).

Deaguero v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline repeatedly reminds of the importance of bringing forward a complete record–for example, when challenging a summary judgment ruling, it’s a problem when “the appellate record does not include the Commission’s motion, Deaguero’s response, or the order granting partial summary judgment.” No. 05-22-01002-CV (March 28, 2024).

Hernandez v. Ayala involved a dispute about the value of a “barndominium“–basically, a barn that you can live in–and turned on the “property owner” rule about testimony as to value:

Ayala provided no basis for his valuations of the property. He did not testify that he was familiar with the market value of the partnership property or otherwise explain how he determined the value of each item, except for his testimony that an appraiser told him the barndominium was worth $120,000.

No. 05-23-00549-CV (June 18, 2024).

The supreme court’s recent opinion in Pay & Save, Inc. v. Canales involved a grocery-store customer who got his foot stuck in a forklift pallet used to display watermelons.

The court of appeals was unimpressed with the plaintiff’s case, but distinguished between legal and factual sufficiency in its analysis, and thus remanded for a new trial instead of rendering judgment for the defendant. As the supreme court summarized:

“The court of appeals correctly recognized that the evidence shows only ‘a possibility that someone’s foot might enter a pallet opening.’ It still erroneously concluded, however, that such evidence is legally sufficient evidence of an unreasonably dangerous condition. In doing so, it reasoned that ‘the jury could have reasonably inferred that a customer could get a foot stuck in a pallet side opening, which could cause the customer to fall and be injured.’”

The supreme court disagreed, characterized the problem as ine of legal sufficiency, and rendered judgment for the defendant:

“The court of appeals’ error was twofold. First, it assumed that a mere possibility of harm suffices to legally establish the existence of an unreasonable risk of harm. Second, it assumed that it needed to credit the jury’s flawed inference to that effect. We have long held to the contrary.  … As the evidence shows only a mere possibility of harm, it is legally insufficient.”

No. 22-0953 (Tex. June 14, 2024) (per curiam).

In re State of Texas helpfully clarifies the standard for when temporary relief is appropriate during the pendency of an appeal. Eliminating some uncertainty that had crept into the sparse case law about this topic, the supreme court observed:

Rather than describe the purpose of relief under Rule 52.10 as “preservation of the status quo,” we find Rule 29.3’s analogous formulation more helpful. An appellate court asked to decide whether to stay a lower court’s ruling pending appeal or to stay a party’s actions while an appeal proceeds should seek “to preserve the parties’ rights until disposition of the appeal.” The equitable authority weexercise today, under Rule 52.10, serves the same purpose—preservation of the parties’ rights while the appeal proceeds. A stay pending appeal is, of course, a kind of injunction, so the familiar considerations governing injunctive relief in other contexts will generally apply in this context as well.

No. 24-0325 (Tex. June 14, 2024). The court then examined how those general equitable considerations–including likelihood of success on the merits–applied in that case. This clarification of the law serves to generally align Texas and federal practice on the issue of appellate stays (setting aside the hot-button topic of “administrative stays”).

The Fifteenth Court’s new judges do not start empty-handed when it comes to precedent, as that Court has several sources of precedent to draw upon by operation of law.

Governor Abbott has announced the judges of the Dallas Division of the new business court–Hon. Andrea Bouressa of Collin County, and appellate stalwart Bill Whitehill of Dallas.

Governor Abbott has appointed the three inaugural members of the new Fifteenth Court of Appeals: Hon. Scott Brister, presently of Hunton Andrews Kurth, well-known statewide from his service on the Texas Supreme Court, and the author of City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005); Hon. April Farris, of the First Court of Appeals; and Hon. Scott Field, of the 480th District Court in Williamson County, and formerly of the Third Court of Appeals.

At issue in Robinson v. Boral Windows LLC was the scope of a release, which addressed “any and all actions … from the beginning of time to the present, including any and acts or omissions occurring to date … specifically includ[ing] without limitation all matters arising out of … the Employment Agreement ….”  After a comprehensive review of case law involving similar terms, the Fifth Court held:

• The release was not limited to the identified Employment Agreement, given the other, broader language in the release;
• For similar reaons, the release included claims based on two other instruments, even thought they were not specificaly identified in the release;
• The release extended to a successor-in-interest to one of the parties, by operation of law and because it had a standard “all predecessors, successors [and] assigns” clause.

No. 05-22-01184-CV (June 10, 2024) (mem. op.).

A popular meme shows Oprah Winfrey giving cars away to everyone in sight. In Pack Properties XIV, LLC v. Remington Prosper, LLC, the Fifth Court found fact issues all ’round, and held that all parties summary-judgment motions should be denied in a dispute about a contract related to the establishment of a car dealership. Two key points were:

• Under Fifth Court precedent, the term “affiliate” in a contract “is generally defined as a ‘corporation that is related to another corporation by shareholdings or other means of control’ and as a ‘company effectively controlled by another or associated with others under common ownership or control.'” Applying that precedent, the record presented a fact issue about “whether sufficient control” existed among the relevant parties.
• “Materiality” arises in two distinct settings. In one, “a court must determine if the parties’ agreement is sufficiently certain to be an enforceable contract. The question generally arises when the agreement lacks a particular term or contains a term that is unclear. The ultimate issue in this kind of case is the existence of a valid contract, which is a legal question.” In the other, “the question is whether a breach by one party was sufficiently important to excuse the other party’s continuing performance, i.e., the affirmative defense of prior material breach. These cases do not address a missing term and its effect on the validity of a contract; instead, these cases look to the significance of a particular term within the total agreement. Courts performing this analysis address the materiality issue as a fact question.”

Judge Easterbrook’s recent opinion about good fonts for legal writing emphasized the importance of “x-height,” which is the relative size of a small “x” to a capital letter in a particular font. It’s important to note, though, that x-height is only one of the relevant size measures, and an excessively high x-height can cause problems with “descending” letters such as “p” and “y.” This excellent article, from which the below illustration is taken, further explains this point while defining the other relevant measurements.

Legendary Seventh Circuit judge Frank Easterbrook has written authoritatively on many topics. Thanks to AsymaDesign, LLC v. CBL & Assocs. Mgmnt, Inc., the choice of a good font is now among them.

Judge Easterbrook noted that he was writing in Palatino Linotype, the standard font of the Seventh Circuit (and one of two that I regularly use, alternating with Book Antigua). He explained that it’s a desirable font for legal writing because it has a large “x-height” (the height of a lowercase “x” compared to a capital letter), along with similar fonts designed for book publication:

The Appellant made the unfortunate choice of Bernhard Modern, a “display face suited to movie posters and used in the title sequence of the Twilight Zone TV show.” Because of that font’s low x-height, it’s hard to read in book-like writing:

He concluded: “We hope that Bernhard Modern has made its last appearance in an appellate brief. “

Claim preclusion barred a second lawsuit for unpaid rent, when the record showed as to an earlier lawsuit that:

When appellants filed the previous lawsuit, the lease entitled them, in part, to three categories of damages: (1) rent unpaid before termination, (2) rent unpaid after the lease’s termination and before appellants receive judgment therefor, “and” (3) “unpaid rent called for under the Lease for the balance of the term[.]” Moreover, appellants cite judicial opinions that provide a landlord may sue for future damages upon breach of lease. Consequently, appellants “could have” alleged in the previous lawsuit a claim seeking judgment for all three categories of damages authorized by the lease.  Instead, appellants alleged and recovered in the previous lawsuit only part of their claim by seeking solely unpaid rent that had accrued prior to the previous judgment.

(citations omitted). The judgment in the earlier case had a clause that said: “This Judgment does not preclude Plaintiffs from seeking additional damages as they accrue after December 2020.” That language didn’t change the Fifth Court’s ruling, however:

[A]ppellants “terminated” the lease August 5, 2020, and the lease expressly authorized appellants to seek damages they seek in this lawsuit at the time they terminated the lease. Consequently, appellants’ claim for the damages they claim in this lawsuit accrued—came into existence as a legally enforceable claim—on August 5, 2020, when they terminated the lease and before they filed the previous lawsuit. Therefore, we conclude the recital in the previous judgment concerning claims that “accrue after December 2020” cannot apply to appellants’ claim for damages for breach of lease in this lawsuit, which accrued August 5, 2020, prior to the previous lawsuit and judgment.

SJF Forest Lane LLC v. Phan, No. 05-22-00905-CV (May 31, 2024) (citation omitted).

This is a cross-post from 600 Camp:

Thryv, Inc. v. NLRB, a review of the NLRB’s handling of an unfair labor practices case, presents deft usage of a typographical device called the “dinkus”:

Thanks to the observant Cedric Bond for pointing this out!

The Fifth Court continued to cast a skeptical eye at spoliation instructions in Copper Creek Distributors, Inc. v. Valk. The Court found an abuse of discretion in two regards; first, as to the trial court’s assessment of the evidence about certain QuickBook records:

However, there is no evidence CCDI intentionally or negligently failed to preserve the QuickBooks data. In his deposition, Escoffie testified he had not attempted to log into QuickBooks and he had not called QuickBooks to attempt to access his books ks and records. He stated he would work with his attorney to determine whether he had access to QuickBooks — the record does not show whether this happened and, if it did, whether any documents or data were recovered. Considering the failure to provide any evidence about when CCDI “closed out” its online QuickBooks account and when CCDI migrated from the online platform to the desktop platform along with the lack of evidence about whether Escoffie searched for QuickBooks records and recovered any, the trial court abused its discretion by concluding Platinum met its burden to show CCDI intentionally or negligently breached its duty to preserve accounting books and records, including QuickBooks files. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred by instructing the jury that CCDI destroyed or failed to preserve accounting books and records, and the jury could consider that evidence would have been unfavorable to CCDI.

and second, by not considering whether lesser sanctions would be effective. The Court then found harm, and as a result, reversed and remanded. No. 05-23-00123-CV (May 24, 2024) (mem .op.).

A long-anticipated constitutional challenge to the new Fifteenth Court of Appeals was recently filed by Dallas County, who was able to avoid some justiciability issues as the likely subject of a transfer order to that Court later this year.

Kroger Specialty Infusion v. Sturns, No. 05-22-01276-CV (May 16, 2024), presents four important, “nuts and bolts” tips about summary-judgment affidavits:

1. Conclusory objection. An argument that an affidavit is “conclusory” is considered a “defect of substance” that may be raised for the first time on appeal.
2. Conclusory example. This statement, as a matter of law, is conclusory as to whether someone improperly solicited customers. If you’re drafting an affidavit, say more than this:
   

   “While employed by BioPlus, and shortly before becoming employed by BioPlus, Sturns solicited some of the same customers, referral sources and/or patients in her former Sales Territory, in violation of her Agreement with [Kroger]. Sturns: (a) provided BioPlus business cards and marketing materials to one or more customers, referral sources and/or patients within the Restricted Area and/or the Sales Territory (both as defined in the Agreement); (b) conducted meetings with one or more such customers, referral sources and/or patients; and (c) met with or spoke to such customers, referral sources and/or patients.”

3. Other objections. “Objections to the testimony of an interested witness or the absence of personal knowledge are defects in form” that must be raised in a specific objection that the trial court rules upon (emphasis added).
4. Still an other objection. The need for an objection includes testimony that starts with weasel words like “I have reason to believe” or “[u]nless stated otherwise, I have personal knowledge.” Those are still objections to form that must be raised by objection, ruled upon, etc.

(LPHS represented one of the successful appellees in this case.)

The facts of Lawton Candle v. BG Personnel were as follows:

1. Lawton Candle is an LLC organized under Oklahoma law. It is not registered to do business in Texas and does not have a registered agent in Texas.
2. BG Personnel sued Lawton Candle in Dallas.
3. BG Personnel had process served on Lawton Candle’s registered agent in Tulsa.
4. BG Personnel obtained a default judgment against Lawton Candle.

Lawton Candle filed a restricted appeal, arguing that under Texas law, the only acceptable means of service on a foreign entity is via the Texas Secretary of State. The Fifth Court agreed – rejecting BG Personnel’s argument that no Texas law foreclosed service in the above manner – and vacated the default judgment. No. 05-23-00449-CV. (May 13, 2024).

Last week’s Alonzo v. John opinion from the supreme court, in addition to its holding about impermissible jury argument, concluded with this provocative footnote about last year’s Gregory v. Chohan opinions:

Last term, the Court clarified that claimants cannot rely on unsubstantiated anchoring to sustain a damages award. See Gregory v. Chohan, 670 S.W.3d 546, 558 (Tex. 2023 (plurality op.) (“Unsubstantiated anchors . . . have nothing to do with the emotional injuries suffered by the plaintiff and cannot rationally connect the extent of the injuries to the amount awarded.”); id. at 569 (Devine, J., concurring) (“[Claimants] cannot engage in ‘unsubstantiated anchoring’ by asking fact-finders to rely on evidence that has nothing to do with the pain or anguish they’ve suffered.”); id. at 576 (Bland, J., concurring) (“Counsel’s unchecked directives to the jury to employ mental anguish measurements based on standards that depart from the evidence render the verdict legally infirm under long-standing common law.”).

No. 22-0521 (Tex. May 10, 2024).

Only a few weeks after the Fifth Circuit reversed on incurable argument grounds, the Texas Supreme Court did the same in Alonzo v. John holding that the injection of race-based argument into a significant personal-injury trial required reversal. The court noted, inter alia, this excerpt from the plaintiff’s rebuttal closing argument:

We don’t want the 4 or 5 million dollars. And now we certainly don’t want this $250,000. … We don’t want their 4 or 5 million dollars. That’s not fair. Because it’s a woman, she should get less money? Because she’s African American, she should get less money? No. We’re going to fight because we believe in the jury system.

No. 22-0521 (May 10, 2024) (per curiam).

In the musical Six, Anne Boleyn sings the song “Don’t Lose Ur Head,” with the refrain “Sorry, not sorry!” Similarly, in In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, the trial court’s default judgment ended with the confusing phrase:

“This Judgment finally disposes of all claims and all parties, and is not appealable. The Court orders execution to enter for this judgment.” 

The supreme court held that this judgment was not final under Lehmann, particularly given that it arose in the default-judgment context. No. 22-1100 (May 11, 2024) (emphasis added).

“Under [Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code] Section 41.003, a court may not imply a unanimous jury finding in imposing exemplary damages. The burden to secure a unanimous verdict is on the plaintiff and ‘may not be shifted.'” Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc. v. Bruce, No. 22-089 (Tex. May 3, 2024).

It’s an election year, which means election litigation, which brings this reminder from the Fifth Court about its jurisdiction in such cases:

“We do not have jurisdiction to grant any sort of writ other than a writ of mandamus in an original proceeding under the election code. ‘A suit for injunctive relief in an appropriate trial court is the proper avenue for relief if a person is in danger of being harmed by a threatened violation of the election code.'” 

In re Wernick, No. 05-24-00524-CV (May 3, 2024).

In Sanders v. The Boeing Co., No. 22-20317 (May 2, 2024), the Fifth Circuit summarized the two key holdings that resulted from certification of a question about the Texas limitations-savings statute (reproduced in full below):

1. “[Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code] Section 16.064(a)(1) applies whenever the previous court dismissed an action for lack of jurisdiction. Thus is so even when the court ‘erred and actually had jurisdiction or could have had jurisdiction had the claims been pleaded differently.'” (citation omitted)
2. “[A] dismissal or other disposition does not ‘become final’ for purposes of Section 16.064(a)(2) until the parties have exhausted their appellate remedies and the court’s power to alter the dismissal has ended.'” (citation omitted, cleaned up).

The Fifth Court denied en banc review of Monticello Asset Managment v. Wells, a premises liability case involving a gruesome accident involving contact between a flagpole and an electric line. Four Justices joined a dissent to the denial of en banc review.

The supreme court has approved a new rule about use of a sworn appendix instead of an official clerk’s record, aligning “conventional” appeal practice with the longstanding custom in mandamus proceedings.

The supreme court granted mandamus relief with respect to the denial of a pro hac vice motion in In re AutoZoners, LLC. Among other matters that didn’t support the trial court’s ruling, the Court noted:

Listing out-of-state attorneys whose pro hac vice motions have not yet been granted on a signature block below the name and signature of a Texas attorney is not a problematic practice and provides no grounds for denying a pending or subsequent pro hac vice motion.

The Court further held: “Kern’s participation in one or two Texas cases in the last two years—and five cases in fifteen years—is not ‘appearing in courts in  Texas on a frequent basis” as contemplated by [Tex.R. Govern. Bar Adm’n] 19. Facilitating this kind of rare, occasional participation in Texas cases by an out-of-state attorney is precisely why we allow pro hac vice admission in Texas courts. No. 22-0719 (Tex. April 26, 2024).

The supreme court provided guidance about the limits of “alter ego” liability in JNM Express, LLC v. Lozano, holding:

     The “injustice” prong requires more than a judge’s or juror’s “subjective perception of unfairness.”  Instead, it references “the kinds of abuse . . . that the corporate structure should not shield,” like “fraud, evasion of existing obligations, circumvention of statutes, monopolization, criminal conduct, and the like.” “Such abuse is necessary before disregarding the existence of a corporation as a separate entity.” A “plaintiff must prove that he has fallen victim to a basically unfair device by which a corporate entity has been used to achieve an inequitable result.”
    The court of appeals erred because it did not address the injustice prong. Had it done so, it would have recognized that the evidence here does not satisfy that prong’s standard. The Lozanos point to nothing in the record showing that the Marins abused the corporate form such that failing to pierce the corporate veil would result in “injustice” in the sense that our alter ego cases describe that concept. One relevant consideration in the tort context is whether the corporation was “reasonably capitalized in light of the nature and risk of its business.” Yet the Lozanos produced evidence at trial to demonstrate that the companies did have the resources to protect their drivers.

No. 21-0853 (April 19, 2024) (per curiam) (citations and footnotes omitted, emphasis added). (In the graphic, DALL-E illustrates “piercing the corporate veil”).

The supreme court recently reversed a court of appeals’ (not Dallas) conclusion about waiver of charge error, holding:

At the charge conference, defense counsel objected to the use of the federal regulations’ definitions at all, arguing that the trial court should have used the Texas Pattern Jury Charge instead. Counsel alternatively objected to the specific application of the federal regulations’ definitions to Omega. …

Petitioners’arguments on appeal are more nuanced than at the charge conference, but the upshot is the same: the jury charge should have used the common-law definitions from the Pattern Jury Charge, not the federal regulations’ definitions. … 

Petitioners repeatedly made similar arguments both before and after the charge conference, using common-law considerations (not the federal regulations’ definitions) to argue that no defendants, and certainly not all, were Mr. Lozano’s employer. Their answer to the Lozanos’ petition also stated that Mr. Lozano was not their employee. This sufficiently put the trial court on notice of the objection.

JNM Express, LLC v. Lozano, No. 21-0853 (Tex. April 19, 2024) (footnotes omitted). (The graphic was provided by DALL-E, asked to illustrate the concept of an argument becoming “more nuanced” from trial to appeal, wihch apparently involves a transition from printed documents to a tablet.)

Sidney Powell may have avoided trouble with the State Bar for her involvement in questionable litigation about the 2020 election, but a Fifth Court panel majority denied Ken Paxton’s immunity-based appeal about a similar sort of disciplinary action, arising from Texas’s effort to intervene in election litigation at the Supreme Court.

A dissent–by the Court’s lone Republican member–had a broader view of the Attorney General’s immunity. No. 05-23-00128-CV, Paxton v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline (April 18, 2024) (mem. op.). A petition for review is a certainty.

The Fifth Court affirmed a summary judgment for Sidney Powell against disciplinary claims brought by the State Bar in the wake of the ill-fated “Kraken” litigation of 2020-21. The panel — three Democrats, by the way — reviewed a number of record and record-citation issues with the Bar’s filings and concluded:

The Bar employed a “scattershot” approach to the case, which left this court and the trial court “with the task of sorting through the argument to determin what issue had actually been raised.”

Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Powell, No. 05-23-00497-CV (April 17, 2024) (mem. op.) (cleaned up).

The classic children’s book “Caps for Sale” involved a peddler who had many caps. So too, section 52.006 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, which caps the amount of a supersedeas bond at $25 million, but as to which “[t]here is a split of authority on whether the $25 million statutory cap … applies per individual judgment debtor or per judgment.”

In Greystar Devel. & Constr., L.P. v. Williams, the Fifth Court held that the cap applies per debtor, joining the Tyler Court of Appeals in so holding, but diverging from the analysis of the San Antonio Court of Appeals. Review by the state supreme court seems likely on this important but elusive issue of statutory interpretation. No. 05-23-001168-CV (April 10, 2024).

The most recent Advocate (the quarterly publication of the State Bar of Texas Litigation Section) has several articles about how the new Fifteenth Court of Appeals will get off the ground. I have a short piece on where the new court is likely to look for precedent, since it will have none of its own to start. I hope you find it useful in thinking about this important new appellate forum.

The Texas Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the unconscionabilty of an arbitration award (and thus, the delegation of arbitrability to the arbitrator) in Lennar Homes of Texas Inc. v. Rafiei, No. 22-0830 (Tex. Apr. 4, 2024). The challenge involved the cost of arbitration; the Court held:

Rafiei has presented no evidence that he sought a deferral or reduction of the administrative fees or an agreement to proceed with a single arbitrator. Without evidence that Rafiei sought to estimate the actual costs associated with arbitrating the arbitrability question, it is speculative to conclude that the delegation provision is itself unconscionable.

Your faithful blogger has been in Scotland the last few days, visiting the University of St. Andrews with my daughter. For inexplicable reasons, Scottish wi-fi services uniformly block the websites of the Texas Supreme Court and the Dallas Court of Appeals. Commentary will resume this week upon my return!

In In re CG Searcy LLC, the Texas Supreme Court clarified what hearing exhibits must be included in a mandamus record:

Rule 52.7 requires a relator to file (1) “document[s] . . . material to the relator’s claim for relief” and (2) “a properly authenticated transcript of any relevant testimony from any underlying proceeding, including any exhibits offered in evidence.” TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a) (emphases added). Because the prepositional phrase “including any exhibits offered in evidence” modifies “transcript of any relevant testimony,” an exhibit that is not relevant or material to the original proceeding need not be included in the mandamus record.

No. 24-0170 (Tex. March 28, 2024).

In a dispute about whether a property owner’s operation of a poker club violated City of Dallas ordinances, the Fifth Court found sufficient evidence to justify a tempoary injunction under one statute (that didn’t require proof of immediate, irrepable injury), and thus held:

Here, we must uphold the trial court’s decision to grant the temporary injunction on any legal theory supported by the record. Because the City pleaded and proved facts to show it was entitled to injunctive relief under section 211.112(c), any error by the trial court in also granting relief pursuant to sections 54.016 and 54.018 is harmless.

Badger Tavern LP v. City of Dallas, No. 23-496 (March 29, 2024) (mem. op.).

A valet service damaged the plaintiff’s 2018 Lamborghini Huracan (a 2017-model example of which appears in the graphic). The Fifth Court affirmed a small award for loss of use, noting the trial court’s consideration of evidence about other vehicles available to the plaintiff and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. It rejected the plaintff’s request for damages for dimunition of value, noting:

Jones failed to provide any factual basis on which his valuation opinions rested. While Jones testified about how much he paid for the car seven months before the accident, he provided no factual basis to support his speculation about the value of the car at the time of the accident or after it was repaired. The basis for Jones’s opinions were conversations with people who sell “these cars” and “internet sites for all those cars out there.”

Jones v. Mr. Valet, No. 05-23-00355-CV (March 20, 2024) (mem. op.).

The Fifth Court held in Rudnicki v. Thompson Petroleum Corp. that a former oil-company executive was not entitled to indemnity for certain litigation expenses, agreeing with the company’s position that: ““[Partnership’s] Agreement could have provided for indemnification of expenses incurred ‘based on,’ ‘arisin(g from,’ or similarly ‘related to’ a covered person’s performance of the obligations of the GP with respect to [the Partnership]. But that simply is not what it says.” The company was authorized to indemnify the executive, but was not required to do so. No. 05-23-00125-CV (March 20, 2024) (mem. op.).