A recent dispute about various statistical-reporting requirements for prosecutors led to a lively summary of the law in Texas about appellate stays.

1. Fifteenth Court. After an appeal by Texas stayed the trial court’s temporary injunction, the Fifteenth Court granted temporary relief, reinstating the trial court’s injunction for the named parties only, and thus staying enforcement of the reporting rules as to those prosecutors during the appeal. Relying on Tex. R. App. P. 29.3, the court said that it was not deciding the merits on limited briefing but found greater risk of immediate, irreparable harm without a short, party-limited stay. A dissent argued that the majority granted injunctive relief without the required preliminary merits assessment or a likelihood-of-success finding.
2. Supreme Court. In December 2025, the supreme court conditionally granted mandamus relief, concluding that the 15th Court limited the State’s legislatively protected supersedeas without undertaking the preliminary merits assessment required by Rule 29.3, and required a further opinion from that court about the matter by early January. A concurrence elaborated further on several points.
3. Fifteenth Court, Redux. Shortly thereafter, the Fifteenth Court affirmed the temporary injunction for the named prosecutors but narrowed it to exclude non-parties. The court held appellees showed a probable right to relief because the Government Code does not grant the Attorney General authority to promulgate the reporting rules, and such authority cannot be implied absent an express grant. The court also upheld findings about injury, including reporting burdens requiring thousands of staff hours and diversion from prosecutions, and compelled disclosure of privileged and confidential. Notably, the Court deemed the injunction overbroad as to non-parties: temporary relief preserves the parties’ status quo, not statewide interests absent proof of irreparable injury to non-parties. A 15th concurrence again provided further explanation.

While the supreme court takes the entire case when it grants review, as a court of discretionary review it has discretion about what specific issues to address in its opinion. An example appears in First Sabrepoint Capital Mgmnt., LP v Farmland Partners Inc., which reversed on an issue about the timeliness of the trial court’s TCPA order, and then addressed a point about collateral estoppel:

While the court of appeals erred by declaring void the trial court’s order granting Sabrepoint’s TCPA motion, it correctly reversed the trial court’s order granting Sabrepoint’s motion for summary judgment based on collateral estoppel. Because collateral estoppel is the basis for the summary judgment motion and a basis for the TCPA motion, the doctrine’s application to this case will be at issue on remand. Accordingly, in the interest of judicial efficiency, we will address its application here.

No. 23-0634 (Tex. Apr. 25, 2025).

It’s hard to improve on the supreme court’s own summary of how it resolved a jurisdictional dispute involving the new 15th Court of Appeals, so here it is. The consistent theme in these cases has been fidelity to the statutes’ plain meaning.

To challenge a remand order by the new Business Court, the path to take is a mandamus petition rather than direct appeal, as recently confirmed by In re ETC Field Services LLC, from the 15th Court of Appeals on February 21:

ETC appealed the remand order to this Court. Tema moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was not a final order and no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal.2 ETC defended the interlocutory appeal, but alternatively filed this original proceeding for mandamus relief if interlocutory appeal was unavailable. We hold today that no interlocutory appeal is available in these circumstances. … “But that of course does not preclude mandamus review.” “[T]he Legislature’s decision to forego interlocutory review of all pending cases in no way suggests it intended interlocutory review of none of them.” Accordingly, we turn to that issue in this opinion.

No. 15-24-00131-CV (15th Ct. App.) (citations and footnotes omitted).

My friend Arturo Ayala at CSBA recently wrote this useful article about what happens to a supersedeas bond when the appeal ends.

Expo Group v. Purdy clarifies a point about the statutory grant of jurisdiction over injunction orders: “[M]odifying a temporary injunction is akin to granting a temporary injunction—it creates a new or amended temporary injunction from which a party may appeal; refusing to modify does not.” No. 05-24-00653-CV (Jan. 27, 2025) (mem. op.) (citation omitted).

Last week, the supreme court denied mandamus review, of the Fifteenth Court’s denial of emergency relief, in the Attorney General’s lawsuit against the firearms ban of the State Fair of Texas. A concurring opinion noted some oddities in the Attorney General’s litigation position, including:

1. “The State’s presentation to this Court takes no position on whether the State Fair of Texas, a private entity, has the legal authority to exclude patrons carrying handguns from the Fair.”
2. During the litigation, the Attorney General withdrew a 2016 opinion involving the Fort Worth Zoo that appeared inconsistent with its position in the State Fair case, as to which the opinion noted: “Withdrawing the Opinion is not the same thing as repudiating its analysis or explaining why it was wrong, which the State has not attempted to do in this Court.”

No. 24-0813 (Sept. 26, 2024).

Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. MB2 Dental Solutions, LLC declined to take a permissive appeal, stating:

Regarding [Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code] section 51.014(d)’s second requirement, generally, a trial court will make a finding that an appeal will facilitate final resolution of the case “when resolution of the legal question dramatically affects recovery in a lawsuit.” Conversely, when other issues are left pending in the litigation, ultimate termination of the litigation is not advanced by allowing immediate appeal of an otherwise interlocutory order.

No. 05-24-00288-CV (Sept. 20, 2024) (mem. op.).

Two statements in Cooper v. TCH Altera AHCC, LLC capture key concepts in appellate waiver for Texas practice today:

1. Briefing waiver. “Because briefing waiver is disfavored, we will construe appellants’ brief to also challenge the declaratory relief to the extent reasonably possible. See Anderson v. Gilbert, 897 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (“An appellate court should consider the parties’ arguments supporting each point of error and not merely the wording of the points.”).
2. Malooly waiver. “Altera raised multiple grounds attacking appellants’ breach of contract counterclaims, including a ground that appellants could not show that a condition precedent—approval of appellants’ fee by the City of Allen—had been satisfied. Appellants do not address this condition precedent argument in their appellate brief, so we must affirm the judgment on their breach-of-contract counterclaims. See Rosetta Res. Operating, LP v. Martin, 645 S.W.3d 212, 226–27 ‘(Tex. 2022); Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970).”

Deaguero v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline repeatedly reminds of the importance of bringing forward a complete record–for example, when challenging a summary judgment ruling, it’s a problem when “the appellate record does not include the Commission’s motion, Deaguero’s response, or the order granting partial summary judgment.” No. 05-22-01002-CV (March 28, 2024).

In re State of Texas helpfully clarifies the standard for when temporary relief is appropriate during the pendency of an appeal. Eliminating some uncertainty that had crept into the sparse case law about this topic, the supreme court observed:

Rather than describe the purpose of relief under Rule 52.10 as “preservation of the status quo,” we find Rule 29.3’s analogous formulation more helpful. An appellate court asked to decide whether to stay a lower court’s ruling pending appeal or to stay a party’s actions while an appeal proceeds should seek “to preserve the parties’ rights until disposition of the appeal.” The equitable authority weexercise today, under Rule 52.10, serves the same purpose—preservation of the parties’ rights while the appeal proceeds. A stay pending appeal is, of course, a kind of injunction, so the familiar considerations governing injunctive relief in other contexts will generally apply in this context as well.

No. 24-0325 (Tex. June 14, 2024). The court then examined how those general equitable considerations–including likelihood of success on the merits–applied in that case. This clarification of the law serves to generally align Texas and federal practice on the issue of appellate stays (setting aside the hot-button topic of “administrative stays”).

The supreme court has approved a new rule about use of a sworn appendix instead of an official clerk’s record, aligning “conventional” appeal practice with the longstanding custom in mandamus proceedings.

In a per curiam opinion, the supreme court reversed a Thirteenth Court opinion involving persistent – if unlucky – efforts to get a case to the court of appeals: “Mother timely noticed her appeal from both judgments under consideration by the court of appeals. The court of appeals erred in rejecting jurisdiction after Mother relied on the appellate court’s ruling rendering her initial appeal interlocutory.” In the Interest of A.C.T.M., No. 23-0589 (Dec. 29, 2023).

Continuing a theme begun earlier in the week, the Fifth Court again analyzed (and turned down) a permissive appeal in Singh v. Rategain Travel Techs., Ltd., this time on a question about arbitrability. (My LPHS colleague John Volney represented the successful respondent in this matter.)No. 05-23-01088-CV (Dec. 14, 2023) (mem. op.)

Hartline Barger LLP v. Denson Walker Properties, LLC provides insight on when the Fifth Court will (and will not) accept a permissive appeal: “Although the possibility exists that a controlling legal question as to which a substantial ground for disagreement exists might arise in determining whether a fact issue exists in the context of a summary judgment, it is rare, and this fact-intensive case is not that rare occurrence.” No. 05-23-00126-CV (Dec. 11, 2023) (mem. op.).

In November, the supreme court gave final approval to a new rule of procedure about permissive appeals. The key provision is as follows:

The Byzantine rules about post-trial requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law were enforced by the Fifth Court in Mangum v. Mangum: “In his first issue, Roderick challenges the trial court’s failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law despite his timely request and a subsequent notice of late findings of fact. Although his original request was timely filed, the notice of late findings was filed more than 30 days later and did not preserve this issue for appellate review.” No. 05-22-01118-CV (Oct. 31, 2023) (mem. op.).

The Fifth Court declined to resolve a dispute about a spoliation instruction when the relevant record was as follows:

It is not clear what happened. We are reasonably confident that a charge conference of some kind took place during the “Off-the-record discussion” noted in the reporter’s record passage quoted above. Judge Moyé said, “We are off the record,” just before the unrecorded discussion occurred, so perhaps the attorneys were on notice that the court reporter was not transcribing their objections to the final charge. Then again, perhaps they weren’t. Perhaps something happened during the unrecorded conference to make the Monzingos’ attorney reasonably but erroneously believe that the court reporter had begun recording the charge conference before he made his objections to the charge. And during this appeal, Flories has never argued that the Monzingos failed to preserve their second issue.

Monzingo v. Flories, No. 05-22-00719-CV (Oct. 12, 2023).

A recent, short opinion memorializing a settlement summarizes the operation of Tex. R. App. 42:

The recent case of City of Dallas v. PDH Holdings, in the course of rejecting the application of estoppel to bar the enforcement of a zoning ordinance, made two observations about procedural matters of broad general interest:

• Deemed Findings. “PDT argues that because there are no findings of fact and conclusions of law, we imply all findings necessary to support the judgment. While this is true, implied findings must have support in the record on a theory of law applicable to the case. Contrary to what PDT seemed to suggest at oral argument, this does not mean we have carte blanche to craft a remedy based on a theory unsupported by the pleadings or imply findings that have no evidentiary support in the record.”
• Other Districts. “[W]e are not bound by decisions from our sister courts.” (citation omitted).

No. 05-22-00730-CV (June 16, 2023) (mem. op.) (all emphasis added).

The interplay between appellate lawyers and courts (“we need the transcript now!”) and trial-court reporters (“I have twenty other transcripts due this month!”) is part of daily life in appellate practice. The situation in In the Interest of B.Q.L. goes to a whole other level, however, and presents a textbook application of Tex. R. App. 34.6. The Fifth Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, due to the lack of a reporter’s record, when the following facts were established in trial-court proceedings:

(1) Atkins [court reporter] testified she was not present at the trial held on June 8, 2021; (2) her testimony was untruthful; (3) Atkins was the reporter for the trial; (4) Atkins stated she has no notes from the trial; (5) Mother is not at fault for the reporter’s record not being transcribed; (6) the attorneys state the record is necessary to the appeal’s resolution; and (6) the record cannot be replaced by agreement of the parties. 

No. 05-21-01108-CV (March 6, 2023) (mem. op.).

Desperate to hear the fabled song of the Sirens, but knowing full well that they steered sailors toward the rocks, Odysseus told his crew:

“[T]ake me and bind me to the crosspiece half way up the mast; bind me as I stand upright, with a bond so fast that I cannot possibly break away, and lash the rope’s ends to the mast itself. If I beg and pray you to set me free, then bind me more tightly still.”

He survived. Not so, the appellants in Bienati v. Cloister Holdings, LLC, who disclosed during argument that:

“… because the probable right to recovery issue could impact the merits of the entire case, the trial court ‘abated it until this Court weighed in on the merits of the temporary injunction and whether there’s a probable right to recovery.”

The court of appeals held: “We have repeatedly disapproved the practice of postponing the trial on the merits of a case to obtain a ruling on the appeal of a temporary injunction. This practice not only delays the ultimate resolution of the merits of the parties’ dispute but wastes judicial resources.” It thus dismissed the appeal. No. 05-22-00324-CV (Feb. 10, 2023) (mem. op.).

The Texas Supreme Court recently clarified the proper way to dismiss a matter that has become moot on appeal:

MTGLQ’s purchase of the property preceded Alsobrook’s appeal. As the court of appeals correctly concluded, no live controversy existed between the parties after the foreclosure, rendering Alsobrook’s claims moot. The court of appeals thus correctly concluded that dismissal was required. But, as explained, mootness on appeal requires vacatur of the underlying judgment as well as dismissal of the case. The court of appeals should have vacated the trial court’s judgment and dismissed the case.

Alsobrook v. MTGLQ investors, LP, No. 22-0079 (Nov. 18, 2022) (citations omitted). I salute 600Commerce friend Ben Taylor for his persistent advocacy about this and related matters.

Actress and inventor Hedy Lamarr said that “all my six husbands married me for different reasons.” Because judges can also reach the same decision for different reasons, the Fifth Court recently observed that “we ‘must uphold a correct lower court judgment on any legal theory before it, even if the court gives an incorrect reason for its judgment.'” Choi v. Brixmore Holdings, No. 05-20-00516-CV (July 19, 2022) (mem. op.).

The Texas Supreme Court’s majority opinion in In re: Abbott–a mandamus about an appellate stay order in ongoing litigation about medical care for transgender youth–contained an intriguing footnote about the potential boundaries set by the Texas Constitution for appellate-stay orders:

“The State contends that, under an 1880 decision of this Court, courts of appeals exercising appellate jurisdiction lack any authority to “protect the parties from damage during the pendency of the appeal.” City of Laredo v Martin, 52 Tex. 548, 554 (1880). As we observed in Geomet, in which no party raised Martin, such a line of argument “amounts to a constitutional attack on Rule 29.3.” 578 S.W.3d at 89–90. We further noted in Geomet that a state of affairs in which no court can protect parties’ rights during an interlocutory appeal would raise constitutional questions about the automatic stay of trial court proceedings afforded by section 51.014(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Id. at 90. Likewise, the limitation on appellate courts’ Rule 29.3 authority suggested by the State would raise constitutional questions about the State’s statutory right to automatically supersede injunctions on appeal. We do not purport to resolve any of these questions in this expedited mandamus posture.”

No. 22-0229 (May 13, 2022).

In Wofford v. Pinnacle:

• A summary judgment, granted on July 20, 2021, disposed of some but not all claims in the litigation;
• On July 29, the claims addressed by that summary judgment were severed into a new cause (thus creating a final judgment as to those matters);
• On August 30, 2021, the trial court’s plenary power expired in the new cause; and
• In October 2021, the trial court signed a final judgment in the new cause which was later appealed.

The Fifth Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction: “[B]ecause the July summary judgment was made final by the severance and the trial court’s plenary power expired August 30, the October final judgment is void.” No. 05-22-00071-CV (April 18, 2022) (mem. op.).

A cautionary note on motions to extend the notice-of-appeal deadline: “[W]e have repeatedly held that delay caused by waiting for the trial court to rule on a post judgment motion or for the trial court’s plenary power to expire is unreasonable as it reflects an awareness of the deadline for filing a notice of appeal but a conscious decision to ignore it.” Ali v. Spectra Bank, No. 05-21-01113-CV (April 6, 2022) (mem. op.).

Fans of newspaper comic strips know The Phantom as “the man who cannot die.” Equally resilient is the Texas Supreme Court’s Malooly opinion that requires an appellant to address all bases for affirmance. In re Pepperstone Group Ltd. (a mandamus proceeding, so not technically a Malooly case) involved a situation in which an issue had been raised but not in the proper way to trigger Malooly:

“Although Das’s trial-court reply brief contained an objection that Pepperstone’s response was late under the local rules, he asked only that the trial court not consider Pepperstone’s response in ruling on the motion to compel. Das did not contend that his timeliness objection was an independent ‘ground’ for granting his motion to compel. Accordingly, we reject Das’s argument.”

No. 05-21-00767-CV (Feb. 28, 2022) (mem. op.).

The would-be appellant in Cosentino v. Frost Bank tried to appeal a ruling about arbitrability by using the Crowson precedent about what “finality” means in longrunning probate proceedings. The Fifth Court did not accept the argument, reasoning: “As reflected in the parties’ live pleadings, the ancillary proceeding was brought as a declaratory judgment action concerning the validity and enforceability of the PMA [premarital agreement]. The order compelling arbitration determined a preliminary issue within that cause of action—that the PMA was properly executed such that an agreement to arbitrate existed and arbitration of those issues could be compelled—not a cause of action in itself that could be asserted independently as its own lawsuit.” No. 05-21-00829-CV (Feb. 16, 2022) (mem. op.).

Texas’ rule against the appeal of interlocutory orders has a long and colorful history of exceptions to that rule (a story well told by Lee Thompson in her recent law review article about our interlocutory-appeal statute). The increased number of permissible interlocutory appeals can produce procedural friction with the standard appellate process; the supreme court recently granted review of a Dallas case involving such friction on a fundamental jurisdictional point:

The Fifth Court recently recalled a mandate and amended its own judgment to include the surety on a supersedeas bond as an additional party. The motion primarily cited Whitmire v. Greenridge Place Apts., 333 S.W.3d 255, 260-61 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). A big 600Commerce thanks to Ben Taylor for pointing out this order to me (and correcting the pet. history on my original post)

The Fifth Court found that an appeal, taken from the domestication of a foreign judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, was untimely. The Appellant cited the later filing of a third-party action, and a related special appearance, as reasons the clock did not start to run. The Court disagreed:

“The Foreign Judgment became a final Texas Judgment on January 22, 2020, the day it was filed. ‘By its very nature, the UEFJA does not contemplate or authorize the entry of a judgment replacing the foreign judgment.’ … [I]t is well settled that a Texas trial court has no jurisdiction to set aside another state’s judgment and return the parties to the positions they occupied before the foreign judgment was rendered. An intervention and a third-party claim in an enforcement proceeding do not in any way alter this fact.”

Moreno v. Halperin, No. 05-20-00858-CV (Dec. 14, 2021) (mem. op.).

This is a cross-post from 600Hemphill, which follows commercial litigation in the Texas Supreme Court:

“[W]e adopt the following two-step inquiry for determining when requests for findings and conclusions that are not required by the rules will trigger the extended ninety-day filing deadline. First, was the non-jury proceeding a type in which the trial court could consider evidence? Second, if so, was there evidence before the court? When the answer to both questions is yes and a party requests findings and conclusions, all parties benefit from the extended appellate timetable.

The first question is categorical, not case-specific. For example, it will be answered yes for a judgment following a bench trial, a default judgment on a claim for unliquidated damages, a judgment rendered as sanctions, and any other judgment that could be based in any part on an evidentiary hearing.

The second question is case-specific and focuses on whether evidence was presented to the trial court, not whether that evidence proved to be necessary in hindsight. In answering this question, it is not relevant whether the evidence presented was disputed, or jurisdictional, or material to an issue later raised on appeal.” Phillips v. McNeill, No. 19-0831 (Dec. 3, 2021) (citations omitted, emphasis added) (applying IKB Inus. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1997) and Gene Duke Builders, Inc. v. Abilene Housing Auth., 138 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)).

Compton v. Compton, No. 05-21-00163-CV (Nov. 1, 2021), provides a good framework for approaching a settlement on appeal that includes action related to the trial-court order under appeal:

These facts led to a problem with the timeliness of the notice of appeal in Jordan Kahn Music Co. v. Threlkeld:

• January 19, 2021. Trial court signs interlocutory order granting a TCPA motion to dismiss, and orally invites the movant to submit a fee affidavit;
• February 28, 2021. Trial court signs a final judgment, including a fee award.
• Nonmovant timely moved for a new trial.
• May 24, 2021. Notice of appeal filed.

The Fifth Court held that the February 28 judgment was a “trial court order on a motion  to dismiss … under section 27.003” under the relevant statute, and thus triggered the 20-day deadline for perfecting an accelerated appeal–for which, the filing of a motion for new trial does not extend the perfection deadline is it otherwise would. No. 05-21-00381-CV (Sept. 29, 2021) (mem. op.).

In re Frenkel illustrates an important procedural aspect of practice regarding sanctions; specifically, the supreme court’s holding in Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding) about the interplay between an interlocutory sanctions order and the right to its appellate review.

In this case, the Fifth Court found that mandamus review of a $1000 sanction payable to TLAP was warranted because after final judgment, “the trial court would not have the means to compel TLAP to return the monetary sanction.”

Similarly, it found that a requirement to take certain ethics CLEs within 24 months of the order also require mandamus intervention, as “[t]here is no guarantee that a final appealable judgment will be rendered before the twenty-four month period expires,” particularly in light of the COVID pandemic. Accordingly, the Court required the trial court to defer both orders “until rendition of final judgment, thus allowing the merits of the sanctions order to be considered on appeal.” No. 05-21-000194-CV (July 13, 2021).

This timeline led the Fifth Court to deny a request for leave to file a late notice of appeal:

• December 15, 2020. Trial court signs a final divorce decree.
• January 14, 2021. Appellants first learn of the decree by seeing it on the court’s docket. They file a motion for new trial that same day.
• March 15, 2021 became the new deadline for filing a notice of appeal.
• March 25, 2021 was when Appellants filed their notice of appeal.

The Court found the grounds in the motion for leave unpersuasive, noting: “[A]lthough counsel and her firm may have been preoccupied with other matters between February 15 and March 5, and counsel may have been busy handling an emergency after that time, appellants fail to explain how this prevented them from timely filing the notice of appeal.” In the Interest of D.M., No. 05-21-00185-CV (May 21, 2021) (mem. op.).

The Phantom, longtime defender of Bangalia, is often called the “Man Who Cannot Die.” Neither do disputes about the scope of issue statements; in a counterpoint to a recent opinion that read Flakes narrowly, the Fifth Court rejected a Flakes-based objection to a charge-error issue: “Following the supreme court’s mandate, we conclude that, fairly subsumed in Ziehl’s briefing, is the challenge to the trial court’s judgment awarding contribution to all parties who failed to secure a statutorily required jury instruction.” Ziehl v. Tornado Bus, No. 05-19-00901-CV (April 22, 2021) (mem. op.).

The defendants in Chen v. Razberi Technologies lost a special appearance and took an interlocutory appeal. But before resolution of the appeal, the trial court entered final judgment against the defendants, who did not file an additional notice of appeal. A Fifth Court panel concluded that “[t]he special appearance order merged into the final judgment mooting this interlocutory appeal. ” In later proceedings, the Court denied en banc review, over a detailed dissent. No. 05-19-01551-CV (April 28, 2021).

Many books and movies involve tales of scary creatures who return, ranging from Grendel’s family in the ancient epic of Beowulf to “Where’s My Mummy?”, an underappreciated part of the Scooby Doo multiverse. The topic of briefing waiver returns in the majority opinion from Herczeg v. City of Dallas, which found waiver in a sovereign-immunity case because the opening brief did not address untimeliness or exhaustion of remedies. It distinguished St. John Missionary Baptist v. Flakes, 595 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2020), as involving “two grounds [that] were not actually independent but were inextricably intertwined,” while here, “untimeliness and failure to exhaust administrative remedies are independent of the City’s other grounds, which focused on the merits of Herczeg’s claims.” A dissent questioned whether the older authority cited by the majority continued to be viable after Flakes. Justice Garcia wrote for the majority, joined by Justice Smith; Justice Schenck dissented. No. 05-19-01023-CV (March 29, 2021) (mem. op.).

A group of investors (“FPH”) in a business (“FSG”) sought the appointment of a receiver to review and report on the finances of FSG. The trial court (1) agreed, and then (2) allowed FSG to supersede the order with a $10,000 bond while it took an interlocutory appeal, but then (3) allowed FPH to post a “counter-supersedeas bond” of $11,875 so that the receiver’s work could proceed during the interlocutory appeal. The Fifth Court found that “[TRAP] 24.2(a)(3) expressly permitted the trial court to allow FPH to post a counter-supersedeas bond,” and then found the bond amount to be appropriate in light of “[t]he fact that FSG continues to have sole control of its management” and the evidence presented about FSG’s financial situation. Five Star Global, LLC v. Hulme, No. 05-20-00940-CV (March 2, 2021).

The majority opinion in Return Lee to Lee Park v. Rawlings, No. 05-19-00456-CV (Dec. 28, 2020), which affirmed a judgment that allowed the removal of two high-profile Confederate memorials from City of Dallas land, summarized the current state of appellate-waiver law after recent Texas Supreme Court opinions:

“Appellate briefs ‘are meant to acquaint the court with the issues in a case and to present argument that will enable the court to decide the case.’ Tex. R. App. P 38.9. Briefs are to be liberally, but reasonably, construed so that the right to appeal is not lost by waiver. Horron v. Stovall, 591 S.W.3d 567, 569 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). Appellate courts have the authority to request additional briefing on an unbriefed issue that was fairly included in or inextricably entwined with a briefed issue. St. John Missionary Baptist v. Flakes, 595 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam). However, appellate courts retain authority and discretion to deem an unbriefed point waived in lieu of requesting additional briefing. Horton, 519 S.W.3d at 569–70. Whether that discretion has been properly exercised depends on the facts of the case. Id.”

Simon & Garfunkel’s The Sounds of Silence begins: “Hello darkness, my old friend, I’ve come to talk with you again.” In In re Estate of Buchanan, however, the Fifth Court did not want to talk with the litigants again, after silence on a key issue in a previous appeal. The issue was who had the right to control certain funds based on a series of probate-court orders, which had involved a previous appeal to the Fifth Court. It held: “A reviewing court does not again pass upon any matter presented to, directly passed upon, or in effect disposed of by an earlier appeal to that court. An appellate court’s judgment is final not only in reference to the matters actually litigated, but as to all other matters the parties might have litigated and decided in the case. Thus, if James believed the trial court erred by declaring Jennifer has the superior right to the funds, he needed to raise the issue in that appeal.” No. 05-19-01473-CV  (Nov. 19, 2020) (mem. op.).

In an echo (pun intended) of the Flakes litigation, the panel majority and a concurrence disagreed as to whether the appellant had adequately briefed its arguments; the majority finding that they had been appropriately presented and the concurrence holding a different view. For interested practitioners, the full text of the pertinent argument (relating to whether the underlying proceedings were an impermissible collateral attack on an earlier judgment) is reproduced in the concurrence. Eco Planet, LLC v. Ant Trading, 05-19-00239-CV (Nov. 16, 2020).

As the Flying Dutchman (right) restlessly travels the Seven Seas, so does B.C. v. Steak N Shake travel the courts, most recently on remand from the Texas Supreme Court. The Fifth Court denied en banc review; concurrences by Justice Evans and Justice Schenck elaborated on the relevant scope of review (echoing their similar exchange in the Flakes case). Justice Evans succinctly summarized the respective positions: “[T]he record review I conducted was somewhat more than [Steak N Shake]’s view and quite a bit less than Justice Schenck’s view. … [U]ntil we receive contrary direction from the supreme court, we should continue to review the context of the record referenced by the parties, including in our review what the referenced-record contains, not merely the parties’ limited or inaccurate summary of the record.” No. 05-14-00649-CV (Aug. 3, 2020).

In the context of a motion to extend an interlocutory-appeal deadline, the Fifth Court reminded: “We have previously concluded that intentionally waiting for a trial court to hear a motion for new trial is not a reasonable explanation.” Careington Int’l Corp. v. First Call Telemedicine LLC, No. 05-20-00841-CV (Oct. 12, 2020) (mem. op.).

 “…the power granted by section 22.221(a) of the government code is not a power that is granted to prevent damage to the appellant pending appeal.’ ‘That purpose is served by the statutes allowing appellants to supersede judgments by posting an appropriate bond.’ Rather, the power to issue a writ of injunction is limited to the purpose of protecting appellate jurisdiction. 

   Here, relators assert that the pending foreclosure threatens this Court’s jurisdiction over their existing appeal. But unlike the cases cited by relators involving appeals of interlocutory orders, the foreclosure of the property at issue does not moot their claims in the appeal and, thus, does not implicate the Court’s jurisdiction over the appeal.” In re Day Investment Group, No. 05-20-00643-CV (July 2, 2020) (mem. op.) (citation omitted, emphasis added).

To the right, Pikachu is waving, but the appellee in King Aerospace, Inc. v. King Aviation Dallas was not waiving, as the Fifth Court observed:

In its reply brief, KAC contends Randall’s responsive brief on appeal, filed pro se, “provides nothing for this Court to review” because it fails to cite to the appellate record or legal authority. In his response, Randall informed the Court he was unable to find appellate counsel and he submitted his trial counsel’s post-trial brief as his response to KAC’s appellate arguments. KAC, as the appellant, has the burden to show grounds for reversal on appeal.  Randall, as appellee, was not required to file a brief for us to review what was presented to the trial court; thus, he cannot be said to have committed “waiver” due to inadequate briefing. 

No. 05-19-00245-CV (April 30, 2020) (mem. op.) (citation omitted, emphasis added).

In re Johnson catches the eye as an atypical non-memorandum opinion in a pro se mandamus proceeding arising from a criminal case. The novel feature of the opinion is its footnote (longer than the actual opinion), using the Court’s “discretion to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts that are matters of public record” to review the relevant online docket sheet to establish mootness. No. 05-20-00068-CV (March 11, 2020)

The trial court dismissed Heri Automotive’s counterclaims for forum non conveniens. Heri appealed. The Fifth Court dismissed because “no authority exists authorizing the appeal of the challenged interlocutory order,” and also noted that “appellant cites no authpority, and we have found none, that authorizes mandamus review of an interlocutory order granting a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.” Heri Automotive v. Adams, No. 05-19-01215-CV (Feb. 21, 2020) (mem. op.).

Jones v. Schachar succinctly summarizes compliance with Malooly:  “The appellant can do this by either asserting a separate issue challenging each possible ground, or asserting a general issue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and within that issue providing argument negating all possible grounds upon which summary judgment could have been granted.” No. 05-19-00188-CV (Feb. 11, 2020) (mem. op.)

Last Friday’s opinion by the Texas Supreme Court in St. John Missionary Baptist Church v. Flakes reversed St. John’s Missionary Baptist Church v. Flakes, 547 S.W.3d 311 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2018) (en banc). The law of appellate briefing waiver now has (at least) these features:

1. Waiver occurs when (a) the defendants move for summary judgment on two grounds that each are an “independent basis” for judgment (limitations and release), (b) the trial court grants the motion without specifying a reason, and (c) “[o]n appeal, the plaintiff challenged the validity of the release in question but did not address the defendants’ statute-of-limitations argument.” In this situation, the trial court’s judgment “must stand, since it may have been based on a ground not specifically challenged by the plaintiff and since there was no general assignment that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.” Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. 1970).
2. Waiver does not occur when – and a court may thus request supplemental briefing if that would be helpful – when the defendants seek dismissal based on two doctrines (standing and ecclesiastical abstention), the substance of which “significantly overlaps.” The supreme court found such an “overlap” in Flakes when consideration of both doctrines required review of the applicable church bylaws and church membership situation. Two other examples cited in Flakes involve arguments about equitable relief related to points about money damages (First United Pentecostal Church v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214 (Tex. 2017)), and an issue about the applicability of a specific case in a broader dispute about the right to terminate a lease (Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, 578 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. 2019)).
3. Supplemental briefing is discretionary under Flakes; cf. Horton v. Stovall, No.18-0925 (Tex. Dec. 20, 2019) (finding that an appellant should have been given the opportunity to cure the particular record-citation issues identified in that case).

Faced with a lack of appellate jurisdiction because of a nonfinal order, a party suggested abatement to cure the problem rather than dismissal. The Fifth Court rejected that request: “In so doing, we note nothing in the record reflects determination of the counterclaims will be perfunctory.  Nor does the record reflect a determination is imminent. No trial date has been set, and the record reflects December 20, 2019 is the date set for a hearing on appellant’s motion to set a trial date.” Dixon v. Principal Management Group, Inc., No. 05-19-00895-CV (Dec. 3, 2019) (mem. op.) (citations omitted).

“After the justice court held a jury trial in a forcible detainer suit and the jury rendered a verdict, appellant appealed to the county court. The county court ruled in appellees’ favor, and appellant appealed. The record before this Court includes only the jury verdict from the justice court and not a judgment from the justice court.” Because the Fifth Court has no more jurisdiction than the court appealed from, it dismissed Anderson v. Weed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. No. 05-19-00864-CV (Nov. 14, 2019) (mem. op.)

It’s a simple but fundamental point – confirm that the record has the relevant order (or, that there is in fact such an order); see, e.g.:

• “Because the record does not show relator ever filed the motion, we cannot conclude the trial court has a legal duty to rule upon it.”  In re Johnson, No. 05-19-00708-CV (Oct. 21, 2019) (mem. op.); and
• Although appellant asks that the bond be reduced, the record before this Court does not contain a signed order setting the supersedeas bond. Without an order, there is nothing before this Court to review.” Chowdhury v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 05-19-00965-CV (Oct. 25, 2019) (mem. op.)

The Texas Family Code says: “In a suit in which termination of the parent-child relationship is requested, the court shall appoint an attorney ad litem to represent the interests of: (1) an indigent parent of the child who responds in opposition to the termination.” Accordingly, it is a reversible abuse of discretion not to do so. In re R.R.-L., No. 05-19-00507-CV (Oct. 23, 2019).

“The court of appeals granted our stay motion! We’re looking good on the mandamus now!” Not necessarily, as shown by In re Gurley, No. 05-19-01118-CV (Oct. 18, 2019) (mem. op.): ” We stayed the trial court’s September 13, 2019 order granting the motion to expunge the lis pendens pending our disposition of the mandamus petition. On our request, real parties filed a response to the mandamus petition. . . . After reviewing the petition for writ of mandamus, the response filed by real parties, and the applicable law, we conclude relator
has not shown he is entitled to the relief requested.” 

After the Confederate disaster at Gettysburg in 1863, the wily Robert E. Lee held off Ulysses Grant for two more years in a series of battles. Dallas’s Confederate statuary is proving similarly wily; after an initial stay to receive full briefing on the point, the Fifth Court agreed that a writ of injunction was appropriate to maintain the downtown Confederate memorial (right, in part): “The Monument was created in 1896 and has already been relocated once. There is no guarantee that the removal process will be seamless and without damage to the Monument, or that if it is ultimately returned to Pioneer Cemetery that it will be in the same condition as it is today.” The Court required the plaintiff to post a $50,000 bond. It also found that a similar application was moot as to a statute of Lee that has already been sold and reinstalled in the Big Bend area of far West Texas (Texas, incidentally, being the location of Lee’s last command in the U.S. Army before siding with the Confederacy.)  In re: Return to Lee Park, No. 05-19-00774-CV (Oct. 10, 2019) (mem. op.)

John Doe, a shadowy figure who has haunted Anglo-American jurisprudence for centuries, produced a failure of appellate jurisdiction in Chappell v. City of Balch Springs. Chappell sued “the City of Balch Springs, Shaila Lynn Gay, Jonathan Haber, and John Doe Supervisors 1-5.” The three named defendants successfully moved to dismiss under Rule 91a, but Chappell was unable to appeal because her “claims against John Doe Supervisors 1-5 remain pending” and thus kept the Rule 91a order from becoming a final judgment. No. 05-19-01046-CV (Oct. 7, 2019) (mem. op.)

A litigant requested that the Fifth Court take judicial notice of information about the address of an entity; the Court declined to do so: “That document is not part of the summary-judgment evidence. We decline to take judicial notice of the document. ‘The Court of Appeals is not a trier of fact. “For us to consider evidence for the first time, never presented to the trial court, would effectively convert this Court into a court of original, not appellate jurisdiction.”‘ . . . Appellate courts may take judicial notice of documents outside the appellate record to determine their jurisdiction or to resolve matters ancillary to decisions that are mandated by law, such as calculation of prejudgment interest when the appellate court renders judgment. This case does not involve those situations.” Thornton v. Columbia Medical Center, No. 05-18-01010-CV (Sept. 12, 2019) (mem. op.).

The Fifth Circuit noted a limit on its Flakes opinion in Oliver v. Saadi, No. 05-17-01403-CV (Aug. 30, 2019) (mem. op.): “Oliver is obliged to attack every ground that by and of its own force could have produced the judgment. He is not obliged to marshal and attack every subsidiary argument and citation to authority that may have informed the trial court’s thinking along the way. To be sure, the arguments relating to the admission or exclusion of evidence may vary and here include qualifications, reliability, and relevance. But none of these interstitial evidentiary debates would amount either to a ‘ground’ for summary judgment on their own account.”

Tex. R. App. 49.7 says: “A party may file a motion for en banc reconsideration as a separate motion, with or without filing a motion for rehearing. The motion must be filed within 15 days after the court of appeals’ judgment or order, or when permitted, within 15 days after the court of appeals’ denial of the party’s last timely filed motion for rehearing or en banc reconsideration. . . . ”

An en banc majority of the Fifth Court concluded that this rule allowed the filing of a petition for en banc reconsideration within 15 days of an order denying panel rehearing. A concurrence reached the same result for a different reason, “informed by a mandate from the supreme court that requires us to examine a case on its merits when there is an ‘arguable interpretation’ that would allow us to do so.” (Its author, Justice Schenck, followed similar principles in his dissent last year from St. John’s Missionary Baptist Church v. Flakes.) And a dissent approached the rules differently, finding that they “treat panel rehearing and en banc reconsideration motions equally in this regard and give a party only one guaranteed opportunity to file either or both of those motions unless we change our judgment or opinion.” Cruz v. Ghani, No. 05-17-00566-CV (July 22, 2019) (en banc).

The complex structure of Texas’s intermediate appellate courts was the subject of Justice Schenck’s concurrence from the denial of en banc review in Brooks-PHS Heirs, LLC v. Bowerman, a docket-equalization transfer from San Antonio. The opinion observes: “When one intermediate court of appeals sits in the place of another, it applies the precedent of the transferor court. Tex. R. App. P. 41.3. Of course, we (or more directly I as the author) have endeavored to do that here, applying San Antonio precedent to arrive at the result we think that appellate court would reach. The question of whether that application is correct at this point is essentially out of reach of the en banc review mechanism as it is described in rule 41.2, as the panel has already applied what it sees as San Antonio law; our remaining colleagues that constitute the en banc court in Dallas could likewise only predict how San Antonio would rule; and the San Antonio Court of Appeals has no seat at the table. See id. 41.2 (decision by en banc court).” No. 05-18-00356-CV (July 5, 2019) (emphasis added).

The last stand of Dallas’s Confederate War Memorial (right) has been extended until mid-July; the Fifth Court stayed matters until it can receive and consider full briefing on the request for a writ of injunction during an appeal about the Memorial and the related statue of Robert E. Lee. In re: Return to Lee Park, No. 05-19-00774-CV (July 1, 2019) (order). Robert Wilonsky has a good summary of the current status of the litigation in the Dallas Morning News.

Perlman v. EKLS Firestopping & Construction is the latest opinion from the Fifth Court that affirms the denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss, when the communications and associations at issue were fundamentally private and business-related. The appellee sought an award of fees for a frivolous motion, but the Court reminded: “[Appellee], however, did  not file a notice of appeal, which is required to alter a trial court’s judgment or other appealable order. Under [Tex. R. App. P.] 25.1(c), we may not grant a party who does not file a notice of appeal ‘more favorable relief than did the trial court except for just cause . . . .” No. 05-18-00971-CV (June 28, 2019).

Conditionally granting mandamus relief from this order by the Fifth Court (a “lift-stay” order in a TCPA appeal), in In re Geomet Recycling, the Texas Supreme Court held:

“[T]o the extent EMR faced irreparable harm, it had an avenue available to it by which a court could provide a remedy without violating the statutory stay. It did not pursue that  remedy but instead asked the court of appeals to lift the stay in violation of [CPRC] section 51.014(b). EMR’s choice of an unsuited procedural mechanism does not create a constitutional problem we must address. And to the extent EMR did not face irreparable harm but simply wanted a hearing on the trial-court motions that had been pending when Geomet’s appeal triggered the stay, that is exactly what [CPRC] section 51.014(b) prohibits.”

It also observed: “Whether . . . an order under [TRAP] 29.3 referring a motion to the trial court for findings and recommendations would violate the statutory stay ‘of all trial court proceedings’ is a question the parties have not briefed and that we need not decide.” No. 18-0443 (June 14, 2019).

A dispute about the operation of the mandate rule, in a long-running dispute about the winding up of a law partnership, unfolded as follows:

1. Trial court, first time. The trial court’s first judgment, in a dispute about the winding-up of a law partnership, “[a]mong other things, . . . ordered Pelley and Scott Pelley P.C. to pay $55,672.80 to Wynne and Smith as reimbursement for overhead operation expenses incurred as part of the law firm’s post-dissolution expenses during the years ‘2012 to present’ and ordered the Pelley parties to pay $40,000 to the Wynne parties for attorney’s fees incurred ‘in connection with the Gibbs Estate and Shankles Estate cases.'” (emphasis added, here and below)
2. Court of appeals, first time. On appeal from that judgment, the Fifth Court held, in part: “[T]he trial court erred when it failed to include contingent attorney’s fees on appeal in the final judgment.
   The trial court’s final judgment is reversed as to Wynne’s and Smith’s request for contingent appellate attorneys’ fees and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The remainder of the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.”
3. Trial court, second time. On remand, the trial court awarded additional, post-judgment overhead expenses, to which the losing party objected: “[T]he final judgment ordered the paying of overhead through the date of the trial. There is no provision in the final judgment or anywhere else where this Court ordered any sort of continuing obligation after the date of judgment. Frankly, if it did, it wouldn’t be a final judgment. There simply is no provision in the final judgment for the amount that counsel is proposing for additional overhead.”
4. Court of appeals, second time. “We agree . . . .on remand the trial court had no authority to address the matter of overhead expenses, which had been finally adjudicated by our first opinion, judgment, and mandate. We remanded this case with specific instructions [about attorneys’ fees].”

Pelley v. Wynne, No. 05-18-00550-CV (June 13, 2019).

A judgment creditor sought mandamus relief, in the trial court, to require the Dallas sheriff to execute necessary title documents after a seizure and forced sale. The Fifth Court (which affirmed the grant of mandamus relief) observed: “An original proceeding for a writ of mandamus initiated in the trial court is a civil action subject to trial and appeal on substantive law issues and the rules of civil procedure as any other lawsuit. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over such proceedings” Gabriel v. Outlaw, No. 05-18-00503-CV (April 22, 2019) (mem. op.)

In a recent mandamus opinion, the Fifth Court found that laches began to run when a coordinator’s “e-mail states specifically that the judge had granted the motion to strike and, as such, signing an order was merely a ministerial act.” In re Yamaha Golf-Car Co., 05-19-00292-CV (April 8, 2019) (mem. op.) As a direct-appeal counterpoint, Swart v. Morales holds: “Although the record includes a memorandum ruling on the trial court’s letterhead, the ruling is not signed. This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from signed orders or judgments. Without a signed appealable order, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.” No. 05-18-01229-CV (April 10, 2019) (mem. op.) (citations omitted).

The unfortunately-worded judgment in Last Frontier Realty Corp. v. Budtime Forest Grove Homes, LLC provided:

. . . this Court finds that the Motion should be, and hereby is GRANTED in all respects.

 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that [Last Frontier’s] claims asserted herein are hereby dismissed with prejudice, and all costs of court are taxed against [Last Frontier].

 

This order disposes of all claims and all parties.

 

This order is final and unappealable, and all relief not expressly granted herein is denied.

(emphasis added). Sensibly, the Fifth Court held: “[T]he word ‘unappealable’ is a clerical error and [we] reform the trial court’s judgment to replace ‘unappealable’ with ‘appealable.’”

“Appellate timetables do not run from the date the non-suit is filed, but from the date the trial court signs the order of dismissal.” Kerville Fitness Property LLC v. PE Services LLC, No. 05-17-01317-CV (March 25, 2019) (mem. op.) (citing In re: Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1997)). Accordingly, a partial summary judgment order, coupled with a nonsuit of other claims, does not create finality for purposes of appellate deadlines.

After a February 12 oral argument (scroll down for the link to the lengthy media file) where skepticism was expressed about applying the TCPA to trade-secret litigation, on February 14, the Fifth Court issued an order lifting the automatic stay created by statute during the appeal of the denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss. That order allows temporary-injunction and related proceedings to continue in the trial court. Dyer v. Medoc Health Services, LLC, No. 05-18-00472-CV.

Telfer v. Adams presented the question whether an objection to an affiant’s lack or personal knowledge was a defect in “form” or “substance,” and thus whether a trial court objection and ruling is necessary to preserve error about the affidavit’s consideration under Seim v. Allstate Texas Lloyds, 551 S.W.3d 161 (Tex. 2018). The Fifth Court sidestepped the question by concluding that the notary’s acknowledgement was sufficient to prove up the attached documents. The Court noted that its prior opinions were not consistent on the point, and cited an informative article by now-Magistrate Judge David Horan about the Fifth Circuit’s practices on this topic: “Because panels lack the authority to overrule one another, our first decision touching upon a question should control pending en banc reconsideration.” No. 05-17-01387-CV (Feb. 8, 2019) (mem. op.) (The mild incongruity of a rule about the resolution of uncertainty appearing in a memorandum opinion, which assumes that “the issues are settled,” Tex. R. App. 47.2, is a byproduct of 2003 rule amendments that reconfigured the types of appellate opinions in Texas.)

Turnover in the Fifth Court at the start of 2019 created optimism about motions for rehearing. For panels where two Justices changed, that optimism may be misplaced in light of Tex. R. App. P. 49.3: “A motion for rehearing may be granted by a majority of the justices who participated in the decision of the case. Otherwise, it must be denied.” E.g., Apex Fin. Corp. v. Loan Care, No. 05-17-00855-CV (Jan. 11, 2019).

A new discussion of St. John Missionary Baptist Church v. Flakes, 547 S.W.3d 311, 313–18 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet. pending) (en banc), appeared in EMF Swiss Avenue LLC v. Peak’s Addition HOA: “[T]he HOA contends that EMF’s appellate issue doesn’t match the HOA’s summary judgment ground because EMF focuses on whether the Board abused its discretion, but the HOA’s summary judgment ground focused on whether the City and Board interpreted the City’s ordinances correctly. We . . . disagree with the HOA. In this case, abuse of discretion and ordinance interpretation are two sides of the same coin. The HOA’s summary judgment ground asserted that the Board abused its discretion because it misinterpreted the ordinances and thus affirmed the permit. . . . On appeal, EMF’s issue asserts that the trial court erred because the City and the Board didn’t abuse their discretion in issuing and affirming the permit, and its appellate argument presents its own ordinance interpretation.” No. 05-17-01112-CV (Dec. 28, 2018) (mem. op.)

In Jordan v. Klingbeil, “the trial court’s October 23 Order indicates the trial [judge] intended for its September 22 Order to constitute a final and appealable judgment that disposed of all claims.” Unfortunately for the appeal, however, the Fifth Court noted (1) “factual recitations or reasons preceding the decretal portion of a judgment form no part of the judgment itself,” and (2) “the October 23 Order cannot constitute a final judgment because it lacks the decretal language typically seen in a judgment” [such as “ordered, adjudged, and decreed,” etc.]. Because of these shortcomings with the October 23 Order, and the September 22 Order’s failure to address all causes of action or include Lehmann finality language, there was no final judgment and thus no appellate jurisdiction. No. 05-17-01228-CV (Dec. 18, 2018) (mem. op.)

This sequence of events led to a timely appeal, if barely:

• Trial court entered judgment on July 19, 2017;
• Appellant timely filed a motion for new trial on August 18, 2017, making the notice of appeal due by October 17;
• Appellant filed a notice of appeal on November 1, 15 days late but within the TRAP 26.3 “grace period”;
• Appellant filed a TRAP 26.3(b) motion to extend the deadline on November 3.

The Fifth Court reasoned that the filing of the notice fell within a line of cases treating various filings as “implied . . . motion[s] for an extension of time,” and granted leave to file the notice. Jeanes v. Dallas County, No. 05-17-01269-CV (Oct. 31, 2018) (mem. op.)

The appellant in In re Knies challenged an order about an award of attorneys’ fees in connection with a discovery matter, entered four months after the trial court’s plenary power expired. The Fifth Court found that it had no jurisdiction over this void order, reasoning: “Judicial action taken after the expiration of the court’s jurisdiction is a nullity, and any orders signed outside the court’s plenary jurisdiction are void. We have no jurisdiction to consider the merits of an appeal from a void order.” (citation omitted). (Of course, in reaching that conclusion, the Court necessarily held that the order was void, which is basically the relief appellant was requesting by a different path.) No. 06-18-00919-CV (Oct. 30, 2018) (mem. op).

In re: C.R. involved a father’s challenge to a termination order. No. 05-18-00412-CV (Sept. 21, 2018) (mem. op.) The father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the order under section 161.001 of the relevant Family Code subchapter but did not address the grounds found in section 161.002(b) – the issue addressed by the Fifth Court’s recent en banc opinion in St. John Missionary Baptist Church v. Flakes, 547 S.W.3d 311 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2018, pet. filed).

As luck would have it, the C.R. panel included both Justice Evans, who wrote for the majority in Flakes, and Justice Schenck, who wrote the main dissent. The panel majority (Justice Evans, joined by Justice Lang-Miers) held: “In light of [the father’s] failure to challenge the trial court’s termination under subsections 161.002(b)(1) and (b)(2)(B), either of which fully supports the trial court’s termination order, we need not address the unchallenged findings or the grounds raised in  [the father’s] brief and affirm the trial court’s order.”

Justice Schenck’s concurrence, acknowledging Flakes as controlling, warns: “We affirm the judgment below in this case, which permanently terminates appellant’s parental rights, without regard to its merits and notwithstanding the heightened due process and due course of law concerns that arise from this fundamental liberty interest.”

Findings of fact and conclusions of law are often requested in cases where they are not strictly required. There may be good tactical reasons for such a request, but it will not affect the appellate deadlines unless the findings and conclusions are in fact required. “A request for findings of fact and conclusions of law will extend the time for perfecting an appeal if they are required by the rules of civil procedure or may properly be considered by the appellate court. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(4). . . . ). A request for findings of fact and conclusions of law following a summary judgment is not appropriate and does not extend appellate deadlines.” Bosh v. Bosh, No.  See Linwood v. NCNB Tex., 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).

An published opinion about recoverable attorneys’ fees in a declaratory judgment action reviewed the controlling authorities, from the Texas Supreme Court and the Fifth Court, and reminded of these principles-

• “[Counsel]’s argument that her fees were ‘intertwined” was an insufficient basis for the trial court’s award. But neither should the trial court have disallowed all fees ‘simply because the services also further[ed] non-recoverable claims.'”
• “[Counsel] offered some evidence of her recoverable fees through her attorneys’ testimony and supporting documentation . . . . ‘Unsegregated attorney’s fees for the entire case are some evidence of what the segregated amount should be.'”
• Remand is an appropriate appeal remedy “for reconsideration with sufficiently detailed information for a meaningful review of the fees sought.”
• There is dispute among the Texas courts of appeal as to when a timely objection about segregation must be made. Footnote 4 of the opinion summarizes the authority on this point.

Anderton v. Green, No. 05-17-00024-CV (July 23, 2018).

While applying federal and not Texas law, a useful tidbit about whether a notice of appeal is “jurisdictional” appeared during the last SCOTUS term in Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services: “Several Courts of Appeals, including the Court of Appeals in Hamer’s case, have tripped over our statement in Bowles [v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 210–213 (2007)], that “the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’ The ‘mandatory and jurisdictional’ formulation is a characterization left over from days when we were ‘less than meticulous’ in our use of the term ‘jurisdictional.’ The statement was correct as applied in Bowles because, as the Court there explained, the time prescription at issue in Bowles was imposed by Congress. But ‘mandatory and jurisdictional’ is erroneous and confounding terminology where, as here, the relevant time prescription is absent from the U.S. Code. Because Rule 4(a)(5)(C), not § 2107, limits the length of the extension granted here, the time prescription is not jurisdictional.” No. 16-658 (Nov. 18, 2017) (citations and footnote omitted).

In Bethel v. Quilling Selander – what is now the second (here is the first) opinion to note the distinction between “issues” and “arguments” after the Fifth Court’s March 29 en banc opinion in St. John Missionary Baptist Church v. Flakes – the Court observed: “Courts may not consider issues that were not raised in the courts below, but parties are free to construct new arguments in support of issues properly before the court. Thus, to the extent Bethel’s assertion is an argument as opposed to an issue, we address it.” (emphasis in original, citation omitted). The Court was also willing to consider a defense of attorney immunity in the context of a Rule 91 motion to dismiss, notwithstanding other intermediate Texas authority that takes a narrower focus in that procedural setting. No. 05-17-00850-CV (May 30, 2018) (mem. op.)

A majority of the Fifth Court recently held in St. John Missionary Baptist Church v. Flakes that “construing [Tex. R. App. P] 38.9(b) to require us to identify and suggest briefing on issues not raised by an appellant would depart from our duty to be neutral and impartial.” No. 05-16-00671-CV (March 29, 2018) (en banc). As a counterpoint to that bright-line rule, in a different context, a later panel noted in American Realty Trust v. Andrews Kurth: “We cannot consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. But the distinction between issues and arguments is not always clear.”  No. 05-16-01433-CV  05-16-01433-CV (May 8, 2018) (mem. op.) (citations omitted, quoting authorities saying that “[Appellant] was not required on appeal or at trial to rely on precisely the same case law or statutory subpart that we now find persuasive” and “We do not consider issues that were not raised in the courts below, but parties are free to construct new arguments in support of issues properly before the Court.”)

In a rare en banc decision, a majority of Fifth Court justices held in St. John Missionary Baptist Church v. Flakes that “construing [Tex. R. App. P] 38.9(b) to require us to identify and suggest briefing on issues not raised by an appellant would depart from our duty to be neutral and impartial.” Thus, in the case before it: “Because appellants fail to challenge all grounds upon which the trial court could have granted appellees’ amended motion to dismiss and plea to the jurisdiction, we have no discretion to do anything other than to accept the validity of the unchallenged ground.” Two dissents countered that “where the parties have in fact preserved the issues below, timely appealed, and identified the issues for a decision on appeal, a brief that fails to adequately cite to authority or the record, or that omits an argument that is deemed to be included in the trial court’s disposition of the issue, should not be fatal to the appeal. Instead, that deficiency simply amounts to ‘a failure to properly present the case on the briefs’ and affords the court a number of efficient options under the rules.” No. 05-16-00671-CV (March 29, 2018).

The majority opinion was written by Justice Evans, joined by Chief Justice Wright and Justices Francis, Lang, Lang-Miers, Brown, Stoddart, and Whitehill. The dissenters were Justices Schenck, Bridges, Fillmore, Myers, and Boatright (who also wrote a separate, individual dissent). The division of opinion in this case offers a rare insight on how the viewpoints of the Justices compare on a waiver issue; a general topic frequently addressed by the Fifth Court in a variety of different settings.

After a hearing on your special appearance, the judge says “Denied.” Can you appeal? No: “An oral rendition is not sufficient. The appellate timetable runs from the date an appealable written judgment or order is signed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1; Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co., 907 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex. 1995).” Effel v. Rosberg, No. 05-17-01332-CV (March 6, 2018) (mem. op.)

Appellant filed a notice of appeal about a special appearance that was timely, measured from the ruling on a motion to amend and reconsider, but was not timely, when measured from the original ruling. The Fifth Court found that it was untimely: “The record here reflects the issue in the special appearance was whether the trial court could exercise specific jurisdiction over appellant. Appellant’s motion to amend and reconsider did not present any new arguments. Instead, it cited to decisions issued after the original order was signed, none of which changed the state of the law regarding specific jurisdiction. Because the motion to amend and reconsider presented no new argument, we conclude the amended order denying appellant’s special appearance was not independently appealable and agree with appellees that appellant should have filed its notice of appeal within twenty days of the signing of the original order.” Michelin North America v. Gallegos, No. 05-17-00617-CV (Nov. 21, 2017) (mem. op.)

A trial was held, but after the verdict, a bankruptcy caused several years of inactivity before entry of final judgment in 2015. Unfortunately, in the meantime, a significant part of the reporter’s notes had been lost or destroyed. While Tex. R. App. 34.6 can require a new trial in such a situation if the loss occurs through no fault of the appealing party, the Fifth Court found it did not apply here. In Piotrowski v. Minns, the Texas Supreme Court noted that the applicable Government Code provision “authorizes reporters to cull stale notes from their records after three years when no party has requested otherwise,” whcih means that without a specific request from a litigant, “the litigant is not free from fault if the notes are destroyed as the statute authorizes. 873 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex. 1993). The Court found that Piotrowski was good law and controlled here, where no such request had been made in the relevant time period. Geeting v. Dyer, No. 05-16-00128-CV (Nov. 7, 2017) (mem. op.)

Recent decisions have grappled with whether a “memorandum of decision” qualifies as a final judgment for purposes of starting appellate deadlines; the recent case of In re RKK further contributes to that dicsussion, finding that the trial court’s memorandum in that case did start the clock. No. 05-17-00794-CV (Oct. 25, 2017) (mem. op.)

B.C. v. Steak & Shake involved a late-filed summary judgment response. The unsuccessful appellant sought rehearing en banc, which led to another opinion. Among other matters, the Court declined to consider a “supplemental clerk’s record” containing information about the logistics of the filing, when that material was not before the trial court or the Fifth Court at the time of its opinion. The Court quoted Chief Justice Hecht’s statement on the general subject in Worthy v. Collagen Corp., 967 S.W.2d 360, 366 Tex. 1998): “Supplementation of the record after a case is decided is a different matter. It certainly does not serve judicial economy for the appellate court to allow a supplementation of the record that would require it to reconsider its decision on the merits when the party has had ample opportunity to correct the omission prior to decision.”  967 S.W.2d 360, 366 (Tex. 1988). No. 05-14-00649-CV (Oct. 27, 2017) (suppl. op. on rehearing).

At issue in Galaxy Builers, Ltd. v. Globus Management Group was a trial court order denying enforcemement of an arbitrator’s subpoena. While the order said that it was final, section 171.098 of the Texas Arbitration Act does not list it as an appealable category of arbitration-related ruling; thus, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. No. 05-17-00831-CV (Oct. 2, 2017) (mem. op.)

The trial court dismissed Williams’s lawsuit for want of prosecution. Williams moved to reinstate, triggering Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(3), which requires the court to “set a hearing on the motion as soon as practicable.” The trial court did not do so, and reversal resulted because under the language of this rule, “the trial court has no discretion to fail to hold a hearing.” Williams v. Moreno, No. 05-16-01114-CV (Sept. 7, 2017) (mem. op.) While arising from direct appeal rather than a petition for mandamus, this outcome is a useful reminder as to other such mandatory rules.

If your opponent makes unclear arguments on appeal, after a bench trial with detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the opinion of Pelley v. Wynne, No. 05-15-01560-CV (Aug. 28, 2017) (mem. op.), reminds of two principles to bring clarity:

1. “When a party’s issue globally attacks the trial court’s findings of fact and there is no method to ascertain the appellant’s true objection to the sufficiency of the evidence, the findings of fact issued by the trial court are binding on the trial court.” (“However, the binding nature of the trial court’s findings of fact does not prevent an appellate court from reviewing the conclusions drawn from those factual findings.”)
2. An attack on a conclusion of law, as required by Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i), must “contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, wiith appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”

In the recent family law case of In re: B.W.S., this memorandum was held to not start the running of appellate deadlines; the Court notedd (among other things) how the parties reacted:

When a document such as the Memorandum here instructs the parties to prepare an appropriate final order, this is evidence that the trial court did not intend the document to be a final judgment. This is supported further by the fact the trial court signed the Final Order in this case three months later. Additionally, the parties did not treat the Memorandum as a final judgment below. Mother did not file post-judgment motions after the court sent the Memorandum; she filed them after the trial court signed the Final Order. And even though Father argues on appeal that the Memorandum was the final judgment, he did not argue that below, and he also filed a motion asking the court to sign a final order.

No. 05-15-01207-CV (Nov. 28, 2016) (mem. op.) (citation omitted). In contrast, in the recent family law case of In re B.D., a similar memorandum was held to constitute a judgment and start the running of appellate deadlines; discounting (among other things) how the parties reacted to it:

“Despite the trial court’s hearings to consider appellee’s motion to sign an order and its subsequent order, we conclude the memorandum substantially complies with the requisites of a formal judgment to be accorded final judgment status triggering the appellate deadline.”

No. 05-17-00674-CV (Aug. 31, 2017).

The key distinction between these opinions seems to be the inclusion  of express language that the memorandum is not intended as a judgment, and that requests the parties to prepare draft judgments. This practice echoes the general custom endorsed by Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001), of including “language of finality” in a ruling intended to be a final judgment. Of course, even under Lehmann, the substance controls rather than the “magic words,” so this area looks to be one that will continue to pose practical challenges. (SPECIAL THANKS to Hon. Emily Miskel of the 470th District Court in Collin County, who alerted me to these cases on her informative Twitter feed.)

In TSP Operations, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., the Fifth Court listed several deficiencies in an appellant’s brief that justified dismissal of the appeal, after appellant did not cure the deficiencies in response to a notice from the Court. For reference, here is a copy of the brief. No. 05-17-00131-CV (August 7, 2017).

In the department of “rare bird sightings,” the case of Hollingsworth v. Walaal Corp. involved an appeal, under the newly-revised Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145, to a trial court order requiring an appellant to pay for a reporter’s record. The appellant filed an affidavit of inability to pay costs and the trial court had an evidentiary hearing on the appellees’ challenge to it. Recognizing that the appellant did not offer tax returns or the like, the Fifth Court reversed, finding that his “testimony was uncontroverted” and that “[a]lthough the trial court was required to evaluate Hollingsworth’s credibility, the trial court was not free to completely disregard the only evidence establishing his inability to pay costs when no evidence was offered in rebuttal.” No. 05-17-00555-CV (June 9, 2017) (mem. op.)

Dahlheimer sought a writ of injunction in the court of appeals to stay proceedings involving a receivership about the sale of a home. The Fifth Court found that it lacked jurisdiction, noting that its injunctive power is limited to “jurisdiction over the subject matter of a pending appeal,” and that “[t]he power to grant a temporary writ of injunction to prevent damages which would otherwise flow to  alitigant who has an apppeal pending rests exclusively with the trial court.” In re Dahlheimer, No. 05-17-00556-CV (June 8, 2017) (mem. op.)

The new “permissive appeal” procedure has not led to a lot of permissive, interlocutory appeals; another example of that trend appears in Oklahoma Specialty Ins. Co. v. St. Martin de Porres, Inc. The parties stipulated to damages, the trial court found the policy ambiguous and thus interpreted in a certain way, and said it would follow whatever the Fifth Court decided about that interpretation. The Court declined to hear the case, finding: “Given the posture of this case following the trial court’s rulings and the parties’ stipulations, we conclude a permissive appeal will not materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation by considerably shortening the time, effort, and expense involved in obtaining a final judgment. (applying Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(d).

Smith intervened in a case after a judgment had been entered; the trial court granted a motion to strike his intervention. Resolving a tangled web of procedural issues, the Fifth Court held that (1) the striking of his intervention was not appealable before final judgment; (2) Smith’s appeal was limited to the merits of his intervention, not the claims of others; and (3) Smith’s filing of a motion for new trial extended the appellate deadlines. Smith v. City of Garland, No. 05-16-00454-CV (Apr. 20, 2017).

The Fifth Court affirmed summary judgment for D Magazine in a defamation suit by a former volunteer, finding that most of the statements at issue were unactionable opinions or accurate statements of fact. Summarizing the underlying principles of free speech, the opinion reminds that a “rhetorical flourish” that is “merely unflattering, abusive, annoying, irksome, or embarrassing, or that only hurts the plaintiff’s feelings, is not actionable.” The court lacked appellate jurisdiction over part of a related appeal by the Dallas Symphony, since it involved the denial of a summary judgment about a tortious interference claim rather then free speech issues, although the Court was able to address the civil conspiracy claim against the Symphony. D Magazine Partners LP v. Reyes, No. 05-16-00294-CV (April 18, 2017) (mem. op.)

In Viveri Youth Service v. Orme, the Fifth Court dismissed an appeal for lack of a final judgment. While the docket sheet indicated the case had been closed, the Court observed: “The last order, however, contains no language of finality or other indication the case was closed. While the trial court’s docket sheet reflects the case was closed, a docket sheet entry does not constitute a judgment or other appealable order of the trial court.” No. 05-17-00002-CV (April 11, 2017) (mem. op.)

An attorney paid a sanction and then challenged the sanctions order as part of the appeal from the final judgment in the action. In reviewing an objection based on mootness, the Fifth Court observed that while an appeal becomes moot “when a judgment debtor voluntarily pays and satisfied a judgment rendered against him,” the purpose of that rule is “to prevent appellants from misleading their opponents into believing a controversy is over when it is not.” Thus, “payment on a judgment will not moot an appeal of that judgment if the judgment debtor clearly expresses an intent that he intends to exercise his right of appeal and appellate relief is not futile.” Here, before the attorney paid the sanction, the other side had notice of his intent to appeal when payment was made, so the appeal was justiciable. Kamel v. AdvoCare Int’l, L.P., No. 05-16-00433-CV (March 28, 2017) (mem. op.)

A useful reminder about timeliness appears in Duchouquette v. McWhorter, in which the appellant filed a late notice of appeal within the 15-day grace period, but neglected to move for leave to extend the deadline. In addition to dismissing the appellant’s appeal, the Fifth Court dismissed the cross-appeal noticed 8 days after the appellant’s: “[T]he Court does not have jurisdiction over a cross-appeal where the original notice of appeal is untimely.” No. 05-17-00041-CV (March 13, 2017) (mem. op.)

In In re: Douglas D. Halofitis, No. 05-16-01047-CV (Sept. 27, 2016) (mem. op.), the Fifth Court gives a helpful roadmap for parties who seek to challenge a judgment of which they were given late notice.  We know that trial courts usually lose plenary jurisdiction over a judgment within 30 days after the court signs the judgment, which is also the deadline for filing an appeal. But what if you don’t receive notice of the judgment?

Under Rule 306a, when a party does not receive notice or acquire actual knowledge of judgment within twenty days, the deadlines begin to run not from the signing of the judgment, but instead from the sooner of the date the party received notice or acquired actual knowledge of the judgment or 90 days after the judgment was signed. A few pointers to keep in mind:

1. the 306a motion must be sworn and must establish the date of first notice or knowledge of the judgment and that this date was more than 20 days after the judgment was signed;
2. the 306a motion, including any evidentiary supplements necessary to satisfy the procedural requirements of 306a(5), must be filed within the court’s plenary period as calculated from the date of first notice or knowledge of the judgment;
3. the movant should seek an immediate evidentiary hearing on the 306a motion and obtain a finding of fact of the date of first notice or actual knowledge of the judgment;
4. in no event will the periods begin to run more than 90 days after the judgment is signed, meaning that if you receive notice more than 90 days after the judgment is signed, your only avenue may be a restricted appeal or bill of review; and
5. the 306a motion should be coupled with a post-judgment motion, e.g. motion for new trial, motion to reinstate, or motion to modify judgment. If you wait for a decision on your 306a motion, your post-judgment motion may end up being untimely even if your Rule 306a motion is successful because post-judgment motions must still be filed within 30 days of the date found to be the date of first notice or actual knowledge of the judgment.

Henry S. Miller Commercial Co. lost a trial on a fraud claim but succeeded in a later malpractice claim against its trial counsel. The Fifth Court resolved two issues – (1) postjudgment assignment of malpractice claims as part of a reorganization was acceptable where “Here, HSM asserted its own malpractice claim against the Lawyers in its own name. It pursued its own claim through trial and judgment. Under these circumstances, HSM’s right ‘to bring [its] own cause of action for malpractice is not vitiated’ by the assignment to its judgment creditors” (applying Tate v. Goins, Underkofler, Crawford & Langdon, 24 S.W.3d 627, 629 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied)); and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing HSM’s claim for gross negligence based on the failure to designate a key responsible third party. Accordingly, because a new trial was required on punitive damages, it was also required on compensatory damages, and thus liability as well. Henry S. Miller Comm’l Co. v. Newsom, Terry & Newsom LLP, No. 05-14-01188-CV (Sept. 14, 2016) (mem. op.)

Ten Hagen Excavating, Inc. v. Castro-Lopez presents a detailed review of the evidence about a serious truck accident, involving issues of tort law beyond the usual scope of this blog. As a matter of style, the opinion is notable for deftly using accident photos in its description of and analysis of the issues, as well as a diagram of how the accident happened. No. 05-15-00902-CV (Aug. 29, 2016).

We all too easily forget that the requirements of a good appellate brief are defined by law, as recently noted in Lau v. Reeder, No. 05-14-01459-CV (Aug. 16, 2016) (mem. op.)

As to the issues presented, “a brief must state concisely all issues for review and reveal the legal questions we are called upon to decide. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f); Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dis., 315 S.W.3d 893, 896 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.).”

As to the record citations that accompany the argument, the Justices “have no right or obligation to search through the record to find facts or research relevant law that might support an appellant’s position because doing so –4– would ‘improperly transform this Court from neutral adjudicators to advocates.’ Chappell v. Allen, 414 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.)”

And as to good draftsmanship, a brief does not violate the rules but is notably unhlepful when the table of contents “indicates that the argument portion of the brief for all nine issues is located on pages 18 to 94 without any indication or notation as to where specific issues are addressed,” and the 77-page argument section “also does not denote where each of the nine issues is discussed and the only arguable headings in this section do not identify the issues to which they are attached.”

The appeal of an eviction case was resolved largely by the lack of a reporter’s record in Lyons v. Polymathic Properties, Inc. The opinion reminds of several basic principles triggered when a reporter’s record is required, which are worth remembering when considering whether to obtain a record, and in responding to an argument if an opponent has not obtained one:

• The judgment of the trial court implies all necessary findings of fact to sustain the judgment; “[i]n other words, we must presume the missing reporter’s record supports the decisions of the trial court”;
• Attaching a partial transcript to a brief is not a substitute for a formal reporter’s record; and
• Statements in a brief that are unsupported by the record cannot be accepted as facts.

No. 05-15-00408-CV (June 29, 2016) (mem. op.)

Rainier Income Fund I, Ltd. v. Gans presented an appeal from the district court’s confirmation of the rulings of a “special judge” appointed under chapter 151 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. The appellant moved for a new trial before the district court; the appellee contended that it was not effective to extend the appellate deadline, as the district court’s power to grant a new trial in this posture is significantly limited by chapter 151. After a thorough review of the statute and the general principles surrounding the motion for new trial in Texas, the Fifth Court concluded that the motion was effective and the deadline was extended. In particular, it noted the Texas Supreme Court’s reminder in Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Scott, 846 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Tex. 1993) that: “The filing of a motion for new trial in order to extend the appellate timetable is a matter of right, whether or not there is any sound or reasonable basis for the conclusion that a further motion is necessary.” No. 05-00460-CV (June 7, 2016) (mem. op.)

The appellate bar is still getting used to section 51.014(d) of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code, under which a “permissive” interlocutory appeal may proceed under certain circumstances. In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Seagoville Partners, after initially granting leave to appeal under that section, the Fifth Court reconsidered whether the trial court had in fact made “a substantive ruling on a controlling question of law” as required by the statute. After thoroughly reviewing the procedural posture of the case, the Court concluded that the trial court could have also decided on the basis of whether the evidence was sufficient to raise a fact issue under the legal standard advocated by the appellant. Accordingly, it dismissed the appeal. No. 05-15-00760-CV (June 9, 2016) (mem. op.)

AdvoCare filed a petition to take a Rule 202 deposition from Michael Moussa; Moussa, joined by Shereef Kamel, counterclaimed.  AdvoCare obtained a $3,500 sanctions award against Kamel and his counsel related to that filing.  They appealed, arguing that “AdvoCare never asserted any affirmative claim for relief in the suit, the rule 202 petition has been ‘superseded and rendered moot’ by the institution of arbitration proceedings initiated by AdvoCare against Moussa and Kamel, and their counterclaims are no longer pending because they have nonsuited the counterclaims.”  The Fifth Court disagreed because no written order confirmed the nonsuit; accordingly, it dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction over an appealable final order. Kamel v. AdvoCare Int’l, L.P., No. 05-15-01295-CV (March 4, 2016) (mem. op.)

The wrenching facts of the paternity dispute in In re: H.H. provide a rare example of when a finding of legally insufficient evidence can justify remand rather than rendition.   The underlying rule, Tex. R. App. P. 43.3, requires that “When reversing a trial court’s judgment, the court must render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered, except when: (a) a remand is necessary for further proceedings; or (b) the interests of justice require a remand for another trial.”  Under the rule, in the Fifth Court: “Remand is appropriate when, for any reason, a case has not been fully developed below.”

Here, the child “was barely a year old when the trial court entered the decree of termination and had been in the custody of TDFPS for almost her entire life, never at any time living with Father. . . . Father has been incarcerated since before learning he was potentially the biological father of H.H. and admits in his appellate brief that he remains incarcerated. However, there is no evidence in the record regarding when Father will be released or his ability to care for H.H. in a manner consistent with her interests.  Additionally, neither Father nor his attorney appeared at the hearing[.]” Accordingly, ” a remand of the case against Father is appropriate to further develop the record and is in the interest of justice.”  No. 05-15-01322-CV (Feb. 12, 2016) (mem. op.)

Tunnell sued Archer for negligence after a truck accident involving Archer’s cattle.  The trial court declined to dismiss Tunnell’s claim for failure to file an expert report under a statute related to claims against health care providers (Archer was a doctor), and Archer  appealed that denial.  After a Texas Supreme Court opinion clarified the underlying statute,Tunnell contended that Archer’s appeal not only no longer had merit, but had become frivolous and sanctionable.

After Archer continued with the appeal on other grounds, the Fifth Court agreed with Tunnell and sanctioned Archer and his counsel for the costs of the motion to dismiss: “After the supreme court’s opinion in Ross, there were no reasonable grounds for an advocate to believe the case could be reversed. However, appellants did not dismiss this frivolous appeal. Instead, appellants’ counsel filed a brief on the merits asserting ERISA preemption based on non-existent orders that this Court lacked jurisdiction to consider. No reasonable counsel could believe the ERISA-preemption argument was a reasonable ground for reversal in this case when there was no written order on a motion asserting the argument and no statute permits an interlocutory appeal from such an order. In these circumstances, we conclude that appellants and their counsel’s actions are so egregious as to warrant the award to Tunnell of just damages from appellants and their counsel for their pursuit of this frivolous appeal.”  Archer v. Tunnell, No. 05-15-00459-CV (Feb. 9, 2016) (mem. op.)

The Hales sued their homebuilder for fraud and violation of the DTPA, alleging serious problems with the foundation of their Rockwall home (right).  They substantially succeeded at trial, and the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed in large part in Bishop Abbey Homes, Ltd. v. Hale, No. 05-14-00137-CV (Dec. 16, 2015) (mem. op.)  In particular, the Court affirmed as to limitations – a significant issue in this long-simmering dispute – noting that “each time the Hales raised a concern about the foundation, they were assured by one of appellants’ experts that the foundation was not the cause of the problems the Hales observed.”  The court also affirmed as to sufficiency challenges to liability, several claims of improper closing argument, and a challenge to the the basis of the exemplary damages award based on constitutional and Kraus factors. The court requested a remittitur as to (a) mental anguish damages (for sufficiency reasons) above $208,856 per plaintiff; and (b) a portion of the additional/exemplary damages award, based on the applicable cap and the conclusion that the total award “exceeds the guidelines set forth in [Bennett v. Reynolds, 315 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. 2010)] and [Tony Gullo Motors I, LP v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2006)] for the type of harm suffered by the Hales as a result of appellants’ conduct.”

Not too early . . . Gast v. Tinsley, No. 05-15-00498-CV (Nov. 24, 2015, mem. op.) (unresolved claims remained in the trial court against other defendants)

Not too late . . . In re: S.A.W., No. 05-15-00876-CV (Nov. 25, 2015, mem. op.) (notice untimely after nunc pro tunc order revised judgment to a significantly earlier date)

While the slow season for opinions continues at the Dallas Court of Appeals, a short memorandum opinion provides a procedural lesson that could prove useful for any appellate attorney dealing with a pro se opponent. In this case, the appellant filed an affidavit of indigence with the trial court, seeking to avoid prepayment of costs under TRAP 20.1. The clerk challenged the appellant’s indigent status on September 15, and the court reporter contested the affidavit on September 17. But when multiple challenges to an affidavit of indigence are filed, the trial court still has to rule within 10 days of the first challenge. The trial court signed an order sustaining the court reporter’s challenge on October 6, well outside the 10-day period that should have run from September 15. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had abused its discretion, reversed the order sustaining the contest to the pro se appellant’s indigence, and held that he could proceed with the appeal without advance payment of costs.

Bell v. Harris, No. 05-15-01117-CV

On July 10, the district court orally denied the special appearance of Ann Stokley. The court did not sign a written order, however, which left Stokley unable to pursue an interlocutory appeal. On September 15, Stokley filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Dallas Court of Appeals. Two days later, that Court has issued a brief memorandum petition denying relief. Although a trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to rule within a reasonable time, the Court could not conclude that the trial court had done so here in light of “the trial court’s actual knowledge of the motion, whether its refusal to act is overt, the state of the court’s docket, and the existence of other judicial and administrative matters which must be addressed first.” Ms. Stokley will presumably pursue an interlocutory appeal sometime after the trial court issues a written order.

In re Stokley, No. 05-15-01110-CV

In early 2012, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed a temporary injunction that would have prevented BB&T from foreclosing on a pair of properties secured by a $10 million promissory note. Two and a half years later, matters have not improved for the borrowers, as the Court has now affirmed summary judgment for the bank.

In responding to the no-evidence summary judgment motion, the borrowers had “relied entirely on evidence presented at the temporary judgment hearing” to show that they had a valid contract with BB&T that superseded the bank’s right to foreclose. Because the Court had previously held that this evidence amounted to nothing more than an unenforceable “agreement to agree,” the law of the case doctrine prevented the outcome from being any different in this subsequent appeal. The same evidence was also held to be insufficient to support the borrowers’ claims for fraud and declaratory judgment, while a money had and received claim failed because the borrowers had made a $1.8 million payment with full knowledge of the facts and without fraud or duress. Finally, the trial court had not abused its discretion by striking the borrowers’ fifth amended petition because it had been filed outside the deadline in the court’s scheduling order, was not filed with leave of court, and was prejudicial to the bank because it sought to add a claim that “would effectively inject new substantive matters into the litigation by reinjecting old ones.”

TCI Luna Ventures, LLC v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 05-13-01221-CV

The owner of an apartment complex sued the builder for construction defect claims. The defendant moved for summary judgment on limitations and lack of notice, which is an element of the plaintiff’s express warranty claim. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion without specifying the grounds. For reasons that are not clear from the opinion, the appellant limited its issues on appeal to the express warranty claim, but only addressed the limitations argument. That resulted in affirmation of the summary judgment ruling.  Because the appellant failed to challenge the other ground — i.e., lack of notice — on which summary judgment could have been granted, the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment based on the unchallenged ground.

ZZ&Z Props., Ltd. v. ZCC-ZPL,LLP, No. 05-14-00812-CV

A short opinion helps to illustrate the limited reach of an appellate court’s authority over the cases before it. On interlocutory appeal, both litigants agreed that the trial court should have vacated an order appointing a receiver in Texas to serve ancillary to a primary receivership in Minnesota. But in addition to vacting the order appointing the receiver, the appellant also wanted the Court of Appeals to undo all the receiver’s actions. That was beyond the appellate court’s powers however. Pointing to TRAP 43.2, the Court held that it could affirm, modify, reverse and render, reverse and remand, vacate, or dismiss — none of which permitted the Court to grant the additional relief sought by the appellant.

Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co. LP v. Verde Minerals, LLC, No. 05-15-00014-CV

With all the TCPA cases running through the appellate courts, it’s worth taking a quick look at one procedural issue. The question presented by way of motion to the Court of Appeals was whether the appellants were required to supersede the attorney fees awarded to the defendants in a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ business disparagement claims. The appellate court held that attorney fees are not damages, and therefore the trial court did not err in denying the defendants’ motion to raise the supersedeas amount to include the attorney fees.

Mansik & Young Plaza LLC v. K-Town Mgmt., LLC, No. 05-15-00353-CV

One of the questions appellate lawyers get from time to time is “What’s our deadline to file for mandamus?” The answer is that there is no formal deadline under the rules, but if you wait too long you may end up waiving your right to mandamus. A short opinion from the Dallas Court of Appeals exemplifies the latter principle. On June 6, 2014, the county court at law granted a motion for new trial. On May 27, 2015, a mandamus petition was filed, seeking to require the trial judge to explain its reasons for setting aside the jury verdict and granting a new trial. With the new trial now scheduled for July 8, the Court of Appeals held that the unexplained delay of almost one year to challenge the new trial ruling was too long to justify mandamus relief.

In re Stembridge, No. 05-15-00672-CV

The Dallas Court of Appeals has now joined two other Texas appellate courts in holding that “A post-verdict motion requesting attorney’s fees filed before the entry of a final judgment is a sufficient pleading to support an attorney’s fee award.” The Court also disposed of the appellant’s argument that a $50,000 fee award was unreasonable because it far exceeded the $11,000 in damages found by the jury, holding that the issue was waived by failing to request a reporter’s record of the hearing.

Nisby v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., No. 05-14-00814-CV

A year before trial, Investment Retrievers filed a business records affidavit and attached business records in a suit to recover on an assigned credit card debt. The trial court rendered judgment over the debtor’s objection that the business records affidavit was inadmissible because it was made by a third party. On appeal, new counsel argued that the judgment was not supported by evidence because the business records affidavit was not included in the clerk’s record. That deficiency was quickly cured through the filing of a supplemental clerk’s record, and the Court of Appeals defendant had failed to preserve other arguments by not objecting at the trial court or by not briefing them on appeal.

Parks v. Investment Retrievers, Inc., No. 05-14-00024-CV

The Relator in this mandamus action sought to avoid his obligation to respond to post-judgment discovery requests.  He argued that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to respond because he did not receive notice of the trial date and therefore the judgment against him was void.

The Dallas Court of Appeals denied his mandamus petition because procedurally the Relator did not follow the correct steps to challenge the validity of the underlying judgment.  The Court noted that if indeed the Relator did not have notice of the trial setting, the judgment may be voidable.  But the proper procedural path to challenging the judgment was for Relator to file a bill of review in the trial court to set aside the judgment (as it had become final and was no longer appealable).  Then, if the Relator wanted to avoid enforcement of the judgment pending a decision on the bill of review, he could petition the trial court to enjoin its enforcement.

In this case, the Court noted that until it was set aside, the judgment was valid and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the plaintiff’s post-judgment discovery.  Moreover, because Relator could seek to set aside the judgment and enjoin its enforcement in the trial court, mandamus relief was not appropriate.

In re Lowery

A special appearance in a probate case has led to the exceedingly rare grant of a motion for sanctions for the filing of a frivolous appeal. In this instance, the appellant managed to make a general appearance in the case before filing the special appearance — a fact that the appellant had failed to even address in response to the appellee’s briefing in the probate court. On top of that, the appellant had failed to preserve his argument on appeal that the special appearance was somehow severable from the motion to show cause in which he entered his general appearance, nor had the appellant objected (and thereby preserved error) when the probate judge overruled the special appearance without holding a separate hearing on it. Although the appellee had not submitted any evidence of her damages to support the award of sanctions, the Court of Appeals granted her leave to file such evidence within ten days of the opinion.

Estate of Ardyce Deuel-Nash, Deceased, No. 05-14-00128-CV

When a judgment judgment for breach of contract is entered that includes an award of attorney fees, the defendant is generally not required to supersede that fee award in order to suspend judgment. Instead, the defendant only has to supersede post-judgment interest on the award for the expected duration of the appeal. In this case, Highland Capital Management was awarded $2.8 million in attorney fees, but the defendant only bonded out $287,000. Highland moved to increase the supersedeas bond, arguing that the attorney fees were actually compensatory damages because the parties’ contract contained a clause requiring the defendant to pay Highland’s fees in the event of a breach. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, essentially concluding that an award of attorney fees under the contract was no different than an award of attorney fees under Chapter 38 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code (which Highland had also sought in its pleadings and at trial).

Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Daugherty, No. 05-14-01215-CV

A trial court that dismisses a lawsuit after a motion made under the Texas Citizens Participation Act “shall award to the moving party . . . reasonable attorney’s fees . . . incurred in defending against the legal action as justice and equity may require.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.009(a)(1). In this case, the trial court signed its order on March 6 granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, then followed it up on April 14 with an order awarding defendant $15,616 in attorney fees and sanctioning the plaintiff another $15,000. The plaintiff claimed that the April 14 award was a nullity because the March 6 order was a final judgment. The Court of Appeals disagreed, first order did not purport to dispose of the defendant’s claim for fees and costs, and both the court and the parties recognized that there had not been a final judgment because they continued to litigate the additional issues. The Court of Appeals went on to rule on several other issues, concluding among other things that the plaintiff had waived any complaint about the trial court’s failure to timely hold a hearing on the motion to dismiss by failing to object in the trial court; that the statements attributed to the defendant were not capable of being defamatory; and that the plaintiff had not pointed to any evidence of damages to support its tortious interference claim. The judgment was therefore affirmed.

American Heritage Capital LP v. Gonzalez, No. 05-12-0892-CV

An opinion issued on an emergency motion to stay a trial court’s order unsealing alleged trade secret materials highlights a difference between Dallas and some of the other courts of appeals when it comes to obtaining temporary stays. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to permanently seal the disputed records under TRCP 76a and ordered that the documents were to be unsealed at 5 pm last Friday. Because unsealing orders are considered to be final for purposes of appeal, the defendant perfected an appeal and moved for an emergency order to stay the unsealing of the documents. The Court of Appeals granted that request, holding that a temporary stay was necessary to preserve the rights of the parties pending appeal. The Court noted that other appellate courts have applied a more stringent standard, under which the movant must show that it would be entitled to the issuance of an injunction to protect appellate jurisdiction under section 22.221 of the Government Code. The opinion expressly states that it was not ruling on the merits of the unsealing order, and that nothing in it was intended to bind the submission panel when the appeal proceeds to the merits.

Oryon Techs. v. Marcus, No. 05-14-00446-CV

Deadlines in the Texas appellate courts can often be forgiving, with extensions of time routinely and even retroactively granted. A new memorandum opinion illustrates one of the limits to those generally flexible deadlines. James Polk’s notice of appeal was due on November 4, but it was not actually filed until November 18. That was within the 15-day permitted for an extension of time to file the notice of appeal, so the Court of Appeals directed the appellant to file a motion under Rule 26.3 that set forth a reasonable explanation of the need for the extension. When that motion was filed, however, it explained that the original deadline had been missed due to Polk’s need to determine whether to appeal at all, including whether it made economic sense to do so. Because that response showed that Polk had consciously ignored the November 4 deadline, rather than missing it inadvertently, the Court of Appeals denied the extension and dismissed the appeal.

Polk v. Dallas County, No. 05-13-01731-CV

The Lavon Water Supply Corp. sued TierOne Converged Networks to evict TierOne and its equipment from Lavon’s water towers. TierOne superseded the eviction by depositing $10,800 — one year of rent — into the registry of the court. Lavon then moved to increase the bond to $40,500, basing the increase on the offer of a competing company to lease the space for $3,375 per month. The trial court granted the request to increase the bond, but the Court of Appeals set aside that order on motion for review.

In setting the supersedeas bond in an eviction suit, the court must consider the reasonable value of the rents likely to accrue during appeal. Although the testimony of Lavon’s witnesses established the amount of rent that TierOne’s competitor proposed to pay, there was no evidence that $3,375 was a reasonable rental rate for space on Lavon’s water towers. In addition, TierOne had offered to waive the exclusivity provision in its lease, and the testimony established that TierOne’s competitor was willing to lease space from Lavon with TierOne’s equipment still in place. Thus, there was no evidence that Lavon was being deprived of any increased rents, and the order increasing the supersedeas bond was vacated.

TierOne Converged Networks, Inc. v. Lavon Water Supply Corp., No. 05-13-00370-CV

The Court of Appeals has once again denied a permissive interlocutory appeal. Respondents sued petitioners for injuries they sustained after a bus accident in Mexico. The bus ticket stated that the passenger accepted “the validity and application of the authority and jurisdiction of the applicable Mexican Law and Regulations…” The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to apply the laws of Mexico, ruling instead that Texas law applied. Petitioners appealed. The Court found that although petitioners claim they will have to do additional discovery without a decision from the Court of Appeals on the choice of law issue, petitioners failed to show the appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Autobuses Ejecutivos v. Cuevos

On July 6, 2012, the trial court in this case signed an order denying the defendant’s special appearance.  The defendant then moved for reconsideration of that denial on August 9, which the trial court subsequently denied on September 24.  On October 15, the defendant appealed the second denial.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because, under the rules, the defendant’s notice of interlocutory appeal was due by July 26, or twenty days after the trial court denied the first special appearance. The Court explained that permitting appeals twenty days after a motion for reconsideration would essentially eliminate the twenty-day requirement.

Pahl v. Swaim

Suzann Ruff asked the probate court to stay arbitration of her dispute with Michael Ruff and Frost Bank. The probate court agreed and issued an order staying the arbitration, denying Michael’s motion to stay the judicial proceedings, and stating that the court would conduct a hearing to determine whether to grant of deny Michael and the bank’s motions to compel arbitration. Michael and the bank filed a notice of interlocutory appeal, and Suzann moved to dismiss. The court of appeals agreed with Suzann. An interlocutory order staying arbitration is appealable under CPRC § 171.098, and an order denying the stay of judicial proceedings in favor of arbitration is appealable under CPRC § 51.016 and 9 U.S.C. 171.098(a)(2), but those statutes first require a final decision as to whether the case is subject to arbitration. No such decision had been made in this case, because the court’s order also stated that it would proceed to a hearing on the merits of the motions to compel arbitration. Since the probate court had not determined whether the dispute was subject to arbitration, the court of appeals had no jurisdiction to hear the attempted appeal.

Ruff v. Ruff, No. 05-13-00317-CV

The court of appeals has dismissed Glenda Rhone’s appeal from the trial court’s summary judgment order. Ordinarily, this would be a bad thing for the appellant. In this instance, however, the dismissal is as good as a win. As it turns out, the lawsuit was originally dismissed for want of prosecution in January 2012, and the trial court did not enter any order reinstating the case until after the motion to reinstate had already been overruled  by operation of law under Rule 165a(3). The parties apparently proceeded to litigate the case anyway, and the trial court entered the summary judgment order in March 2013. Rhone appealed, but the court of appeals determined it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Because the case had not been timely reinstated, the final judgment was actually the January 2012 dismissal order, which would have to have been appealed within 90 days (thanks to the motion to reinstate extending the appellate deadlines). Thus, Rhone could not appeal the case, but the summary judgment order turns out to have been void in any event because it was issued after expiration of the trial court’s plenary power.

Rhone v. Geer, No. 05-13-00492-cv

The court withdrew its previous opinion in this case, which dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, and entered a new opinion affirming the trial court’s judgment denying Whitehead’s motion to vacate entry of a foreign judgment against him. The previous opinion held that Whitehead could not maintain a restricted appeal because he had participated in the hearing on the motion to vacate, despite not participating in the proceedings in Indiana that resulted in the underlying judgment. The new opinion holds that Whitehead’s lack of participation in the Indiana proceedings meets the relevant requirement to maintain a restricted appeal. The court affirmed the entry of the Indiana judgment, however, because there was no error by the Texas trial court. The certification of the Indiana judgment was accomplished by the stamped “certified copy” on the final page, meeting the authentication requirements of Texas Rule of Evidence 902.

Whitehead v. Bulldog Battery Corporation, No. 05-12-00449-CV (Memorandum Opinion on Rehearing)

The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a restricted appeal from the entry of a foreign judgment. Bulldog received a judgment against Whitehead in Indiana after failing to answer a request for admissions or to appear at trial. Bulldog filed the Indiana judgment in a Texas district court pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act and Whitehead moved to vacate. The court held a hearing at which both parties were represented by counsel and denied Whitehead’s motion on February 7, 2012. Whitehead filed a notice of restricted Appeal on April 4, 2012. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Whitehead fully participated in the hearing on his motion to vacate in the Texas court and because he failed to file his notice of appeal within 30 days after the judgment was signed.

Whitehead v. Bulldog Battery Corporation, No. 05-12-00449-CV

UPDATE: The court has withdrawn this opinion on rehearing.

Upon dismissing appellant’s groundless DTPA claim, the trial court awarded appellee $42,500 in attorney’s fees.  On top of that, the trial court ruled that appellant had to deposit $36,000 to supersede the judgment.  This ruling was based on the trial courts finding that the attorney’s fees it awarded to appellee were compensatory damages requiring a supersedeas bond. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that attorney’s fees are not compensatory damages and thus do not necessitate the identified security.

Lopez v. RS Clark, No. 05-12-00868-CV

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment for the appellant on count one and for apellee on counts two and four, but said nothing about counts three and five other than invoking a Mother Hubbard clause in the order, which reads: “All relief requested and not expressly granted herein is hereby denied.”   With its order, the trial court granted appellee permanent injunctive relief, exonerated appellee’s bond, and taxed costs against appellant.

On appeal, the Court avoided the substantive issues and only addressed its own jurisdiction.  Following Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001), the Court held that the trial court’s order was not “final” because it neglected to address claims three and five, and because the Mother Hubbard clause and the permanent injunction did not suffice to render those claims final.

Auroura Loan Services v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC

The court of appeals continues to explore the limits of permissive interlocutory appeals. In this instance, the court was faced with an agreed-upon appeal from an order granting a motion to quash the deposition of the appellant’s former attorney, who allegedly had information showing that a mediated settlement agreement should be vacated. The trial court granted the opposing party’s motion to quash, and the parties agreed to present that ruling to the court of appeals under section 51.014(d) of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code. But the court of appeals rejected that effort, holding that the appeal did not present a “controlling issue of law,” as required by the statute. The trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash did not determine whether other sources of evidence regarding the mediation would be admissible at trial, and the parties could not use an agreed appeal to resolve that evidentiary issue before it was presented at the time of trial. The court therefore dismissed the appeal.

Gunter v. Empire Pipeline Corp., No. 05-12-00249-CV

In this Memorandum Opinion, the Court of Appeals addressed whether it may exercise jurisdiction over an order granting an interlocutory summary judgment order for permanent injunctive relief, but which did not dispose of the defendant’s counterclaims. The Court refused to exercise jurisdiction, holding that “[a] summary judgment that fails to dispose of all claims, even if it grants a permanent injunction, is interlocutory and unappealable.”  Notably, however, the court pointed out that the appellant could have tried to challenge the injunction as actually being an appealable temporary injunction, but the appellant had not attempted to use that procedure.

Young v. Golfing Green Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 05-12-00651

The court dismissed an appeal from post-judgment orders following foreclosure proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. After trial, the trial court entered one order denying Knoles’s efforts to avoid a writ of execution and prohibiting him from challenging the writ going forward and a second order sanctioning Knoles’s counsel for actions related to the writ. In a letter brief to the court of appeals, Knoles argued that the orders were appealable final judgments because they adjudicated a new set of facts and followed a conventional trial on the merits. The court rejected this argument, holding that the orders were issued to aid in the enforcement of the underlying unappealed judgment and that Knoles has no standing to appeal the order imposing sanctions against his counsel. Thus, the court had no jurisdiction over the appeal.

Knoles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 05-12-00473-CV

Being an appellant is hard when you don’t have a reporter’s record.  In this instance, the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal of a temporary injunction order, claiming that the plaintiff and intervenors had no standing to assert their claims and that the trial court had made a host of other errors.  But the court of appeals could find no request for a reporter’s record.  Only a partial transcript of the temporary injunction was included in the record, and there was no notice of issues relied upon in the clerk’s record.  In the absence of a complete reporter’s record, the court of appeals had to presume that the missing portions of the transcript supported the trial court’s ruling.  Accordingly, the temporary injunction was affirmed.

Dao v. Silva, No. 5-12-00331-CV

Van Peterson entered into a contract with ADT to provide commercial alarm services to his jewelry store. Allegedly, an unidentified man wearing an ADT uniform and driving an ADT van came to the jewelry store and sold Van Peterson a device for its alarm system, but instead of installing the device, the man disabled the alarm. Van Peterson’s store was burgled soon after. Van Peterson brought various tort, fraud and DTPA claims against ADT. ADT filed a traditional motion for summary judgment on the tort claims, arguing that Van Peterson waived liability for these claims in the contract, and a no-evidence motion on the other claims. The trial court eventually denied the motions but permitted an interlocutory appeal under former section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

On appeal, the court first held that ADT could not raise issues first advanced in its reply in support of its no-evidence motion for summary judgment. The court reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on the tort claims because the parties’ contract included a limitation-of-liability provision as to those claims. Such waivers are not invalidated by the DTPA, which only limits waivers of DTPA claims. Finally, the court held that ADT could not challenge on appeal Van Peterson’s subrogated insurer’s pursuit of a DTPA claim because only Van Peterson was a party to the litigation and any opinion as to the insurer would be advisory.

ADT Security Services, Inc. v. Van Peterson Fine Jewelers, No. 05-11-01468-CV

Attorney Robert Collins was sued by his client, Chris Green, for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.  Green claimed that Collins had failed to serve the defendant in the underlying lawsuit, thereby allowing that case to be dismissed for want of prosecution.  As a result, Green’s claims became time-barred.  Collins filed an answer to Green’s lawsuit, but failed to appear at trial. Green testified in support of his claim, and the trial court granted a default judgment for $31,500.  The trial court subsequently denied Collins’ motion for new trial, and Collins appealed.

On appeal, Collins argued that the judgment had to be reversed because Green had failed to prove that he could have collected on any judgment in the underlying lawsuit.  But while that complaint may have been accurate, the court of appeals saw no need to reach it because Collins had failed to brief anything about Green’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.  That meant that he had failed to attack all independent grounds supporting the judgment, resulting in affirmance of the case.

Collins v. Green, No. 05-11-00893-CV

The court dismissed an agreed interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of competing motions for summary judgment related to a home foreclosure for want of jurisdiction. The Guzmans obtained a home mortgage on which the Bank eventually foreclosed. The Guzmans sued for wrongful foreclosure and breach of contract and argued that the Bank lacked standing to foreclose on the property or enforce the original note. Both sides moved for summary judgment, and the trial court denied the competing motions on the basis that the parties failed to satisfy their burdens for summary judgment. In agreement on the facts and the relevant legal issues, the parties filed a joint motion to appeal from interlocutory order under section 51.014(d) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code contending that the “issues raised in [the] dispositive motions involve controlling questions of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and obtaining a ruling on those issues of law from the appeals court will materially advance the outcome of this case.”

In its jurisdictional analysis, however, the court of appeals emphasized the fact that the trial court did not substantively rule on the controlling legal issues presented in the agreed interlocutory appeal. Instead, it submitted the issues to the appellate court for an advisory opinion – contrary to the purpose of section 51.014(d) – and thus the court had no jurisdiction over the appeal under that section.

Bank of New York Mellon v. Guzman, 05-12-00417-CV

In an opinion affirming a breach-of-contract case between two subcontractors, the court of appeals reiterated an important appellate principle: unchallenged findings of fact is binding against the appellant.  In this case, Bulldog Ironworks failed to challenge the trial court’s finding that the prevailing party, Top Flight, was never notified by Bulldog or the general contractor that it needed to complete its portion of the project before Bulldog completed the task with its own employees.  Without such notice, the court of appeals concluded that Bulldog had prevented Top Flight from performing, thereby breaching Bulldog’s own contractual obligations.

Bulldog Ironworks, LLC v. Top Flight Steel, Inc., No. 05-10-01360-CV

The court issued a memorandum opinion clarifying the appellate timetable after the filing of a foreign judgment in a Texas court. Appellee received a judgment in a New York court and filed it in the Texas trial court on September 29, 2011. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on June 20, 2012. The court questioned whether the notice of appeal was untimely. In her jurisdictional brief, appellant argued that the deadlines for post-judgment motions set forth in Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b run from the date the judgment was signed in the New York court, and thus contended that she never had an opportunity to contest the foreign judgment because the deadlines to do so had expired before appellee filed the foreign judgment in the Texas court.

The court held that Rule 329b applies only to Texas judgments. Under Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a)(1), the ninety day deadline for the appellant to filed her notice of appeal ran from the date that the appellee filed the foreign judgment in the Texas court. Thus, she had filed her notice of appeal more than five months past the deadline, and the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Watel v. Dunmann Realty, LLC, No. 05-12-00938-CV

In a memorandum opinion, the court has reaffirmed the venerable rule that an appellant must challenge all grounds asserted in a motion for summary judgment if the trial court has not specified on which grounds the motion was granted.  In this instance, the bank moved for summary judgment, attacking the elements of the plaintiffs’ causes of action and seeking to prove its affirmative defenses.  The plaintiffs disputed the estoppel, ratification, and waiver defenses, but failed to address the separate defense of quasi-estoppel.  On appeal, they likewise failed to challenge the quasi-estoppel defense.  As a result of that failure, the court of appeals automatically sustained the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, without any need to reach the merits of the quasi-estoppel defense.

Walker v. Town North Bank, N.A., No. 05-10-01174-CV

In this memorandum opinion, the court reaffirmed some basic litigation procedures. The plaintiff was fired by his law firm employer and sued alleging 37 separate claims. The trial court granted summary judgment, and Cruz appealed the first time. The court of appeals affirmed on every claim but two and remanded. The trial court severed those claims and Cruz appealed a second time. On appeal, the court first determined that on remand, the trial court only had jurisdiction to consider issues regarding the two claims included in the scope of the remand as stated in the court of appeals’ mandate. Thus, Cruz’s issues related to claims outside the trial court’s jurisdiction were rejected. Because of the court’s limited jurisdiction, issues that Cruz failed to preserve prior to the first appeal were not reopened by the mandate and the trial court did not err by limiting discovery to the remaining matters over which it had jurisdiction. Finally, the trial court did not err by severing Cruz’s remaining claims and requiring him to replead under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 41 and 68.

Cruz v. Schell, Beene & Vaughn, L.L.P., et al., 05-01-00565-CV