In Valk v. Copper Creek Distributors, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Court, citing the rule that a reviewing court must address issues that would require rendition of judgment before turning to issues that would result only in a remand for a new trial.

In this case, the Fifth Court identified an erroneous spoliation instruction and remanded for a new trial without reaching the appellants’ other points on appeal — including legal sufficiency challenges that, if sustained, would have ended the case outright. The supreme court held that this shortcut was reversible errorr, acknowledging a narrow exception permitting remand in the interest of justice — most often when governing law changes during the life of a case — but found that no such circumstances existed here.

The supreme court also held that the Fifth Court’s harmless-error analysis was inadequate because it did not assess “the entire record of the case as a whole.” The court of appeals reasoned that the spoliation instruction may have caused the prevailing party to present less damages evidence than otherwise, but the supreme court noted that  the prevailing party repeatedly told the jury that no other damages evidence was available and had made strategic litigation choices — such as declining to call a retained damages expert — that were unrelated to the instruction. Because a proper harm analysis must weigh factors both supporting and undermining a finding of harm, addressing only one appellate issue in isolation does not provide the  holistic view of the case that a thorough harm analysis demands. No. 24-0516; Apr. 17, 2026

(This is a cross-post from 600Camp.) While the appellant was unsuccessful in Pete v. Equifax, Inc., he seems to have set a record for an imaginative demand: “Appellant David Pete, proceeding pro se, sued Appellees Equifax and JND Legal for $200,000,000,000 under a variety of legal theories. The district court denied Pete’s in forma pauperis motion and ordered Pete to pay the filing fee because he falsely claimed the United States Attorney General owed him more than $100 quintillion.(emphasis added).

In Collingwood USA, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., the Fifth Court affirmed the dismissal of a negligent-supervision claim under Rule 91a, concluding that this cause of action requires physical injury to state a cognizable claim. Because the plaintiff alleged only economic damages arising from a contractual relationship with the employee, the economic loss rule barred recovery.

A concurrence/dissent, frustrated with the developing standards about use of Rule91a, expressed hope that  “the lack of clear guidance regarding the use of rule 91a instead of special exceptions and summary judgment will be addressed by the legislature or the Texas Supreme Court.” No. 05-24-00629-CV, Apr. 10, 2026.

To authorize substituted service under Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(b), the plaintiff must establish a location where the defendant can “probably be found.” Applying that rule in a restricted appeal, Copa Room LLC v. MM Mercer Boardwalk LLC reminds that when a process server’s affidavit describes failed attempts to locate the defendant, that evidence may well show only where the defendant can probably not be found:

Hale’s declaration does not state or suggest any location where the defendant “[could] probably be found.” Instead, his declaration listed four unsuccessful service attempts suggesting that the addresses where service was attempted were not, in fact, places where Hulme could probably be found. Mercer’s unsworn motion states that service was attempted at “four business addresses associated with Defendant Hulme,” citing Hale’s declaration in support. However, even assuming “business addresses associated with” a defendant is equivalent to a place the defendant “can probably be found,” Hale’s declaration does not state that any of the addresses are currently associated with Hulme. Instead, the declaration indicates that each of the locations were vacant or had businesses unassociated with Hulme.

No. 05-24-01428-CV (April 3, 2026) (citations omitted).

The appellants in Pourmohammadagha v. Poury challenged the denial of their motions to dismiss under the TCPA, but had trouble with two principles about the scope of that statute relative to when a lawsuit is filed.

1. Before. “[A] communication made before a lawsuit is filed does not trigger TCPA protection as an exercise of the right to petition through statements made in or pertaining to a judicial proceeding.”
2. After. “A communication made after a lawsuit is filed also does not establish the applicability of the TCPA’s protection unless the movant demonstrates that the legal action is ‘based on or is in response to’ the other party’s exercise of the right to petition.” And in that context, “when the pleadings, evidence, and parties’ arguments are based on a mix of protected and unprotected activity, and they do not distinguish between the two, a defendant-movant’s motion to dismiss under the TCPA should be denied.”

No. 05-25-00143-CV (April 1, 2026).