In re Jackson holds that attorney immunity protects an in-house corporate attorney from a tortious interference claim brought by a terminated CEO. The former CEO had amended his petition to remove references to Jackson as “general counsel” and recast him as a “business advisor,” but the Fifteenth Court found this recharacterization did not defeat the defense: “[N]o matter how Jackson’s conduct is characterized, for immunity purposes the question is whether rendering advice to a client in these circumstances is ‘the kind of conduct‘ attorneys engage in when discharging their professional duties to a client.” (emphasis added).

The Court clarified that the test for attorney immunity does not ask what actual advice an attorney gave (since that is privileged) but instead examines hwether the challenged conduct is “the kind of conduct” that attorneys undertake while discharging professional duties to a client. Here, when a multi-billion-dollar company considers firing a CEO who may raise a $350 million claim, seeking legal advice is expected, and rendering that advice is precisely the kind of conduct corporate attorneys and general counsel perform.

The Court rejected the argument that allegations of Jackson’s involvement in business operations—such as attending strategy meetings and meeting with employees on technology matters—showed his interference was non-legal, noting that none of those activities related to the actual conduct sued upon: advising on the CEO’s termination. The Court further held that an attorney’s self-interest does not cancel the immunity defense so long as that interest coincides with the client’s interests, because the inquiry “focuses on the function and role the lawyer was performing, not the alleged wrongfulness, or even asserted criminality, of the lawyer’s conduct.”

A dissent argued that the live pleadings—which must be taken as true under Rule 91a—portrayed Jacksonas a business advisor pursuing his own self-interest in obtaining the CEO position for himself. The dissent stressed that attorneys often wear many hats in the corporate world and that not every action by someone with a law license qualifies for immunity; rather, the conduct must be particular to “the office, professional training, skill, and authority of an attorney.” No. 15-25-00235-CV, Jul. 14, 2026. (Of general interest, a 2014 Fifth Circuit case addressed similar issues in the context of privilege.)

In Kinder Morgan Treating LP v. North Park Advantage Walden MRU, LLC, the Fifth Court held that the economic loss rule barred a negligent misrepresentation claim arising from erroneous gas-recovery simulations provided during negotiation of an equipment lease. The lessee sought to recover over $5.6 million in reliance damages after a simulation error caused it to dramatically overestimate the profitability of a gas processing plant.

The Court observered that the parties had used their agreements to allocate the very risk at issue: the lessee had tried during negotiations to make the lessor warrant the simulation results, but the lessor refused, and the lessee chose to proceed anyway under contractual language disclaiming any representation or warranty that the equipment would produce the simulated results. Therefore, held the Court, allowing the tort claim would “disrupt the allocation of risk the parties negotiated and agreed upon.”

It also rejected the argument that the lessor breached an “independent, pre-contractual legal duty,” noting that the factual bases for both the contract and the negligent misrepresentation claims were identical and that the lessee was, in essence, seeking to recover in tort what was expressly excluded by the contract’s limitation of liability provision. No. 05-24-01447-CV (Jul. 1, 2026) (applying, inter alia, the Fifth Court’s 2024 opinion in Wal-Mart v. Xerox that provided a through review of the economic-loss rule).

In Dignity Gold, LLC v. Ilmarin Group, LLC, the Fifth Court reversed the trial court’s denial of a special appearance following default judgments against two out-of-state defendants.

The Court explained that Texas courts may exercise specific jurisdiction only over a defendant whose alleged Texas contacts — not simply the presence of its officer during unrelated communications — give rise to the plaintiff’s claims. Even assuming the plaintiffs’ evidence could be considered and that the officer’s in-Texas communications could be attributed to the defendants, the Court further that communications that “routine transaction-related” communications— project benchmarks, document requests, administrative matters — did not supply the required suit-related contacts to support specific jurisdiction. No. 05-25-00134-CV (June 24, 2026).